Jones v. Jones
| Decision Date | 19 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 20CA3 |
| Citation | 2021 Ohio 1498 |
| Parties | TUMANYA JONES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NICHOLAS JONES, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
DECISION & JUDGMENT ENTRY
APPEARANCES:
Nicholas Jones, Lebanon, Ohio, pro se appellant.
Tumanya Jones, Beavercreek, Ohio, pro se appellee.
CIVIL CASE FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT
{¶1} This is an appeal from a Highland County Common Pleas Court judgment that granted a divorce to Tumanya Jones, plaintiff below and appellee herein, and Nicholas Jones, defendant below and appellant herein. Appellant assigns the following errors for review:
{¶2} This appeal arises from a contentious divorce proceeding that the parties have litigated for more than 4 years. On December 20, 2016, approximately ten years after the parties married, appellee filed a complaint for divorce. Appellant later filed a counterclaim for divorce. At the time appellee filed her complaint for divorce, the parties had one minor child who has since become emancipated.
{¶3} The trial court held multiple hearings regarding the parties' divorce. The court held the final hearing over the course of three days in October and November 2017. After the final hearing, the trial court entered an order that divided some of the parties' personal property, modified its temporary parenting time order, and set a briefing schedule to resolve the remaining disputes.
{¶4} On December 20, 2017, appellant filed a motion to show cause against appellee. Appellant asserted that appellee violated court order by failing to: (1) transport the minor child to counseling, (2) schedule make-up parenting time; and (3) notify appellant of medical appointments. On January 8, 2018, appellant filed a second motion to show cause and contended that appellee failed to comply with the order to provide parenting time on Christmas day.
{¶5} On January 12, 2018, the trial court entered a decision that resolved the remaining disputed property-division issues. The court ordered the parties to file their 2017 income tax returns "in the manner in which their income tax obligations are the least possible under the law." The court further ordered that the parties share any refund or liability in proportion to each party's total income.
{¶6} The trial court denied appellant's request for a credit for payments made during the pendency of the case. Appellant had asked the court to count "as part of [appellee]'s equitable distribution in terms of debts" "any payments made toward the farm until sale." In denying appellant's request, the court observed that appellant did not "propose[] any specific credit." The court additionally found "no evidence that either party should be granted any credit for any payments made under the temporary orders in the division of property set forth herein."
{¶7} On January 18, 2018, the trial court entered "temporary orders regarding contempt motions, child support, spousal support and property division." The court noted that events had transpired between the date of the final hearing and the court's January 12, 2018 decision that raised "a serious question * * * whether it is in the best interests of the child that either party be designated as residential parent and the case should be certified to the juvenile court, or if the Court should reconsider which parent is to be designated as residential parent due to [appellee]'s conduct which the Court has previously found constitutes parental alienation and the conduct of the child." The court thus "reopened" the case with respect to the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities and issued temporary orders regarding the parties' parenting time rights. The court additionally ordered the parties to complete an eight-week co-parenting course. The court stated that it would conduct a hearing to allocate parental rights and responsibilities after the parties completed the co-parenting course. The court also indicated that it would delay ruling on the contempt motions until after it received a report of the parties' co-parenting course progress.
{¶8} On February 12, 2018, appellee filed a notice of appeal. However, this court dismissed the appeal for lack of a final, appealable order.
{¶9} On May 14, 2018, the trial court found appellee in contempt for her failure to transport the child to counseling sessions. The court did not, however, find appellee in contempt with respect to the denial of parenting time. The court noted that the child refused to visit appellant and that appellee complied with the court's order "to take steps to punish the child if he refused to go to visitation." The court pointed out to appellant that appellee had "filed unruly charges with the Sheriff's department."
{¶10} On May 16, 2018, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce. The court noted that it had "reopened the record for the sole purpose of allocating parenting time." The court designated appellee the residential parent and awarded appellant parenting time. The court incorporated its previous decisions and granted the parties a divorce.
{¶11} Appellee appealed the trial court's decision. This court, however, determined that the court's decision did not constitute a final, appealable order because the parties' life insurance policies had not been divided.
{¶12} On October 31, 2019, the trial court entered a decision that granted each party his or her own life insurance policy. The court thereupon directed appellee to prepare a final decree that incorporated all of the court's previous decision. The court also stated that "[i]f the parties have reached any agreements that are different than the previously filed decisions or orders of the Court, they shall be identified in the final decree and will be adopted by the Court provided the parties and counsel have signed off on them." The court indicated, however, that it would "not consider any objections or additions that relate to any proposed modification of the Court's prior decisions or orders."
{¶13} On January 27, 2020, the trial court entered an amended final decree of divorce that incorporated its previous decisions. The court noted that the parties agreed to the division and disposition of the real estate during the 2017 final hearing and agreed to a division of their retirement accounts. The court stated that it had entered additional decisions regarding the division of personal property and in 2018, filed a final decision regarding all remaining disputed issues. The trial court designated appellee the residential parent of the minor child (even though at the time of the court's January 2020 decision, the child had become emancipated). The court allocated parenting time to appellant and ordered appellant to pay $796.18 per month for child support beginning March 1, 2018. The court also awarded appellee $750 for spousal support. This appeal followed.1
{¶14} In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred by failing to grant his request for credit for payments made under temporary orders. He asks that we reverse and remand the judgment with instructions to include credit for appellant's payments made under the temporary orders.
{¶15} We first observe that trial courts enjoy broad discretion when dividing marital property in a divorce proceeding. E.g., Holcomb v. Holcomb, 44 Ohio St.3d 128, 131, 541 N.E.2d 597 (1989); Elliott v. Elliott, 4th Dist. Ross No. 05CA2823, 2005-Ohio-5405, 2005 WL 2523205, ¶ 17. Accordingly, an appellate court will not reverse a trial court's decision regarding the allocation of marital property absent an abuse of that discretion. Elliott at ¶ 17. An "abuse of discretion" means that the court acted in an "'unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable'" manner or employed "'a view or...
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