Jones v. Fla. Parole Com'n
| Decision Date | 14 October 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. SC09-612.,SC09-612. |
| Citation | 48 So.3d 704 |
| Parties | Willie F. JONES, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA PAROLE COMMISSION, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
John R. Hamilton of Foley and Lardner, LLP, Orlando, FL, for Petitioner.
Sarah J. Rumph, General Counsel, and Anthony Andres, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Parole Commission, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent.
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Jones v. Florida Parole Commission, 4 So.3d 91 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). The district court certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the decisions of the First and Second District Courts of Appeal in Martin v. Florida Parole Commission, 951 So.2d 84 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007), and Carpenter v. Florida Parole Commission, 958 So.2d 564 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
In March 1968, Willie F. Jones (Jones) was sentenced to prison for a term of 99 years. After Jones had served over 14 years in prison, the Parole Commission entered an order releasing him on parole in May 1982. On April 21, 1990, Jones was arrested in Broward County, Florida on charges of possession of cocaine and prowling but Jones was never convicted of either offense. On April 30, 1990, the State filed a formal "No Information" with regard to those charges. Even though the State had previously filed a formal "No Information," on August 1, 1990, the Parole Commission revoked Jones's parole for violation of a condition of his release. The Parole Commission determined that Jones violated the terms and conditions of his parole, specifically stating that Jones:
Violated Condition 8 by failing to live and remain at liberty without violating the law in that on or about April 21, 1990, in Broward County, Florida he did unlawfully possess a controlled substance, to-wit: cocaine.
The report also indicated that Jones denied the allegations against him, but that the commission relied on the testimony of an officer who observed Jones sitting directly next to a bag of drugs. Jones wassubsequently returned to prison to serve out the remainder of his sentence and remains there today.
On November 20, 2008, Jones filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit alleging factual innocence. On December 5, 2008, the Nineteenth Circuit sua sponte rendered a final order dismissing Jones' petition, finding that the petition "is wholly without merit, and ... untimely," citing section 95.11(5)(f), Florida Statutes (2008), as the basis for declaring the petition untimely. On December 31, 2008, Jones filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Fourth District. The Fourth District redesignated the petition as an appeal and without briefing or argument summarily affirmed the order of dismissal. See Jones v. Florida Parole Comm'n, 4 So.3d 91 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).
This case arises from a certified conflict between the Fourth District, on one hand, and the First and Second Districts on the other. Specifically, the district courts disagree with regard to the applicability of section 95.11(5)(f) to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by an inmate seeking release from unlawful detention by the State. That statute of limitation provides, in pertinent part:
Judicial history with regard to the application of this statute has been checkered. Previously, in Cooper v. Florida Parole Commission, 924 So.2d 966, 967 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), the Fourth District held that the trial court properly denied a petition for habeas corpus as untimely, relying upon section 95.11(5)(f). However, one year later in Martin v. Florida Parole Commission, 951 So.2d 84 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007), the First District rejected the argument advanced and accepted by the Fourth District in Cooper:
We find this reasoning to be flawed for two reasons. First, the legitimacy of applying section 95.11(5)(f) in this situation is questionable in light of Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So.2d 52 (Fla.2000), in which the court held that the legislature was without authority to establish deadlines for asserting claims traditionally remediable through habeas corpus. More to the point, the fundamental characteristic of a habeas claim is an assertion of continued unlawful detention, and the "purpose of a habeas corpus proceeding is to inquire into the legality of the petitioner's present detention." See Sneed v. Mayo, 69 So.2d 653 (Fla.1954). Inasmuch as Martin alleged that he continued to be unlawfully detained, his claim was necessarily filed within the one-year time limitation established by the statute.
Id. at 85-86 (footnote omitted). The First District then certified that its decision was in conflict with Cooper. See id. at 86. A few months later, in Carpenter v. Florida Parole Commission, 958 So.2d 564, 565 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), the Second District explicitly adopted the reasoning of the First District in Martin and also certified that its decision was in conflict with Cooper. In Smith v. Florida Parole Commission, 987 So.2d 229, 229-30 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), the Fourth District affirmed its earlierdecision in Cooper and also certified that its decision was in conflict with Martin and Carpenter.
The opinion in the case before this Court today in its entirety provides:
Jones asserts that the application of section 95.11(5)(f) to habeas petitions violates the doctrine of separation of powers and is expressly contrary to Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So.2d 52 (Fla.2000). We agree.
"It may be said as a general rule that whatever power is conferred upon the courts by the Constitution cannot be enlarged or abridged by the Legislature." State ex rel. Buckwalter v. City of Lakeland, 112 Fla. 200, 150 So. 508, 512 (1933) (citing State ex. rel. Robinson v. Durand, 36 Utah 93, 104 P. 760 (1908)). In Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So.2d 52 (Fla.2000), this Court held:
[T]he writ of habeas corpus and other postconviction remedies are not the type of "original civil action" described in Williams [ v. Law, 368 So.2d 1285 (Fla.1979) ], for which the Legislature can establish deadlines pursuant to a statute of limitations. Due to the constitutional and quasi-criminal nature of habeas proceedings and the fact that such proceedings are the primary avenue through which convicted defendants are able to challenge the validity of a conviction and sentence, we hold that article V, section 2(a) of the Florida Constitution grants this Court the exclusive authority to set deadlines for postconviction motions.
Id. at 62 (emphasis supplied).
The clear rule established by Allen is that the Legislature cannot impose procedural limitations on habeas petitions. Section 95.11(5)(f) provides that "a petition for extraordinary writ, other than a petition challenging a criminal conviction," must commence within one year. Accordingly, based on this Court's decision in Allen, any application of section 95.11(5)(f) to a habeas petition violates the doctrine of separation of powers.
The dissent attempts to circumvent this clear rule articulated in Allen by relying on Williams v. Law, 368 So.2d 1285 (Fla.1979), a case that involved a challenge to an administrative decision of a countyboard of tax adjustment. In Allen, however, we explicitly refused to extend the rule articulated in Williams to the fervently guarded right to petition for habeas corpus. See Allen, 756 So.2d at 60. We made absolutely clear that "[a]lthough habeas corpus petitions are technically civil actions, they are unlike other traditional civil actions." Id. (emphasis supplied). The dissent is merely endeavoring to revisit an argument that this Court unequivocally rejected in Allen.
The Parole Commission asserts that the application of section 95.11(5)(f) to a petition for habeas corpus does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers because the Parole Commission's actions with regard to the revocation of parole or conditional release are essentially administrative in nature. Specifically, the Parole Commission asserts that this Court's holding in Allen is limited to habeas petitions that "challenge the validity of a conviction and sentence," and the habeas petition filed by Jones does not. The only authority upon which the Parole Commission relies to support this contention is this Court's decision in Kalway v. Singletary, 708 So.2d 267...
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