Jones v. Jones

• Citation: 164 P. 757,96 Wash. 172
• Decision Date: 08 May 1917
• Docket Number: 13699.
• Parties: JONES v. JONES.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington

164 P. 757

96 Wash. 172

JONES v. JONES.

No. 13699.

Supreme Court of Washington

May 8, 1917

Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; R. B. Albertson Judge.

Action by Carola B. Jones against T. E. Jones. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Charles F. Munday and Griffin & Griffin, both of Seattle, for appellant.

Halverstadt & Clarke, of Seattle, for respondent.

FULLERTON, J.

The plaintiff, Carola B. Jones, brought this action against T. E Jones, her father-in-law, to recover damages on the ground of alienation of her husband's affections. A verdict of $25,000 was returned by the jury, upon which the court ruled that he would grant a new trial unless plaintiff would submit to a reduction to the sum of $12,500. The plaintiff submitted to the reduction, and judgment was given accordingly. The defendant appeals.

The principal error assigned by the appellant is the denial of his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, which was raised by motions for nonsuit, for a directed verdict, and for judgment non obstante veredicto. The appellant contends that there was an entire absence of any testimony showing, or tending to show, malice on his part, and that, in the absence of any proof of malice, the case should have been taken from the jury and judgment given for appellant. The evidence on the part of the respondent tended to show that Tom Jones, the son of appellant, had been attentive to the respondent for a period of over a year prior to the marriage, during which time he displayed towards her the utmost affection, and exhibited the extremest jealousy of the attentions of other young men to her. He was a constant visitor in her home, taking her frequently for auto rides and to the theater. The respondent at this period was 16 years of age and Tom Jones was 21. After they had been thus intimate for about a year respondent discovered in August, 1914, that she was pregnant. Tom Jones was apparently ignorant of this state of affairs until the father of respondent, in October 1914, called him to the house and informed him of her condition. The respondent was hysterical at the time, and Tom Jones put his arm around her and told her not to worry, and everything would come out all right, saying:

'The only right thing to do was to get married, but he had to speak to his father first, because he was in no position to support a wife'

--then kissed her good-bye and left. He went home and informed his father, who testified that he told his son that, if she was a decent girl and he loved her, he must marry her and take care of her. There is no further evidence of what passed between father and son at the time, but the fact is that the son never returned to the respondent to make good his promise. The respondent later began to threaten a criminal prosecution, and the appellant undertook complete charge of all negotiations, the son remaining passive. The attorney for respondent was insisting that marriage was the only alternative to prosecution. A meeting was arranged between this attorney and those representing the appellant in which the appellant agreed to a marriage between his son and respondent. The marriage occurred about a week later in Everett; the appellant with his son and the respondent with her sister and father composing the party present at the ceremony in the courthouse there. On their return from the marriage ceremony, respondent and her family left the interurban car at Fremont, appellant and his son going on down town. It was in evidence that the appellant promised to call at the home of respondent the next day. He did not go there, however, until about a week later, and then in response to an insistent summons. On this visit appellant asked respondent about her condition, and suggested that she go to some other city until the baby was born. She declined, and then he told her to go to the hospital in Seattle and have the best of care and he would pay all of her bills. She testified that he asked her when she would release his son, and she told him that, with a small baby on her hands, she would not release him. 'Well, he says, 'You can give the baby to Tom, and you can always get married again.' Then he got kind of mad, and he told me he absolutely refused Tom to live with me. He said he had another girl picked out for Tom and had other plans.' This testimony, though denied by appellant, is substantiated by that of the sister of respondent, who was present at the meeting between the parties. The appellant left this meeting in an angry frame of mind, and subsequently declined to pay the hospital bills of respondent. Appellant's son made no effort to visit or cohabit with his wife. She met him but once after the marriage. She testified:

'My sister called Tom up and asked him to meet her, and she went and met him first, and then about five minutes afterwards I met him, because he refused to meet me at all; and he was awfully made because I met him that way, and he said he couldn't talk to me; that his father had forbidden him to say anything; that he had put it in the hands of his attorneys, and I would have to talk to them. He said his father had forbidden him to say anything to me.'

A child was born to respondent in January, 1915. The husband continued to live with his father until July, 1915, when he left his home to take a position in Alaska, without calling upon or communicating with the respondent. The only money he ever contributed to the support of his wife and child was the sum of $20.

We think the motions challenging the sufficiency of the evidence was properly denied by the court, as there was sufficient evidence to warrant the submission of the case to the jury. These objections were based chiefly on the assumption that there was no proof of malice on the part of appellant. It is true the appellant testified there was none, but we think there were matters in evidence from which malice might be inferred. Malice, like other mental processes, is as well shown by conduct as it is by the testimony of the person whose condition of mind is the...