Jones v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 02 May 1888
• Citation: 81 Ga. 293,6 S.E. 181
• Parties: Jones et al. v. Johnson et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

6 S.E. 181

(81 Ga. 293)

Jones et al.

v.Johnson et al.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

May 2, 1888.

Ejectment—Filing Amended Declaration—Substitution of New Lessors—Time op Action Brought.

Where an amendment to a declaration in ejectment substitutes other persons as lessors in lieu of the original lessor, it states a separate cause of action as of the date of the amendment, and where it appears that at the time of the amendment, and for more than seven years prior thereto, the life-tenant had been dead, and defendants had been in the adverse possession of the land under color of title, such defendants will have acquired a prescriptive title thereto.

Error from superior court, Emanuel county; Hines, Judge.

Twiggs & Verdery, for plaintiffs in error.

J. J. Jones, J. C. Dell, and T. H. Potter, for defendants in error.

Blandford, J. We are of the opinion that the court was right in the charge complained of, and that, under the facts of this case, the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover.

1. This was an action of ejectment in the old form; and, under our practice, (and it has always been the practice in this state, so far as we are aware of,) a demise may be introduced into a declaration of this sort, by amendment, at any time; and every demise of this character is a separate and distinct cause of action.

2. The cause of action thus introduced does not relate back to the filing of the declaration, but dates from the time the amendment is filed and allowed by the court.

3. Therefore, when the amendment was had which introduced into the declaration in this case the names of these plaintiffs in error as lessors, in lieu of the original lessor, it constituted a separate and distinct cause of action, commencing from the date of the amendment. And it appears here affirmatively that when this amendment was made, and for more than seven years prior thereto, the life-tenant had been dead, and the defendants had been in the public, continuous, exclusive, uninterrupted, and peaceable possession of this land under a written color of title, claiming it as their own. We think, therefore, that they had a prescriptive title to the land, and that the court was right in the instructions complained of. The judgment of the court below refusing a new trial in this case is affirmed.