Jones v. Interstate Recovery Service

• Decision Date: 10 October 1984
• Citation: 206 Cal.Rptr. 924,160 Cal.App.3d 925
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Henry JONES, et al., Plaintiff and Appellants, v. INTERSTATE RECOVERY SERVICE, Defendant and Respondent. E000552. Civ. 33030.

Page 924

206 Cal.Rptr. 924

160 Cal.App.3d 925

Henry JONES, et al., Plaintiff and Appellants, v. INTERSTATE RECOVERY SERVICE, Defendant and Respondent.

E000552.

Civ. 33030.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

Oct. 10, 1984.

[160 Cal.App.3d 926] Michael B. Lloyd, Riverside, for plaintiffs and appellants.

[160 Cal.App.3d 927] Murchison & Cumming, and Dallas Sacher Los Angeles, for defendant and respondent.

OPINION

RICKLES, Associate Justice.

This case involves the appeal of a trial court's order setting aside a default judgment entered against defendants. The underlying facts involve the repossession of plaintiffs' automobile. Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint for trespass, assault, conversion and infliction of emotional distress against the Bank of America. Codefendant, Interstate Recovery Service, was subsequently served as Doe I. While in the process of apparently wrongfully repossessing plaintiffs' automobile, employees of defendant Interstate Recovery Service were surprised by plaintiffs. Plaintiff Acqueanetta Jones, pregnant at the time, was apparently thrown up against the wall of the garage. Plaintiffs' children were also present when this incident occurred and it is alleged they have suffered emotional injury as a result.

Personal service was effected on defendant Interstate Recovery Service on January 26, 1983. Concerning the first cause of action, trespass, the complaint specifically requested general damages in the sum of $5,000 and punitive damages in the sum of $250,000; concerning the second cause of action, assault, plaintiffs specifically requested $25,000 in general damages and $250,000 for punitive damages; plaintiffs' third cause of action apparently deals with the intentional infliction of emotional distress on their minor children. They requested general damages in the sum of $25,000 and punitive damages in the sum of $100,000. The fourth cause of action deals with a combination of assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress on plaintiffs' children. Plaintiffs therein requested $50,000 for general damages and $50,000 for punitive damages. And plaintiffs' fifth cause of action involves wrongful repossession and the intentional infliction of emotional distress on plaintiffs and their children; she has requested $10,000 for general damages and punitive damages in the sum of $10,000 per child. Each of these money requests appear in the complaint that was served on Interstate Recovery Service as Doe I. By April 7, 1983, plaintiff had not received a response from Interstate Recovery Service. As a result, plaintiffs filed a request to enter default judgment. That request did not mention any amount of damages. After hearing, the trial court awarded default judgment in favor of plaintiff. The court awarded $5,000 on the first cause of action, $25,000 on the second cause of action, $15,000 as to the third cause of action, $25,000 on the fourth cause of action, and $10,000 on the fifth cause of action. In addition, the court awarded a total of $40,000 in punitive damages. As a result, Interstate Recovery Service was held liable for a total amount of $120,000. Judgment was accordingly entered. On June 24, 1983, Interstate Recovery Service filed a motion for relief of default judgment. The motion was brought on the sole ground that the default judgment was void in that plaintiffs failed to personally serve Interstate Recovery Service with a statement of damages as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 425.11. The trial court apparently agreed because the motion for relief of default was granted. Plaintiffs appeal from that order relieving defendant of default judgment.

DISCUSSION

While the general rule limits appeals to judgments, certain exceptions to this rule are recognized. Plaintiffs, in this instance, fall within one exception in their appeal from an order setting aside a default judgment. (6 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Appeal, § 88.)

The issue before us is what constitutes sufficient notice of damages in order to enter a default judgment. Code of Civil Procedure section 425.11, which applies to complaints to recover damages for personal injury or wrongful death, provides that prior to default, "the plaintiff shall give notice to the defendant of the amount of special and general damages sought to be recovered...."

Section 425.11 operates in conjunction with section 425.10, which mandates that a complaint for damages resulting from personal injuries or wrongful death shall not state the amount of damages sought. The purpose of this omission is to protect the defendants from adverse publicity resulting from inflated demands, particularly in medical malpractice cases. (Review of Selected 1974 California Legislation (1975) 6 Pacific L.J. 125, 217.)

Default judgment is a procedural device designed to clear the court's calendar and files of those cases which have no adversarial quality. In order to reach the default stage, a party must follow certain well-defined rules which ensure that a defendant has sufficient knowledge of the pending action. Of course, a defendant may choose to vigorously defend or simply ignore the plaintiff's claims. The rules governing default judgment provide the safeguards which ensure that defendant's choice is a fair and informed one.

Because default judgment ends the controversy, the rules leading to it are precise and should be followed to the letter. Where a plaintiff fails to...