Jones v. Fed. Express Corp.
| Decision Date | 11 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:18-cv-02526-JPM-cgc |
| Parties | Climmons JONES, Jr., Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee |
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Before the Court is Defendant Federal Express Corporation's ("FedEx") Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on May 21, 2021. (ECF No. 58.) Defendant moves the Court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 for an order granting summary judgment in its favor on the issue of whether FedEx's termination of Plaintiff violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and on the issue of whether punitive damages are available to Plaintiff. (See generally id. ) Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination because the alleged comparators are not similarly situated to Plaintiff. (Id. ) Defendant also argues that, even if Plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, Plaintiff cannot prove that FedEx's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiff's termination was pretextual. (Id. at PageID 218.) Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages because (1) Plaintiff has no evidence that FedEx acted maliciously or with reckless indifference in terminating his employment and (2) FedEx's anti-discrimination policies and Plaintiff's access to and use of internal appeals processes demonstrates FedEx's good-faith efforts to comply with anti-discrimination laws. (ECF No. 58-2 at PageID 241.)
Plaintiff Climmons Jones, Jr. filed a Response on June 17, 2021. (ECF No. 63.) Jones argues that "FedEx terminated Mr. Jones's employment when he allowed a weapon to pass through security while permitting similarly situated white security officers to commit the same or worse infractions with little discipline, if any." (Id. at PageID 515.) FedEx filed its Reply on July 1, 2021, arguing that the alleged comparators are not similarly situated to Jones because, although each employee permitted a weapon into the FedEx hub, only Jones was not watching the security monitor at the time. (ECF No. 72 at PageID 808.)
For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Jones is a 58-year-old African American male who worked as a Security Officer for FedEx from February 2, 1998 through August 16, 2017. (Plaintiff's Statement of Additional Facts ("Plaintiff SOF"), ECF No. 63-1 ¶¶ 1–2.)1 On August 4, 2017, "Jones let a 40-caliber semiautomatic Smith and Wesson handgun, with 12 bullets in the magazine and one bullet in the chamber, through in-bound screening[.]" (Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("Def. SOF"), ECF No. 58-1 ¶ 8.) After the FedEx employee realized he had inadvertently brought a weapon into the FedEx hub, he attempted to leave and the weapon was discovered as it went through the outbound x-ray scanner. (Plaintiff SOF ¶ 6.)
Jones was suspended on the same day, after being shown the video of the incident and completing a report. (Jones Deposition, ECF No. 70-9 at PageID 757–59.) Jones admits that the video "shows him digging into his bag for a phone charger, plugging his phone charger into an outlet, manipulating the chair, going back into his bag for a banana, and eating the banana." (ECF No. 58-2 at PageID 228; see also Jones Deposition, ECF No. 60-10 at PageID 315–16.) Having reviewed the video of the incident, the Court finds that FedEx's description that "the video makes clear that had Jones been looking at the x-ray monitor or had even ‘rewound’ the x-ray images that day he would have observed the weapon" is accurate, although Jones "does not recall seeing an image of a weapon on the x-ray monitors when he watched the video[.]" (ECF No. 58-2 at PageID 228; see also Jones Deposition, ECF No. 60-10 at PageID 318.)
Jones's supervisor at the time of this incident and his termination was Ronald Russell, a white male. (Plaintiff SOF ¶ 4.) Russell reported to Avis Buford-Darling, a black female. (Id. ) Buford-Darling reported to Managing Director Ken Adams, a white male. (Id. ) And Adams reported to Vice President Mark Hogan, a white male. (Id. ) Between August 9 and August 16, 2017, Russell met with Buford-Darling, Adams and Hogan to discuss the appropriate discipline for Jones. (Id. ¶ 16.) On August 16, 2017, Jones was terminated. (Def. SOF ¶ 13.)
After his termination, Jones went through several internal appeals, through both the Guaranteed Fair Treatment Process ("GFTP") and FedEx's internal EEO process. (Id. ¶¶ 14–15.) Jones submitted his Charge of Discrimination to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on April 25, 2018, alleging that his termination was discriminatory. (Id. ¶ 17.)
On August 1, 2018, Jones filed the instant action pro se. (ECF No. 1.) An Amended Complaint was filed on October 16, 2018. (ECF No. 15.) On January 15, 2019, the Court granted FedEx's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. (ECF No. 22; see also ECF No. 17.) Jones appealed the dismissal, and the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the case, holding that Jones timely filed his charge with the EEOC. (ECF Nos. 35 & 36.) The Magistrate Judge granted Jones's Motion to Appoint Counsel on September 14, 2020, and Jones filed a Second Amended Complaint on October 30, 2020. (ECF Nos. 42 & 50.)
FedEx filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment on May 21, 2021. (ECF No. 58.) Jones filed his Response on June 17, 2021. (ECF No. 63.) FedEx filed its Reply on July 1, 2021. (ECF No. 72.)
A party is entitled to summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A fact is ‘material’ for purposes of summary judgment if proof of that fact would establish or refute an essential element of the cause of action or defense." Bruederle v. Louisville Metro Gov't, 687 F.3d 771, 776 (6th Cir. 2012).
"In considering a motion for summary judgment, [the] court construes all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party." Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 614 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ). "The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact." Mosholder v. Barnhardt, 679 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ). "Once the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing a triable issue of material fact." Mosholder, 679 F.3d at 448–49 ; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. "When the non-moving party fails to make a sufficient showing of an essential element of his case on which he bears the burden of proof, the moving parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law and summary judgment is proper." Martinez v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 703 F.3d 911, 914 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Chapman v. UAW Local 1005, 670 F.3d 677, 680 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In order to "show that a fact is, or is not, genuinely disputed," a party must do so by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record," "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute," or showing "that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." L.R. 56.1(b)(3); Bruederle, 687 F.3d at 776 (alterations in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) ); see also Mosholder, 679 F.3d at 448 . "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge[.]" Martinez, 703 F.3d at 914 (alteration in original) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). "The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). "[T]he district court has no ‘duty to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.’ " Pharos Capital Partners, L.P. v. Deloitte & Touche, 535 Fed. Appx. 522, 523 (6th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) ().
The decisive "question is whether ‘the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a [fact finder] or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’ "
Johnson v. Memphis Light Gas & Water Div., 777 F.3d 838, 843 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ). Summary judgment " ‘shall be entered’ against the non-moving party unless affidavits or other evidence ‘set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ " Rachells v. Cingular Wireless Employee Servs., LLC, No. 1:08CV02815, 2012 WL 3648835, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 23, 2012) (quoting Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 884, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990) ). "[A] mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is insufficient to defeat summary judgment; rather, the non-moving party must present evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find in her favor." Tingle v. Arbors at Hilliard, 692 F.3d 523, 529 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ). "[I]n order to withstand a motion for summary judgment,...
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