Jones v. Jamrog
Decision Date | 05 July 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 03-1665.,03-1665. |
Parties | Emmett JONES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. David JAMROG, Warden, Respondent-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Raina I. Korbakis, Office of the Attorney General, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellee.
Emmett A. Jones, Carson City, Michigan, pro se.
Before: SILER, COLE, and CLAY, Circuit Judges.
SILER, J. (pp. 594-96), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
Emmett Jones appeals the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Jones sought to represent himself at his state criminal trial. He explained that he wanted to do so in order to have access to files the state would turn over only to his lawyer. The state courts interpreted this as an involuntary waiver of the right to counsel and denied his request. In our view, this conclusion rests on an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court; we therefore reverse the judgment of the district court.
In 1999, Jones stood trial in Michigan for felonious assault. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.82 (1999). There were other charges pending against him at the time and in each case Jones asked for access to police reports and other materials the state had turned over to his lawyer but refused to give to him. The state had a policy permitting the release of these materials to defendants' lawyers, provided the materials remained in the lawyers' custody at all times.1 Over Jones's objections, the original trial judge in Jones's felonious assault case sustained the policy's application to him; the judge also prohibited Jones from speaking in court. The state did not object to Jones meeting with his lawyer to review the materials, but Jones wanted to spend more time reviewing the materials relevant to his case than his lawyer was willing to provide. He resolved this quandary by deciding to represent himself in his pending cases. His decision to proceed pro se arose in the context of his lawyer's motion to withdraw as his counsel.
At a hearing on the motion before a second judge, the judge asked Jones whether he was dissatisfied with his lawyer's services. Jones responded by saying, "my request to represent myself was based on other matters, which I could explain to the Court...." Jones explained he had "no other choice ... other than self-representation" because of the court's order that he not speak in court and because of its ruling that "Defense Counsel was not to provide [him] with any copies of discovery materials or police reports or other court documents." In particular, Jones continued, Jones then said: "If the Court insist [sic] upon ... upholding the local rule I have no choice but to overcome that by representing myself."
Jones's remarks to the judge were not brief; he expounded on the constitutional right to represent oneself, citing, we imagine (the transcript is unclear), Faretta v. California,2 for the proposition that, in Jones's words, When asked by the judge, Jones's lawyer confirmed his client's motivations; the lawyer explained, "if the only way he can get copies of the police reports and the other discovery material that's come along with the police reports is to be represented [sic] himself then that's what he wishes to do...." Ultimately the judge referred the motion to withdraw to a third judge, who was to preside at Jones's felonious assault trial. Nevertheless, the hearing judge did comment on Jones's request. Citing Michigan's standard for waiving the right to counsel, the judge ventured that Jones's request was not unequivocal, as the cases of the Michigan Supreme Court require, "because you're saying, Well, I have no choice but to do this because I disagree with this other ruling [i.e., the original judge's ruling that Jones would not be exempted from the state's policy regarding discovery material]." The judge also noted: "... it seems to me that in a word your problems are not with [counsel] but your problems are with his compliance with some rules that he didn't create."
When the motion to withdraw came before the trial judge, Jones again explained his position: The judge asked Jones's lawyer for his thoughts on the matter and he argued that the state's discovery policy was at odds with Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), because it had the effect of limiting a defendant's access to materials that might be critical to his defense. According to Jones's lawyer, the effect of the discovery policy was most severe in a case like Jones's because he was incarcerated. The lawyer suggested he could not visit the jail frequently enough for his client to have a sufficient opportunity to review the materials. Consequently, the only way for Jones to circumvent this obstacle to preparing his defense was to represent himself. The judge was unmoved by these arguments; he seemed more concerned with whether Jones had been afforded at least some opportunity to review the materials and to discuss them with his lawyer. Because the lawyer had visited Jones at least a few times, the judge was satisfied.
There was then an exchange between the court and Jones regarding whether Jones's request was unequivocal:
Following this exchange, the judge issued his ruling, citing the Michigan Supreme Court's cases on self-representation.3 The judge observed that The judge concluded that Jones's request did not meet these criteria. The request was not unequivocal because the only rationale expressed by Jones In the judge's view, "what really this gets down to is a question of the propriety of — of withholding a police report from the custody or possession of a defendant." For two primary reasons, the judge concluded the application of the state's discovery policy to Jones's case was not improper. First, Jones had been afforded an opportunity to review the materials which he was not permitted to possess, to discuss them with his attorney, and to contact state witnesses listed. Second, there were good reasons for the discovery policy, including the state's interest in avoiding the high cost of copying the materials for all criminal defendants and the need to protect the privacy of potential witnesses. An additional factor rounded out the judge's analysis of Jones's request to represent himself; the judge observed at multiple points that Jones and his lawyer had not had significant disagreements regarding trial strategy.
Finally, the judge held as follows:
All things considered, I think that the position that the Defendant takes is one which, A. Is unreasonable; and, Number two, emphasizes the — the equivocality [sic] of his position in his desire to represent himself.... [O]n the record made here today, I cannot find that his request was [] unequivocal, and even if it was that it was voluntarily made.... There is no dispute concerning strategies. I find that his request to represent himself, while not being made directly, is made indirectly, and in the format of Mr. Getting's motion; and, accordingly, I find that that request is not unequivocal, in other words, he is equivocating. And, furthermore, [] any assertion of the right of self-representation in the facts presented here on the record made this morning would not show he was doing so voluntarily. Um, therefore, it — it is unnecessary — I mean, I think I could stop at the unequivocal issue, but there's — there's really no necessity to get into any off [sic] the other issues because I'm...
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