Jones v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 08 February 1882
• Citation: 74 Me. 356
• Parties: HENRY A. JONES and another, v. GRAND TRUNK RAILWAY COMPANY.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

74 Me. 356

HENRY A. JONES and another, v. GRAND TRUNK RAILWAY COMPANY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

February 8, 1882

ON EXCEPTIONS.

An action of the case brought by the surviving partners of the firm of Blake, Jones and Company, to recover damages for unreasonable delay in the transportation of several lots of flour, amounting in all to four thousand two hundred and twelve barrels, shipped over the defendants' road in the fall of 1866. Of this quantity twelve hundred barrels arrived at destination subsequent to December 24, 1866.

The writ was dated December 24, 1872. The plea was general issue and statute of limitations. The verdict was for two thousand and forty-seven dollars, and defendants alleged exceptions.

The opinion states the material facts.

Charles F. Libbey, for the plaintiffs, cited, upon the question considered in the opinion: Betts v Norris, 21 Me. 324; Bank of Hartford County v Waterman, 26 Conn. 324; Hardy v. Ryle, 9 B. and C. 608; Brotherton v. Wood, 3 Brod. and Bing. 4 (54 E. C. L.); Angell, Lim. (6th ed.) 320, 321; 2 Redf. Railways (4th ed.) 14.

J and E. M. Rand, for the defendants.

It appears that all the flour was (fro some cause which defendants are now unable to explain) a long time in transit. It should have arrived and been delivered to plaintiffs in the month of October, 1866, except two lots due November 9 and 17. We submit that the plaintiffs' several causes of action accrued at the expiration of the time when the several lots of flour ought to have arrived; that all accrued prior to November 20, 1866. Yet plaintiffs did not commence their action until December 24, 1872, more than six years after their several causes of action accrued. And that their entire claim is barred by the statute of limitations.

We think it quite clear that plaintiffs' causes of action accrued at the expiration of a reasonable time for the transportation and delivery of the flour; that they could then have commenced their action; and that the failure to commence an action within six years of such expiration bars all claim. That such is the well-settled law. The elementary works all lay it down as a settled principle that the cause of action arises immediately on the happening of the default, and is not postponed to the damage thereby occasioned; that the statute begins to run from the breach of duty, and not from the damage thereby occasioned.

If one is guilty of negligence whereby injury occurs, six years from time of neglect will bar the action, although the injury has occurred within the six years. 3 Parsons, Contracts, part 2, sect. 6.

In Wilcox v. Plummer, 4 Peters 172, the court say, the question is whether the statute runs from the time the action accrued, or from the time that the damage is developed or becomes definite. And court say, it is well settled that it runs from time action accrued. See also, Angell on Limit. sects. 42, 136, 137, 141, and cases there cited; Battley v. Faulkner, 3, B. and A. 288.

Plaintiffs were not obliged to receive the flour after the expiration of a reasonable time for its transportation and delivery; --could immediately have sued for its value,--and its receipt afterward would have affected amount of damage. Suppose flour never had arrived and never been delivered; when would plaintiffs have had a right of action? We apprehend, at the expiration of a reasonable time for its transportation and delivery.

WALTON J.

The only question is whether the plaintiffs' claim is barred by the statute...