Jones v. General Motors Corp.
Decision Date | 14 May 1941 |
Docket Number | 15261. |
Parties | JONES v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION. |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Haynsworth & Haynsworth, of Greenville, for appellant.
W E. Bowen, of Greenville, for respondent.
This appeal presents two questions for determination: (a) Was the defendant, General Motors Corporation, a foreign corporation, "doing business" within the state in the sense required to subject it, absent consent, to the jurisdiction of our courts? (b) Was service of process made on its agent so as to support a personal judgment against it? The lower court answered in the affirmative, and we are asked to review the judgment.
The plaintiff alleged that he purchased a Buick automobile manufactured by the defendant from a dealer at Easley, South Carolina, under a warranty that the automobile was of good workmanship, in sound condition, and that the defendant within a period of ninety days, and before said car had been driven 4,000 miles, would repair any defects which might appear or develop therein. It is further alleged that within said period and after the car had been driven about 1,750 miles, the motor proved to be seriously defective in various particulars, and that although plaintiff promptly notified the defendant thereof, it failed to make proper repairs, and thereby breached its warranty, to plaintiff's damage.
The summons, without complaint attached, was served on one R. B Deal on August 31, 1939, while he was temporarily in the state, and the complaint was filed in the office of the Clerk of Court on September 7, 1939. The defendant did not appear, answer or demur, and a judgment was rendered against it in accordance with law at the following (November) term of the court, in the sum of $500. Thereafter, the defendant having been notified of the judgment, specially appeared, after notice, before the Circuit Court for the sole purpose of making a motion to set aside and vacate the default judgment. At the hearing below each side submitted affidavits.
Letters under date August 4, 1939, and August 7, 1939, respectively, written by the General Motors Sales Corporation, Buick Motor Division of Atlanta, Georgia, both addressed to the plaintiff, show that he had complained to that corporation relative to the defects in his car. The automobile not having been repaired, or not having been repaired satisfactorily to the plaintiff, he addressed a letter on August 20, 1939, to Mr. Alfred P. Sloan, president of the defendant, General Motors Corporation, in New York, seeking to have the condition remedied. To this letter he received the following reply from the defendant, bearing date August 25, 1939:
Within five days thereafter, on August 30th, the plaintiff received from Mr. McIndoo, Buick zone manager at Atlanta, a telegram informing him: "Our representative will telephone you late today or early tomorrow morning and make definite appointment with you to meet him in Easley."
Pursuant to the telegram the plaintiff met at Easley, Mr. R. B. Deal, the representative referred to in the telegram, who, according to the plaintiff, told him that he had come at the instance of the defendant corporation to attempt if possible to adjust his grievances with reference to the defective motor about which the plaintiff had written the defendant. It appears that after a lengthy discussion, and after the car had been tested, the summons in this action was served upon Mr. Deal, as agent of the General Motors Corporation. Thereafter, the plaintiff, Mr. Deal, and plaintiff's attorney, Mr. Bowen, in the latter's office, further discussed the matter. Upon being introduced to plaintiff's attorney, Deal presented him with a card bearing the following notation beneath the name of R. B. Deal: "Adjuster, General Motors Corporation." At this time, according to plaintiff's affidavit, which is supported by that of his attorney, Mr. Bowen, Deal explained that it was his duty to travel several states in the interest of the defendant, adjusting or attempting to adjust just such matters as had brought him to Easley in connection with plaintiff's car, and he expressed the belief that if given a few days he could satisfy the plaintiff. Mr. Deal exhibited a catalogue or booklet containing the warranty clause of the defendant, and attempted to point out what the defendant was required to do, and what it was not required to do under said warranty. Upon leaving the attorney's office, Mr. Deal is quoted as saying that he was confident that the matter would be adjusted by the defendant.
Counter affidavits submitted by the defendant denied that Deal was its agent or employee; denied generally that Mr. McIndoo (of General Motors Sales Corporation) was its agent; and further denied that it had been at any time "doing business" in South Carolina.
The affidavit of Mr. McIndoo tends to show that Deal was an employee of General Motors Sales Corporation, and under instructions was sent to Easley to inspect plaintiff's car and recommend necessary repairs, but that Deal was not the defendant's agent and had no power or authority to contract on behalf of the defendant.
The defendant contends that Deal was not an agent upon whom process might be served, and that at the time of the attempted service upon him it was not doing business in South Carolina.
There is no one invariable or universal test by which it may be determined whether the person served in an action against a foreign corporation was a proper or competent person for that purpose. The term "any agent," as used in our statute (Section 434, 1932, Code), providing for service on foreign corporations, does not require that the agency be general, but the statute is complied with by service upon an agent having limited authority to represent the corporation. The words "any agent," as used in the statute, were intended to have a broad meaning, and must be liberally construed to effectuate the legislative intent. Forbes v. Kingan & Co., 174 S.C. 24, 176 S.E. 880. Generally, the person served must have some measure of control over the business intrusted to him, or of some feature thereof, and not a mere subordinate employee, without discretion. He must have representative capacity and derivative authority.
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