Jones v. Jones, 94-289
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming |
| Writing for the Court | Before GOLDEN; LEHMAN |
| Citation | 903 P.2d 545 |
| Parties | Theodore H. JONES, Appellant (Defendant), v. Lisa Ann JONES, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Docket Number | No. 94-289,94-289 |
| Decision Date | 29 September 1995 |
Page 545
v.
Lisa Ann JONES, Appellee (Plaintiff).
Page 546
Theodore H. Jones, pro se.
Robert O. Anderson of Andrews and Anderson, Riverton, for Appellee.
Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.
LEHMAN, Justice.
Theodore H. Jones (appellant), appearing pro se, appeals from a Decree of Divorce granted to Lisa Ann Jones (appellee). Appellant claims error regarding the denial of a Motion for Continuance, the awarding of alimony to appellee and the violation of his constitutional right to equal protection.
We affirm.
Appellant delineates three issues for our consideration:
Issue I
Whether the District Court manifested (manifesto) [sic] "failure of justice" in denying Motion for Continuance[.]
Issue II
Whether the District Court erred in awarding alimony to the Appellee/Plaintiff.
Issue III
Whether the District Court erred in denying the Appellant/defendant his civil rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States [C]onstitution: more exact the strict scrutiny clause of the amendment[.]
The parties were married on December 10, 1992, in Pocatello, Idaho. Appellee filed a Complaint for Divorce in Fremont County, Wyoming on April 5, 1994. The district court set the matter for trial on August 24, 1994. Appellant, who at the time was a resident at the Wyoming Honor Farm in Riverton, filed a Motion for Continuance on August 22, 1994. The basis of appellant's motion was that he could not attend the trial on August 24 because he was scheduled to appear before the Parole Board on the same day. On the same the day as the motion was filed, the district court denied the motion noting that both the parole hearing and the trial were being held in Riverton allowing appellant to attend both.
The trial, unreported, was held as scheduled and, on October 31, 1994, the district court entered an order granting the divorce and awarding appellee alimony in the amount
Page 547
of $250.00 a month for one year. Appellant appeals.Appellant asserts that the district court erred by denying his Motion for Continuance. Appellant contends that a continuance was justified by the scheduling conflict between the divorce hearing and his parole hearing.
The decision to grant or deny a motion for a continuance is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Carlson v. BMW Indus. Serv., Inc., 744 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Wyo.1987). A trial court is authorized to grant a continuance when the party asking for it has shown good cause. Id.; W.S. 1-9-102 (1988 Rpl.).
We conclude that, given the untimeliness of appellant's motion, there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying it. Appellant's motion for a continuance was filed two days before the August 24 trial, a trial that was set by Scheduling Order entered June 10. Furthermore, it is apparent from the record that appellant knew at some point before August 1 that there was a scheduling conflict. Appellee, in her trial summary filed August 2, 1994, acknowledged the conflict and advised the court that she would strongly object to "any last minute requests to vacate or continue the trial[.]" Thus, appellant had at least three weeks in which to notify the district court of the problem. Instead, he waited until two days before the hearing before making his motion. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion.
Appellant also complains about the district court's decision to award appellee alimony payments. In Wyoming, alimony is not favored, though it is statutorily authorized. Muller v. Muller, 838 P.2d 198, 199 (Wyo.1992); W.S. 20-2-114 (1994 Rpl.). However, the decision whether to award alimony is within the...
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