Jones v. Jones
| Decision Date | 17 April 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 18733,18733 |
| Citation | 700 P.2d 1072 |
| Parties | DeMar D. JONES, Plaintiff and Respondent. v. Harriet H. JONES, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
B.L. Dart, John D. Parken, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
Glenn Richman, Salt Lake City, plaintiff and respondent.
Defendant appeals from the property distribution and alimony provisions of a decree of divorce, contending that she was not given an appropriate share of the marital assets and that the alimony award is insufficient. We affirm the property division, but reverse the alimony award and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The parties were married on December 13, 1952. They separated during May of 1980, and their divorce decree was entered on June 14, 1982. During the course of the marriage, the couple raised four children, built a 4,000-square-foot home in Sandy, Utah, and established a retail pharmacy business, Riverton Drug, which was the primary income-producing asset of the marriage. The husband is a licensed pharmacist. During the early years of the marriage, the wife worked in minor clerical jobs. However, after the family began to grow, she worked only intermittently, usually at the pharmacy or the associated gift shop. Her primary occupation during the marriage was raising the children, although she also volunteered considerable time to a variety of social service organizations.
After a day-long trial, the trial court issued a memorandum opinion awarding the parties a divorce and describing the property to be awarded to each. Shortly thereafter, the wife's counsel submitted findings of fact, which were approved by the trial court. The findings consisted of nothing more than statements taken from the court's memorandum opinion setting out the property division and reciting that it was "fair and equitable." Neither the memorandum decision nor the findings assigned individual values to each of the assets or a total value to the cumulative share being awarded to each party. Under the terms of the decree, the husband received Riverton Drug, including the land, building, and balance sheet assets, a condominium he had purchased subsequent to the parties' separation, together with its furnishings, a country club membership, and all interest in a time-share condominium in Mazatlan. The wife received the family home with its furnishings, a country club membership, a 1980 automobile, and several securities. In addition to the specific items of property, the wife was awarded $10,000 in cash, $3,500 in attorney fees, and monthly alimony of $1,000 for five years, $750 for five additional years, and $500 thereafter. The wife challenges both the property distribution and alimony provisions of the decree.
In a divorce proceeding, the trial court may make such orders concerning property distribution and alimony as are equitable. U.C.A., 1953, § 30-3-5 (1984 ed.). The trial court has broad latitude in such matters, and orders distributing property and setting alimony will not be lightly disturbed. See e.g., Higley v. Higley, Utah, 676 P.2d 379, 382 (1983); Dority v. Dority, Utah, 645 P.2d 56, 59 (1982); English v. English, Utah, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (1977). However, the trial court must exercise its discretion in accordance with the standard(s) that have been set by this Court. In the present case, we find that the trial court did not comply with those standards. We therefore reverse and remand, but only as to the alimony issue.
We address first the property distribution. The wife argues that the trial court awarded her such a small portion of the marital assets as to make the entire distribution inequitable. Ordinarily, we would assess the merit of such an assertion by reviewing the trial court's findings of fact and the values it assigned to the various items of property included in the distribution. However, in the present case there are no findings of fact that fix these values. In an attempt to compensate for the trial court's failure to make such findings, we have reviewed the record to determine whether the values were apparent from the evidence. However, that examination reveals that the valuation of the most important assets was hotly disputed by the parties. If the trial court accepted one set of values, the wife was clearly awarded too little; if another set was adopted, it is possible that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
On the present record, we cannot determine whether the trial court distributed the property equitably. In re Marriage of Martin, 22 Wash.App. 295, 588 P.2d 1235, 1236 (1979). To avoid problems of this nature, we require that when one of the parties to a property distribution raises a serious question as to the value of one or more of the assets, the trial court's distribution of those assets should be based upon written findings of fact that will permit appellate review. Cf. Chandler v. West, Utah, 610 P.2d 1299, 1301 (1980).
Counsel for the wife contends that the matter should be remanded to the trial court for entry of the required findings. The husband contends that such a remand is unnecessary. He relies on Pearson v. Pearson, Utah, 561 P.2d 1080 (1977), for the proposition that the trial court need only make generalized findings of fact to support its judgment and that the trial court's statement that the distribution was "fair and equitable" is a sufficient finding to sustain the judgment.
The husband misreads Pearson. There the court entered a decree dividing the marital property pursuant to a general formula stipulated to by the parties. Appellant asserted that the court failed to make detailed findings of fact showing that the distribution was in accord with the stipulation. We held that the discretion conferred on the trial court by section 30-3-5 of the Code could not be controlled by a stipulation of the parties and that the trial court's general and rather conclusory findings of fact were sufficient to support the property distribution. Id. at 1082. However, we specifically observed that the Pearson appellant did not claim that the ultimate distribution was inequitable. That fact was critical to the affirmance. In contrast, the gravamen of the wife's claim here is that the distribution was inequitable. To determine whether equity was done, we must have before us specific findings on the facts pertinent to that issue.
Normally, we would grant the remedy sought by the wife and remand for findings on the specific value of the assets. In this case, however, the wife's attorney prepared the inadequate findings of fact she challenges on appeal and the conclusions of law and decree of divorce, all of which the court entered without alteration. Counsel for the wife made no motion to have the trial court amend the findings to include values. See Utah R.Civ.P. 52(b). The wife cannot come now, albeit through new counsel, and complain of her own failure to include specific property values in the findings of fact. She has waived the claim.
The wife's second claim is that the trial court...
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