Jones v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 14 November 1990
• Docket Number: Nos. CA,s. CA
• Citation: 572 So.2d 150
• Parties: Marcellena JONES and Rodney Garland Jones v. Tracy Alan JOHNSON and The Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania. William COURREGE v. Tracy Alan JOHNSON and The Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania. 89 1314, CA 89 1315. 572 So.2d 150
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Page 150

572 So.2d 150

Marcellena JONES and Rodney Garland Jones v. Tracy Alan JOHNSON and The Insurance Company of the State of

Pennsylvania.

William COURREGE v. Tracy Alan JOHNSON and The Insurance Company of the State of

Pennsylvania.

Nos. CA 89 1314, CA 89 1315.

572 So.2d 150

Court of Appeal of Louisiana First Circuit.

Nov. 14, 1990.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 18, 1991.

Writs Denied March 28, 1991.

J.J. McKernan, Baton Rouge, for plaintiff-appellee Marcellena Jones.

John Haas Weinstein, Opelousas, for plaintiff-appellee Rodney Garland Jones.

Ronald R. Thompson, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant State of La.

Before LOTTINGER, SHORTESS and CARTER, JJ.

LOTTINGER, Judge.

This is an appeal by the State of Louisiana through the Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD) from a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs, Marcellena Jones, Rodney Garland Jones, and William Courrege, originally filed two separate suits against Tracy Alan Johnson and his insurer for injuries they sustained in an automobile accident which occurred on October 31, 1985. ¹ The state, through the Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD), was subsequently added as a defendant in those suits, and they were consolidated.

The plaintiffs then settled with and released defendant Johnson and his insurer, reserving their rights against the state. After a trial on the merits on the issues of the state's liability and quantum, the trial court held in favor of plaintiffs and against the state, assessing liability at eighty-five percent (85%) on the part of Tracy Alan Johnson and fifteen percent (15%) on the part of the state through DOTD. The trial court found that Mrs. Jones was entitled to eighty-two thousand one hundred fourteen and 80/100 dollars ($82,114.80) in total damages, and that Mr. Courrege was entitled to sixty-eight thousand fifty three and 36/100 dollars ($68,053.36) in total damages and rendered judgment in those amounts plus legal interest from date of judicial demand against the state through DOTD and in favor of each of those plaintiffs respectively.

The state appeals only the liability portion of the judgment, contending that the trial court erred in holding the state liable to plaintiffs. ²

FACTS

The accident at issue occurred on halloween night, 1985 at the intersection of La. 1 and La. 416 in Pointe Coupee Parish. It was a dark and overcast night, and La. 1 had just been resurfaced with "hot mix" type asphalt, which made the roadway surface very dark. Temporary reflective tape was in place down the center line of La. 1, and flashing yellow caution lights were in place above the intersection.

This intersection is a "Y" type intersection, the trunk and right fork of which is La. 1. The left fork is La. 416, which dead ends into La. 1 at this intersection. However, the "Y" in this intersection is not exactly symmetrical. To a motorist southbound on La. 1, approaching from the trunk of the "Y", the left fork (La. 416) appears to continue straight ahead while the right fork (La. 1) curves sharply to the right. ³

Normally there are several signs visible to a southbound motorist on La. 1 leading up to the intersection, which indicate La. 1 curves to the right, lower the normal speed limit of 55 mph to 45 mph, and La. 416 is the left fork. On the night of the accident, however, these signs were not in place, but had been temporarily removed to facilitate the resurfacing and widening of La. 1. Large orange signs indicating that the area was "under construction" and reducing the speed limit to 45 mph were erected in the place of the signs which had been temporarily removed. Thus, a southbound driver on La. 1 who was unfamiliar with the area could very easily become confused as to which of the two forks was La. 1.

Adding to this already confusing situation was the fact that right in the crotch of the "Y" is a business establishment known as "Lake View Gas and Liquor." This building appears to a southbound motorist from a distance as being situated on the right side of La. 1 instead of on the left side or outside of the curve as it actually is. At night this illusion is particularly confusing because of the concentration of lights at this location.

On the night of the accident, Tracy Alan Johnson, one of the original defendants, was southbound on La. 1 in his 1978 Peterbilt 18-wheeler with a full load of pecans that he had just picked up in New Roads, La. Mr. Johnson intended to remain southbound on La. 1 and did not intend to turn onto La. 416. He was unfamiliar with the area, having passed that way only once, and then going in the opposite direction, on his way to pick up the pecans. The plaintiffs, Mrs. Jones and Mr. Courrege, were northbound on La. 1 in a 1976 Chevrolet Nova driven by Mr. Courrege.

As Mr. Johnson approached the intersection he saw what he perceived to be the headlights of a car coming into his lane from the right. In reality this was the Courrege vehicle coming around the curve northbound on La. 1. Mr. Courrege remained in his lane during this entire time and was never in Mr. Johnson's lane.

In reaction to what he thought was a car coming into his lane from the right, Mr. Johnson locked up his brakes and tried to steer to the left. He skidded straight through the curve, veering slightly to the left and collided with the Courrege vehicle at the apex of the curve. The point of impact was right in the fork of the "Y" and completely within the northbound lane of La. 1, the Courrege vehicle's lane. The skid marks left by Mr. Johnson's truck were 186 feet in length, and the angle at which the truck crossed the center line of La. 1 was almost directly in line with La. 416. This is consistent with the plaintiff's theory that Mr. Johnson was unaware that La. 1 curved sharply to the right but rather thought that La. 1 continued straight ahead in the direction of what is actually La. 416.

Based on the skid marks left by each of the vehicles, the accident reconstruction expert ⁴ testified that Mr. Johnson was going at least 57 mph when he first applied his brakes and was probably going somewhat faster. Mr. Johnson denied that he was going that fast, but admitted that at such a speed it would have been impossible for him to negotiate the sharp right hand curve in La. 1 without overturning. Mr. Johnson further admitted that he did not realize that La. 1 curved to the right until he was about 100 feet from the intersection.

Mr. Courrege's vehicle left skid marks 26 feet long. The accident reconstruction expert testified that this would indicate that the Courrege vehicle was traveling at approximately 27 mph when its brakes were applied, assuming that it had come to a complete stop by the time of impact. This expert further testified that based on the damage to the Courrege vehicle it appeared that it was nearly stopped or had very little velocity left at the time of impact. ⁵ He also testified that the Courrege vehicle might have been going a maximum of 40 mph immediately before it started skidding, and that the position and angle of the Courrege vehicle's skid marks made it physically impossible for it to have been in the southbound lane within at least 4 seconds prior to the skid.

FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT

At the conclusion of the trial the trial court found that Mr. Courrege was free from fault and that Mr. Johnson was driving at an excessive rate of speed and was the primary cause of the accident and plaintiffs' injuries. The trial court withheld a ruling on the state's liability and percentage of fault, if any, until the parties had filed post trial briefs.

Subsequent to the parties' post trial briefs, the trial court held that Mr. Johnson was not aware of the curve until it was too late to negotiate it at the speed at which he was traveling. The trial court further held that the absence of adequate signs indicating the presence of the curve was a contributing factor to the accident. The trial judge stated in his written reasons for judgment that:

"[T]he presence of adequate signing would have warned Mr. Johnson of the approaching curve so that he could have adjusted his speed in order to negotiate the curve, and so that he could properly interpret the confusing lights and physical surroundings. While Mr. Johnson was apparently willing to ignore the forty-five (45) miles per hour speed limit on the construction signs, we [sic] cannot assume that he would have ignored a curve sign with the knowledge that he risked turning over if he did not reduce his speed around the curve. The fault of both parties--Johnson and the Department of Transportation--contributed to the accident."

The trial court went on to apportion the respective fault of Mr. Johnson and the DOTD at 85% to Mr. Johnson, for his excessive speed and failure to maintain control, and 15% to the DOTD for failing to have adequate signs in place warning of the curve. Thereafter, the trial court considered the various injuries and medical bills incurred by the plaintiffs and held that each plaintiff was entitled to the amount previously set forth in total damages. A judgment was signed accordingly in favor of plaintiffs and against the state.

The state now appeals and assigns the following specifications of error I. The trial court committed manifest error of fact and of law by finding that a defect (absence of a curve advisory sign while the roadway was under construction) existed at the intersection [of] La. highway 416 and highway 1, which caused the accident complained of.

II. The trial court committed a manifest error of fact and of law by finding that the cause of this accident was contributed to by the State of Louisiana and that any defect constituted an "unreasonable" risk.

III. The trial court committed manifest error by finding that the State, [through] DOTD had actual or constructive notice of a defect and failed within a reasonable time to correct said defect.

IV. The trial court committed manifest...