Jones v. Greeley

• Decision Date: 15 July 1889
• Citation: 6 So. 448,25 Fla. 629
• Parties: JONES et al. v. GREELEY.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

6 So. 448

25 Fla. 629

JONES et al. v. GREELEY.

Florida Supreme Court

July 15, 1889

Error to circuit court, Duval county; JAMES M. BAKER, Judge.

Action of libel by Jonathan C. Greeley against Charles H. Jones and George W. Jones, partners as Chas. H. Jones & Bro. From an order sustaining demurrer to a plea of justification and judgment for plaintiff, defendants bring error.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

1. The law in libel, as held by this court, being that to publish of and concerning a person any language which tends to bring him into ill repute, or to destroy the confidence of his neighbors in his integrity, is libelous, and actionable per se, printed and published words which clearly imply that a person is a hypocrite, and under the cloak of hypocrisy oppresses widows and orphans, is so actionable. ^[1]

2. A plea in libel, justifying one of several charges, is good as going to mitigation of damages; but the part justified must be distinct and severable from the rest, and must be the precise charge, and the whole of the precise charge.

3. A charge which authorizes the jury to determine whether the language set forth in the declaration has a defamatory meaning, is not erroneous as confining them to that language when they are told that their determination must be founded on their belief from the evidence, there being other evidence than the language of the declaration.

4. It was not error to charge the jury that they might take into consideration the financial ability of the defendants, and that, if they believed 'the defendants actually intended to injure the plaintiff by the publication, they must award heavier damages than if no actual intention existed,'--such intention going to make aggravated damages, and to be distinguished from the intention which the law holds to be admitted by the plea of not guilty.

5. The jury being left, on instructions at the request of defendants, to determine on the evidence whether the meaning of the language used, as assigned by the declaration, was the correct meaning, this court sees no sufficient reason to disturb their finding.

6. This court will not set aside the verdict of $3,000 as excessive considering the evidence as to the character, standing, and business of the plaintiff, in connection with the injurious tendency of the libel, and the wide circulation of the paper of defendants in which the publication was made, there being nothing to indicate that the jury was controlled in the amount of its verdict by any improper influences or prejudices, and the amount not appearing to be grossly excessive.

7. If the judge fails to sign and seal his ruling on charges asked by counsel, as required by statute, but no exception was taken on that account below, the objection is not available here.

COUNSEL Hartridge & Young and Randall, Walkers & Foster for appellants.

H. Bisbee and R. B. Archibald, for appellee.

OPINION

MAXWELL, J.

In the argument of counsel for appellants some of the questions discussed are treated as if the case made by the first and second counts of the declaration was not a case of libel actionable per se. We think otherwise. The charge in both counts is that appellants published of appellee that 'if he (meaning the plaintiff) is posing as a good man, when as a matter of fact his conduct has been and is the reverse of what is supposed to befit the character of a good man, it is not only legitimate and proper, but it is a duty which a journalist owes to the people, to strip off the disguise, and expose the sham. If he (meaning the plaintiff) is pretending to be a philanthropist and a benefactor of the poor, when in fact he has been a grasping and penurious Gradgrind, whose greed has inflicted untold sorrow upon the widow and the orphan, it is proper and right that that likewise should be exposed. If he (meaning the plaintiff) is appearing before the public with the pretense of being one kind of a man, it is legitimate to strip off his mask, and show the real countenance behind it. It is perfectly understood that when a man becomes a candidate he challenges precisely this kind of scrutiny, and renders himself liable to exactly this sort of exposure, and it is precisely this that has happened to Mr. Greeley,'--meaning, as the declaration says, that 'plaintiff is posing as a good man, when as a matter of fact his conduct has been and is the reverse of what is supposed to befit the character of a good man; and that he is pretending to be a philanthropist and benefactor of the poor, when in fact he has been a grasping and penurious Gradgrind, whose greed has inflicted untold sorrow upon the widow and orphan,' etc. This court has held that to publish of and concerning any person any language which tends to bring him into ill repute, or to destroy the confidence of his neighbors in his integrity, is actionable per se. Montgomery v. Knox, 23 Fla. 595 3 South. Rep. 211. It is too apparent to require comment that the language complained of was calculated to produce just such injury to appellee. It in effect brands him as a hyupocrite, and as one who, under the cloak of hypocrisy oppresses the widow and orphan. What worse could be said of him, short of imputing high crime? To be published as a hypocrite the authorities hold is actionable, (Townsh. Sland. & Lib. § 177; Thorley v. Kerry, 4 Taunt. 355; Maloney v. Bartley, 3 Camp 213;) and when to that is added the stigma of such greed as impels him to inflict untold sorrow upon the most helpless members of the community, the case becomes one of much stronger actionable character. And even if there were any doubt in regard to the actionable character of the publication, considering only its probable injury to him as an individual,--which is the complaint of the first count, [6 So. 449] --there can be none when the language is applied to him in his business character of banker and money-lender, as is alleged in the colloquium of the second count. So applied, it is actionableper se, in slander as well as libel, though without such application it would not be actionable in slander, in the absence of special damage, while in libel it would be. Townsh. Sland. & Lib. §§ 179, 180; Sanderson v. Caldwell, 45 N.Y. 398; and, as pertinent to this case, the language of one member of the court in Stone v. Cooper, 2 Denio, 300, where, though it was held that to publish of a person that he used money for shaving purposes was not necessarily actionable, because that might be done in a legitimate and innocent way, he said he would not hesitate to pronounce the publication libelous 'if there was anything in [it] from which it could be fairly inferred that the defendant meant to charge, or to induce the public to believe, that the plaintiff had been guilty of extortion and oppression.' Such inference is one that cannot be avoided in the present case; and, holding the publication to be libelous and actionable per se, we proceed to consider other questions as they are presented by the assignment of errors.

The defendants filed a plea of justification, that it is true the plaintiff 'was engaged in the business of loaning money in Jacksonville * * * from time to time, and was in the habit of loaning money to widows and orphaps and other poor people at large and exorbitant rates of interest, to the great damage and impoverishment of the persons aforesaid who borrowed money from him, which are the same facts charged and intended to be charged in the alleged libelous article.' To this the plaintiff demurred on the ground that the 'justification is not as broad as the charge and is entirely different from the charge.' The demurrer was sustained, and this is assigned for error. The defendants contend that the plea is good as justifying one of the several charges, which, if proven, would go in mitigation of damages in case the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict on the charges not justified; citing Odger, Sland. & Lib. 486. See, also, Stacy v. Publishing Co., 68 Me. 279. This is the rule, but with the qualification that the part justified 'is distinct and severable from the rest;' and it is also necessary that the 'precise charge must be justified, and the whole of the precise charge.' Odger, Sland. & Lib. supra. There are three severable charges in the publication before us, and the one sought to be justified relates to hard dealings with widows and orphans. If the plea covers the whole of that charge, or meets it precisely as made, it is a good plea, without any justification of the other charges. It will be seen, however, that this is not done. The charge was not simply that the plaintiff inflicted untold sorrow upon widows and orphans, or in the language of the plea, loaned them money 'at large and exorbitant rates of interest to [their] great damage and impoverishment;' but that he did this under pretense of being 'a philanthropist and benefactor of the poor.' This latter was a substantive portion of the charge, and the plea is bad in not...