Jones v. Hughes

• Decision Date: 21 October 1912
• Parties: B. F. JONES, Appellant, v. F. T. HUGHES
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

137 N.W. 1023

156 Iowa 684

B. F. JONES, Appellant, v. F. T. HUGHES

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

October 21, 1912

Appeal from Lee District Court.--HON. W. S. HAMILTON, Judge.

THIS is an action in equity to enjoin the prosecution by defendant against plaintiff of a suit, aided by attachment, in a court of Missouri to recover damages for slander and malicious prosecution for words spoken and acts done in Lee county of this state, of which county the plaintiff and defendant are both residents. After the filing of an answer, the court, on motion, dissolved a preliminary injunction which had been granted on plaintiff's application, and from such order the plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Herminghausen & Herminghausen, B. F. Jones, and Bernard A. Dolan, for appellant.

Hughes & McCoid, for appellee.

OPINION

MCCLAIN, C. J.

The case as presented involves the question whether a court of equity in this state may, in a suit by a citizen of the state brought against another citizen of the state, enjoin the prosecution in a court of another state of an action to recover damages for personal wrongs committed in this state. In order to discuss this question with reference to its proper solution under the facts appearing in this case, the following statement of the circumstances will be sufficient:

In November, 1909, an action entitled "R. C. McIlwain and Felix T. Hughes v. William Sinton, B. A. Dolan and B. F Jones" was brought in the superior court of the city of Keokuk, in which it was alleged that the defendants conspiring together and acting jointly and severally to injure the good name of the plaintiffs, maliciously prosecuted a suit in said court, which was afterwards dismissed, and spoke of and concerning the plaintiffs certain false and slanderous words. In April following, and while the action in the superior court at Keokuk was still pending, Felix T. Hughes, as sole plaintiff, instituted an action added by attachment against B. F. Jones as sole defendant in the circuit court of Clarke county, Mo., alleging substantially the same wrongs, and asking the recovery of the same damages as were made the basis of the action in the superior court of Keokuk. Under the attachment land of the defendant was seized in Missouri. Thereupon B. F. Jones, the sole defendant in the action brought in Missouri and one of the joint defendants in the action instituted in the superior court of Keokuk, brought this action in equity against Felix T. Hughes, the sole plaintiff in the action brought in Missouri and one of the joint plaintiffs in the action brought in the superior court of Keokuk to enjoin said Felix T. Hughes from maintaining his action in Missouri, alleging as ground for such relief the pendency of the action in this state; that both he and defendant are residents of Keokuk; that plaintiff has unincumbered property in that city of considerable value; that the cause of action alleged in the Missouri court was based solely upon facts that happened and arose in Lee county (in which the city of Keokuk is situated); that by the laws of Missouri the attachment upon the plaintiff's land there situated had become effectual as a lien without the giving of any bond, and that defendant instituted said action and obtained said attachment against the plaintiff's land in Missouri for the sole purpose of harassing, annoying, and worrying the plaintiff by putting him to great expense in defending said action in another state; and further, that the object of instituting the action in Missouri was to take advantage of a rule of law recognized in the courts of Missouri by which a recovery could be had for malicious prosecution which could not be had by the rules of law recognized on the same subject in the courts of Iowa. On the prayer of the plaintiff a preliminary injunction was granted; whereupon defendant answered under oath, denying any intent or purpose of harassing and annoying the plaintiff by the institution of the suit in Missouri, and denying that the rules of law recognized in Missouri with reference to the recovery of damages for malicious prosecution were any more favorable to the plaintiff in such a suit than those recognized in the courts of Iowa. There are also allegations in the answer as to the joinder of plaintiffs and defendants in the action in the superior court of Keokuk, which are not material in the view which we take of the case. On the filing of his answer, the defendant moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction for various reasons, which, so far as it is necessary to notice them, relate to the jurisdiction of the courts of one state to interfere with the prosecution of actions between its own citizens in another state and the propriety of doing so under the circumstances which are developed in this case. Although the appeal is one from the dissolution of a temporary injunction, the argument extends to the ultimate question of the right of the plaintiff to have the final relief prayed in his petition.

There can be no controversy as to the jurisdiction of a court of equity to render a decree in personam against a defendant enjoining him from resorting to the courts of another state. Such jurisdiction does not involve in any sense the exercise of a supervisory jurisdiction over the courts of another state, but only a supervisory jurisdiction over the acts of the defendant threatening injury to the plaintiff. Such power "proceeds from the undoubted authority that a court of equity possesses over persons within its jurisdiction to restrain them from doing anything that is contrary to equity and good conscience, to the wrong and injury of others, whether the threatened inequitable conduct consists in the prosecution of an action or whatever it may happen to be. The court of equity thus appealed to acts in personam, and it is immaterial whether the threatened inequitable conduct is to be carried on within or without the limits of the jurisdiction." Bigelow v. Old Dominion, etc., Co., 74 N.J.Eq. 457 (71 A. 153).

But conceding the jurisdiction of the court to thus enjoin, and bring within the control of its process, the prosecution of a suit in the courts of another state, the question still remains whether in a particular case the court should exercise that power. As expressing quite clearly the considerations that will control in this respect, we indulge ourselves in further quotation from the opinion of Chancellor Pitney in the case just cited, which was a case in which the New Jersey court of equity was asked to enjoin proceedings in a court of the commonwealth of Massachusetts having adequate jurisdiction to determine the rights of the parties in the case there pending. "But on general principles equity will not interfere with the right of any person to bring an action for the redress of grievance--the right preservative of all rights--except for grave reasons, and on grounds of comity the power of one state to interfere with a litigant who is in due course pursuing his rights and remedies in the courts of another state ought to be sparingly exercised . They must be very special circumstances that will justify this court in restraining the prosecution of an equitable action already pending in a court of such ample jurisdiction. I speak not of any limitation upon the power of this court, but upon the propriety of its exercise in...