Jones v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 18 October 1949
• Docket Number: No. 32704.,32704.
• Citation: 55 S.E.2d 904,80 Ga.App. 340
• Parties: JONES et al. v. JOHNSON.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

55 S.E.2d 904

80 Ga.App. 340

JONES et al.

v.JOHNSON.

No. 32704.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 2.

Oct. 18, 1949.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 2, 1949.

J. B. Jones and others, constituting the Board of Tax Assessors of Early County, refused Clyde Johnson a homestead exemption of most of a tract of land owned by him, and he appealed from the Board's decision.

To review a judgment of the Superior Court of Early County, P. Z. Geer, J., reversing the Board's decision, the members thereof brought error.

The Court of Appeals, Townsend, J., affirmed the judgment, holding that the constitutional and statutory homestead exemption provisions include in rural homestead entire tract of land on which owner's dwelling house is situated, whether the land surrounding it is used simply as an extended approach to such building or is put to agricultural uses.

Syllabus by the Court.

The owner of a farm located in this State who resides in a dwelling house situated on the farm is entitled to a home-stead exemption as to the entire tract of land upon which the dwelling house rssituated, to a value of $2,000, notwithstanding the fact that he devotes the land to agricultural purposes, as this is not such a use of the land as to amount to a commercial or business enterprise within the meaning of Subsection 3 of Code section 92-233 relating to homestead exemption.

The Board of Tax Assessors of Early County, composed of J. B. Jones, B. Minter and W. R. Taylor, herein referred to as the Board, appealed from a decision rendered by the judge of the Superior Court of Early County without a jury and on an agreed statement of facts, the case being in that court on the appeal of Clyde Johnson, herein referred to as the applicant, from a decision of the Board adverse to him.

The agreed statement of facts is substantially as follows: that the applicant Johnson is a citizen and resident of Early County, married and residing with his family on January 1, 1949 on a farm composed of a residence and 125 acres of described land of which he is the owner in fee simple; that on April 1, 1949, he filed his tax return with the Tax Commissioner of Early County in which he valued the residence with the surrounding yard and garden, occupying 2 acres of land, at $750, and the remaining 123 acres of land at $1,000, that at the same time he filed his application for homestead exemption for the entire tract of land, setting it out as he had done in his tax return; that the tax commissioner duly transmitted the application to the Board of Tax Assessors, and that the Board allowed an exemption for the house and 2 acres of land in the amount of $750 but refused to approve for exemption the remaining 123 acres; that the tract is an entire tract in the shape of a parallelogram with the residence on the eastern side thereof; that about 50 acres represents cleared, cultivated land, 25 acres of pasture and 48 acres of swamp lands suitable only for timber; that the applicant is a farmer, has no other occupation, and supports himself and family from the proceeds of the land in question.

To the judgment of the trial court reversing the action of the Board of Tax Assessors insofar as it had refused to allow a homestead exemption for tax purposes in the 123 acres of land, the Board filed its motion for a new trial, the overruling of which motion is here assigned as error.

A. H. Gray, Blakely, for plaintiffs in error.

No appearance for defendant in error.

TOWNSEND, Judge (after stating the foregoing facts.)

Code, § 92-232 defines a homestead as "real property owned by the applicant on January 1st of the taxable year and who is in possession thereof and upon which said applicant resides and the land immediately surrounding said residence and to which he or she has a right to said possession under a bona fide claim of ownership." (Italics ours.)

The homestead is limited in various respects, viz.: (1) by the quality of the estate held, Code § 92-233, Subsections (a) to (k) inclusive, relating to title and occupancy, (2) by the value of the property within the maximum limit of $2,000.00, Code, § 92-219, and (3) by the use to which the property is put, Code, § 92-233, Subsection (l) (1) to (7) inclusive. It is to be noted that there is no limitation as to the size or physical proportions of the property to be embraced within the provision, and it would seem that the purpose of the constitutional provision and statute pursuant thereto in fixing a maximum valuation was by so doing to equalize the exemption as between applicants on the basis of value, regardless of the extent of the tract involved.

The applicant in this case has satisfied the first two...