Jones v. Grand Ledge Public Schools, 430

• Decision Date: 18 July 1957
• Docket Number: No. 430,430
• Citation: 84 N.W.2d 327,349 Mich. 1
• Parties: Robert W. JONES, Ernest Shaw, Ethel Bailey, Dorothy Hultberg, Ethelyn Putney, Evelyn M. Matthews, Forrest C. Hiesrodt, Lila D. Hiesrodt, Homer Hiesrodt, Cora Hiesrodt, Malcalm Twitchell, Marguerite Huhn, Bertha M. Lumbert, Leon Huhn, Gayla Fisher, Marian Kelly, Irene Koepele, Vera O'Connor, Mary Waldrop, Bessie Segerlind, Doris Hewson, Cora Kenyon, Marion Trombley, T. J. Segerlind, Josephine Berner, Herbert Berner, Otto Deer, Vivian Drumheller, Emerson Drumheller, Forrest Winters, Lucille Winters, Julia Shaw, Mattie Haddix, Anna Mae Jones, June McAllister, and Katherine M. Jones, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. GRAND LEDGE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 327

84 N.W.2d 327

349 Mich. 1

Robert W. JONES, Ernest Shaw, Ethel Bailey, Dorothy

Hultberg, Ethelyn Putney, Evelyn M. Matthews, Forrest C.

Hiesrodt, Lila D. Hiesrodt, Homer Hiesrodt, Cora Hiesrodt,

Malcalm Twitchell, Marguerite Huhn, Bertha M. Lumbert, Leon

Huhn, Gayla Fisher, Marian Kelly, Irene Koepele, Vera

O'Connor, Mary Waldrop, Bessie Segerlind, Doris Hewson, Cora

Kenyon, Marion Trombley, T. J. Segerlind, Josephine Berner,

Herbert Berner, Otto Deer, Vivian Drumheller, Emerson

Drumheller, Forrest Winters, Lucille Winters, Julia Shaw, Mattie Haddix, Anna Mae Jones, June McAllister, and Katherine M. Jones, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. GRAND LEDGE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 430.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

July 18, 1957.

Monaghan & Monaghan & Crawmer, Detroit, Parks, Church & Wyble, Lansing, for appellants.

Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, Lansing, Snyder & Loomis, Lansing, of counsel, for appellee.

Before the Entire Bench.

CARR, Justice.

The question at issue in this case is whether the board of education of the Grand Ledge school district may refuse to accept for admission to its high school nonresident students who have completed the first 8 grades and are desirous of high school instruction. Some of the plaintiffs who have joined in the suit are officers of school districts that have heretofore been sending students to defendant's schools and have been paying tuition and transportation costs therefor. Other plaintiffs are parents of minor children who are residents of districts not maintaining high schools and who are desirous of continuing their studies beyond the 8th grade. Residents of school districts which have heretofore sent students to the Grand Ledge public schools have also joined in the suit on the ground that they will be affected in the future by the result.

The bill of complaint avers that defendant maintains an accredited high school at the city of Grand Ledge, and that nonresident students have been denied enrollment in the 9th grade of said high school. It is the position of the plaintiffs, as set forth in their pleading, that the board of education of defendant is without authority to refuse admission to the schools under its jurisdiction of duty qualified nonresident pupils making application for enrollment.

Plaintiffs asked in their bill of complaint that an order issue requiring defendant to show cause why it should not be enjoined from denying admission to its schools of the pupils in question, and also for a temporary restraining order preventing defendant from refusing to accept said pupils. In accordance with the prayer of the bill an order was issued by a circuit court commissioner of the county containing the restraining provision requested. At the time the circuit judge was absent from the county. The matter was heard by the judge on September 17, 1956, and the temporary injunction sought was denied, the court being of the opinion that as a legal proposition the board of education of the defendant school district had the right to say whether or not nonresident students should be admitted to the schools under its supervision.

Under date of September 26, 1956, defendant filed its motion to dismiss the bill of complaint, alleging therein that the pleading did not state a cause of action for equitable relief and that plaintiffs were not entitled under the law to compel admission of the pupils in question to the high school of the defendant. Following a hearing on the motion the court, under date of November 7, 1956, entered an order dismissing the cause. Plaintiffs have appealed, claiming in substance that under pertinent provisions of the State Constitution and of the school code of 1955 ¹ the court was in error in denying the relief sought. It is the position of appellee that under the present code providing for the regulation of matters pertaining to education and the maintenance of schools plaintiffs are not entitled to the equitable remedy sought by them.

Article XI, § 1, of the Michigan Constitution declares that:

'Religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.'

Section 9 of the same Article directs the legislature to 'continue a system of primary schools, whereby every school district in the state shall provide for the education of its pupils without charge for tuition.' It has been repeatedly recognized by this Court that the legislature is vested with complete authority to determine the manner in which the directives of the Constitution shall be carried out, the creation and operation of a system of public schools, the creating of school districts, and the powers and duties of school officials chosen in accordance with the law.

In MacQueen v. Port Huron City Commission, 194 Mich. 328, 160 N.W. 627, 629, it was said:

'Fundamentally, provision for and control of our public school system is a state matter, delegated to and lodged in the state Legislature by the Constitution in a separate article entirely distinct from that relating to local government. The general policy of the state has been to retain control of its school system, to be administered throughout the state under state laws by local state agencies organized with plenary powers independent of the local government with which, by location and geographical boundaries, they are necessarily closely associated and to a greater or less extent authorized to cooperate. 'Education belongs to the state. It is no part of the local self-government inherent in the township or municipality except so far as the Legislature may choose to make it such.' [Belles v. Burr, 76 Mich. 1, 43 N.W. 24]; Attorney General [ex rel. Zacharias] v. Board of Education, 154 Mich. 584, 118 N.W. 606. The general school laws were carefully planned and enacted to guard that distinction; provision was made for organization of the common school districts, with officers elected at school meetings by electors with defined qualifications, and who as a school board were given large plenary powers and control of school matters, practically independent from the local government of municipalities in which the schools were situated.'

Of like import is Child Welfare Society of Flint v. Kennedy School District 220 Mich. 290, 189 N.W. 1002, 1004, where the Court, after referring to certain provisions of the State Constitution, said:

'The Legislature has entire control over the schools of the state, subject only to the provisions above referred to. The division of the territory of the state into districts, the conduct of the school, the qualifications of teachers, the subjects to be taught therein, are all within its control. In Attorney General [ex rel. Kies] v. Lowrey, 131 Mich. 639, 644, 92 N.W. 289, 296, it was said:

"The school district is a state agency. Moreover, it is of legislative creation. It is true that it was provided for in obedience to a constitutional requirement; and, whatever we may think of the right of the district to administer in a local way the affairs of the district under the Constitution, we cannot doubt that such management must be in conformity to the provisions of such laws of a general character as may from time to time be passed, and that the property of the district is in no sense private property, but is public property, devoted to the purposes of the state, for the general good, just as almshouses and courthouses are, although confided to local management, and applied to uses which are in a sense local, though in another sense general."

The authority of the legislature with reference to matters pertaining to education has been recognized in other decisions, including Detroit Board of Education v. Superintendent of Public Instruction, 319 Mich. 436, 448, 29 N.W.2d 902, 908, where it was said:

'* * * the power of the legislature with reference to school districts in general has been uniformly regarded as embracing the power to create and alter them, regulate the powers and duties of boards of education, provide for the management of the affairs of such districts, direct and control the system of education of the State, and, in general, exercise with reference thereto the authority of a sovereign State over its governmental agencies.'

See, also, Ira School District No. 1 Fractional v. Chesterfield School District, 340 Mich. 678, 66 N.W.2d 72; Sturgis v. County of Allegan, 343 Mich. 209, 72 N.W.2d 56.

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