Jones v. Jones
| Decision Date | 22 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | 37033-0-III |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | JEFFREY P. JONES and PETER C. JONES, Respondents, v. RUSSELL K. JONES, Appellant. |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Russell Jones appeals the trial court's denial of his motion challenging the extension of five money judgments and its refusal to vacate orders finding him in contempt and imposing sanctions and attorney fees on account of the contempt. We affirm.
Between November 2004 and June 2005, Jeffrey Jones and Peter Jones obtained three judgments against their brother, Russell [1] which we refer to hereafter as "Judgments 1 through 3." All arose out of litigation over the parties' mother's estate.[2]
In aid of collection, Jeffrey and Peter initiated a supplemental proceeding in the spring of 2006, obtaining an order requiring Russell to produce financial records. When the records were not produced, they moved the court to continue the supplemental proceeding and hold Russell in contempt. On May 11, 2006, a court commissioner entered the requested order, continuing the supplemental proceeding to June 15 and ordering Russell to produce the financial records.
When the records were again not produced, a further order was entered on June 15, 2006, continuing the supplemental proceedings to July 13 and requiring Russell to appear and produce the financial records at that time. Russell persisted in refusing to produce the records, and supplemental judgments awarding sanctions and fees were entered in 2006 which we refer to hereafter as "Judgments 4 and 5."
As the five judgments approached their 10-year expiration, Jeffrey and Peter moved ex parte to extend them, obtaining the following orders extending the judgments for another 10 years:
In August 2018, almost two years after the last extension order Russell moved under CR 60(b)(5) for relief from the 2006 orders of contempt and Judgments 4 and 5, arguing that the court commissioner had lacked subject matter jurisdiction to order the production of documents in a supplemental proceeding. In November 2018, he moved for relief from the 2014, 2015, and 2016 orders extending the five judgments. He argued that the judgments were extended without personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, or procedural due process. Among his arguments was that RCW 6.17.020(3) requires that an application to extend a judgment be brought more than 90 days before the expiration of the original 10-year period, and Jeffrey's and Peter's applications had been made too late.
The trial court heard argument of the motions and orally denied the requested relief. Written orders were later entered. Addressing the motion to vacate the orders of contempt and Judgments 4 and 5, the trial court reasoned that supplemental proceedings are equitable in nature, a court's equitable powers apply, and at a postjudgment deposition permitted by CR 69(b), a deponent can be required to produce documents in accordance with civil rules. As an alternative basis for denial, it found Russell's motion untimely.
Addressing Russell's challenge to the extension of the judgments the trial court found RCW 6.17.020(3) to be plain on its face, allowing a valid judgment to be extended within the 90 days preceding expiration. It found the statute to be self-executing, permitting the judgments to be extended on the basis of an ex parte application.
Russell moved for reconsideration, which was denied. He appeals.
Russell makes three assignments of error. We address them in the order presented.
Russell first argues that because a judgment is a lien on real property and an extension of a judgment extends the lien, an order extending a judgment constitutes a deprivation of property that requires due process. He asks us to apply Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2105 115 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991), and hold that before a court extends a judgment, due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Courts applying postjudgment enforcement procedures such as Washington's extension of judgment procedure have recognized that when a creditor's interest in collecting a valid judgment is balanced against the debtor's interest in keeping property that has already been protected by prior notice and hearing, due process does not require prior notice and an opportunity to be reheard. E.g., Gedeon v. Gedeon, 630 P.2d 579, 583 (Colo. 1981). A number of state courts have held that the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, which allows creditors to file foreign judgments without affording the judgment debtor prior notice and an opportunity to be heard, does not violate due process. In Gedeon, for example, the Colorado Supreme Court found no due process violation where the debtor's only notice that a New Mexico judgment had been filed in Colorado was notice upon filing, by mail to his last known address. The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the debtor's argument that the procedure of entering the judgment without formal notice or the requirement of a hearing was an unconstitutional taking of property without due process of law. Id. at 582-83. The Iowa Supreme Court agreed in Wells Fargo Equipment Finance, Inc. v. Retterath, 928 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Iowa 2019). So did a New Jersey appellate court, which held that "neither Fuentes [v. Shevin[3] nor [Connecticut v.] Doehr apply here because those cases dealt with pre-judgment remedies and the procedure at issue here is a post-judgment process." Enron (Thrace) Expl. & Prod. BV v. Clapp, 378 N.J.Super. 8, 19, 874 A.2d 561 (App. Div. 2005); and see accord Nix v. Cassidy, 899 So.2d 998, 1002 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004).
Applying the Mathews factors, a debtor has no significant interest in the extension of a judgment, since Washington statutes contemplate upon entry that a judgment can be extended. There is little risk of an erroneous deprivation: the debtor's due process right to contest liability was protected before the judgment was entered, and the limited risk of an irregular extension is adequately protected by the debtor's right to bring a postextension challenge. Finally, the court extending a judgment will review whether the extension appears regular, meaning there will seldom be a need for anything more than an ex parte procedure.
Russell argues there was a "second deprivation of property" because the orders extending the judgments changed his status from that of a 10-year judgment debtor to that of a 20-year judgment debtor. Washington statutes treat judgment debtors as 10-year debtors subject to their creditor's election to extend the judgment for another 10 years. Russell's status did not change.
No due process violation is shown.
Russell next argues that the judgments were extended in violation of RCW 6.17.020(3). We review the trial court's application and interpretation of a statute de novo. Sessom v. Mentor, 155 Wn.App. 191, 195, 229 P.3d 843 (2010).
The statute further provides that "[t]he application shall be granted as a matter of right, subject to review only for timeliness, factual issues of full or partial satisfaction, or errors in calculating the judgment summary amounts." Id.
Russell's first argument that the judgments were extended in violation of RCW 6.17.020(3) is easily rejected. Although the statute does not require advance notice to the debtor and an opportunity to be heard, Russell argues that we should imply those procedural requirements since they are constitutionally required, and the legislature is presumed to...
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