Jones v. Hogan

• Decision Date: 13 March 2018
• Docket Number: No. 3:15CV8-MPM-JMV,3:15CV8-MPM-JMV
• Parties: LA TIDTUS JONES PETITIONER v. NORRIS HOGAN, ET AL. RESPONDENTS
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi

LA TIDTUS JONES PETITIONER v. NORRIS HOGAN, ET AL. RESPONDENTS

No. 3:15CV8-MPM-JMV

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI OXFORD DIVISION

March 13, 2018

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter comes before the court on the pro se petition of La Tidtus¹ Jones for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The State has responded to the petition, and Mr. Jones has replied, and the matter is ripe for resolution. For the reasons set forth below, the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be denied.

Habeas Corpus Relief Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

The writ of habeas corpus, a challenge to the legal authority under which a person may be detained, is ancient. Duker, The English Origins of the Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Peculiar Path to Fame, 53 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 983 (1978); Glass, Historical Aspects of Habeas Corpus, 9 St. John's L.Rev. 55 (1934). It is "perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law of England," Secretary of State for Home Affairs v. O'Brien, A.C. 603, 609 (1923), and it is equally significant in the United States. Article I, § 9, of the Constitution ensures that the right of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, except when, in the case of rebellion or invasion, public safety may require it. Habeas Corpus, 20 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Deskbook § 56. Its use by the federal courts was authorized in Section14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Habeascorpus principles developed over time in both English and American common law have since been codified:

The statutory provisions on habeas corpus appear as sections 2241 to 2255 of the 1948 Judicial Code. The recodification of that year set out important procedural limitations and additional procedural changes were added in 1966. The scope of the writ, insofar as the statutory language is concerned, remained essentially the same, however, until 1996, when Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, placing severe restrictions on the issuance of the writ for state prisoners and setting out special, new habeas corpus procedures for capital cases. The changes made by the 1996 legislation are the end product of decades of debate about habeas corpus.

Id. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a federal court may issue the writ when a person is held in violation of the federal Constitution or laws, permitting a federal court to order the discharge of any person held by a state in violation of the supreme law of the land. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 311, 35 S. Ct. 582, 588, 59 L. Ed. 969 (1915).

Procedural Posture

La Tidtus Jones is in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections and is currently housed at the East Mississippi Correctional Institution in Meridian, Mississippi. On July 19, 2011, Jones was convicted in the Circuit Court of Tunica County, Mississippi, of one count of uttering a forgery. See State Court Record (hereinafter "SCR" for Case No. 2011-KA-01468-COA), Vol. 1, p. 122. On August 23, 2011, he was sentenced as a habitual offender under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-81 to serve ten years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. SCR, Vol. 1, p. 141-143.²

Jones filed an appeal of his conviction and sentence with the Mississippi Supreme Court. On appeal, he raised the following ground for relief, through counsel:

Issue 1. Whether the indictment handed down was fatally defective where it charged the appellant with uttering a forgery, and the check described in the indictment was a different check altogether than that which was attached, requiring different elements of proof.

Issue 2. Whether, after a pretrial hearing on the matter, the trial court committed plain error by forcing the appellant to be shackled when the prospective jurors entered the courtroom, during voir dire, and throughout the entire jury selection process.

Issue 3. Whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress audio recording evidence of an interrogation over the objections of the defense that the appellant's Miranda rights had been violated.

Issue 4. Whether the trial court erred when it failed to sustain the appellants motion to set aside the jury's verdict (JNOV) as legally insufficient, or, in the alternative, for failing to grant the motion for a new trial as the jury's verdict was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

On April 23, 2013, the Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. Jones v. State, 130 So.3d 519 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013), reh'g denied, Sept. 17, 2013, cert. denied, Jan. 23, 2014 (No. 2011-KA-01468-COA).

Jones filed an Application to Proceed in the Trial Court with a Motion for Post-Conviction Relief in the Mississippi Supreme Court on June 27, 2014. In the application he raised the following issues pro se:

Issue 1. Whether Jones has been subjected to a violation of due process of law and the equal protection clause in violation of the 5^th and 14^th amendments to the United States Constitution and whether there was prosecutorial misconduct at Jones trial denying Jones a fair trial under the equal protection clause of the United States and the state of Mississippi laws?

Issue 2. Whether the trial court committed "plain error" when it passed sentence upon applicant Jones without having subject matter jurisdiction over Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-81 and whether jeopardy attached?

Issue 3. Whether the trial court committed "plain error" in ruling admissible for trial Jones's alleged confession of December 4^th, 2009, since applicant testified at thesuppression hearing that the investigating officer "Michael Nichols" had made "promises and threats" and that the state never put on any officers to rebut Jones's allegations?

Issue 4. Whether the trial court erred by failing to review and listing to the entire taped interrogation and by failing to suppress the statement there from?

Issue 5. Whether Petitioner Jones is entitled to a new trial where a "juror" failed or refused to disclose that "he" was "acquaint" with state's key witnesses the alleged victim "Linda Tutor" of Money Tree Inc.

Issue 6. Whether Jones United States Constitutional 6^th Amendment right to be confronted with the witnesses against him from the "First Security Bank" of Batesville, Mississippi?

Issue 7. Whether the trial court committed "plain error" in allowing into evidence at trial of another separate alleged offense by Jones and if so whether such other (check) evidence was of another separate offence denying Jones due process to a fair trial?

Issue 8. Whether the Petitioner Jones been denied effective assistance of attorney of trial and on appeal as the law afford him under the 6^th Amendment of the United States Constitution and the State of Mississippi Constitution (1890)?

On October 2, 2014, the Mississippi Supreme Court denied the motion. The court found that the claims of prosecutorial misconduct and plain error in sentencing were without merit. The court also found that Jones' claim of error in the admission of his police statement was barred by res judicata. As to Jones' claims of juror misconduct, confrontation clause violation, and plain error in admission of evidence, the court held that Jones was capable of raising these issues at trial or on direct appeal, and they were barred because he failed to do so. Miss Code Ann. § 99-39-21(1). The court also held that Jones' claims of ineffective assistance of counsel did not meet the requirements of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

Mr. Jones' grounds for relief can be found in the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus, memorandum, and amendments, which the court has taken verbatim from ECF Docs. 1, 3, 13, 14, 15). Mr. Jones raises the following grounds for relief, pro se, in ECF Doc. 1:

Ground One. Whether the indictment handed down was fatally defective where it charged Jones with uttering a forgery.

Ground Two. Whether, after a pretrial hearing on the matter, the trial court committed plain error by forcing Jones to be shackled in front of jury.

Ground Three. Whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress audio recording evidence on an interrogation over objection.

Ground Four. Whether the trial court erred when it failed to sustain Jones motion to set aside the jury's verdict (JNOV).

Jones raises the following grounds for relief, pro se, in ECF Doc. 3:

Ground Five. Whether Petitioner Latitus Jones denied effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal?

Ground Six. Whether the trial court committed plain error in allowing the state in trial to introduce evidence of another separate offense by the Appellant Jones and whether such evidence were of another separate offense?

Ground Seven. Whether the State's prosector withheld solemn declaration or affirmations made for the purpose of establishing or proving some facts "real's trucking inc. check was return for not able to locate account" denying petitioner the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him?

Ground Eight. Whether there was prosecutorial misconduct committed at trial, and whether such prosecutorial misconducts denied petitioner Latitus Jones due process / a fair trial.

Ground Nine. Whether the court erred in ruling admissible for trial the petitioner's alleged confession of 12-04-10, since the petitioner testified at the hearing that the investigating office "Michael Nichols" had made threats and promises and the states prosecutor never put the officer on to rebut the allegations?

Ground Ten. Whether the trial court committed plain error when it passed sentence on petitioner Latitus Jones without having subject matter jurisdiction over M.C.A. § 99-19-81 and whether jeopardy had attached?

Ground Eleven. That this court is required pursuant to Haines v. Kerner, 404 US 519 (1972) to liberally construe petitioner's herein asserted grounds for relief.

Ground Twelve. That Petitioner Latidtus Jones is actual innocence of uttering forgery and that a fundamental miscarriage of justice did accured.

Ground Thirteen. That petitioner Jones is entitled to the

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