Jones v. Kelly

Decision Date22 April 1913
Citation78 S.E. 17,94 S.C. 349
PartiesJONES v. KELLY et al.
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Florence County; S.W. G Shipp, Judge.

Action by Ella F. Jones against Chas. M. Kelly and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Walter Hazard, of Georgetown, for appellant. Willcox & Willcox and Henry E. Davis, all of Florence, for respondents.

FRASER J.

This is an action to reform a deed. The complaint alleges: That heretofore, to wit, on or about the 5th day of October, 1868 one Charles McAllister, being then the owner thereof executed and delivered to E. T. Moody his certain deed, whereby he conveyed, in consideration of the sum of $500, a certain tract of land in Williamsburg county containing 15 acres (describing the land). That at the time of the conveyance above mentioned the sum of $500 was the full and fair value of the absolute title of said Chas. McAllister without any limitation or reservations. That as plaintiff is informed and believes the said Chas. McAllister and the said E. T. Moody both at the time understood that said E. T. Moody was receiving a conveyance in fee simple without reservation or limitation, and the said E. T. Moody paid the consideration mentioned in the deed with this understanding; but that on account of an error in the preparation of the deed of conveyance (which was prepared by a party not skilled in such matters) such deed was so formed as to convey, as plaintiff is informed and believes, a life estate only to the said E. T. Moody. That thereafter, by a succession of conveyances, the land was conveyed to the plaintiff. That Charles McAllister died in 1876. That the defendants are his heirs at law and the heirs of the heirs who are now dead. The complaint prays for a reformation of said deed, and that she be declared the owner of said land. Some of the defendants answered the allegations as to a mistake in the deed, and set up laches, etc. It was referred to a referee to take the testimony. The trial was had before his honor, Judge Prince, who in a very strong and elaborate decree found as follows: "Without prolonging the discussion to greater length, it is sufficient to say that a careful consideration of all the facts established by the testimony fails to satisfy me that there was a contract between McAllister and Moody, whereby the former agreed to convey to the latter a fee-simple estate in the property in question, and that through mistake the deed which was executed by McAllister failed to express that contract." E. T. Moody was offered as a witness. Moody had warranted the title, but during the taking of the testimony, after he had testified, he was given a release under his warranty, and he went back on the stand, and reaffirmed his statements. His honor ruled out the testimony of Moody, and held that the plaintiff was guilty of laches, and that the claim was stale. In the view that this court takes of this case, it will only be necessary to consider the ninth exception, and we will consider that exception as raising the initial question in this case and in its consideration will consider the testimony of Moody. Has the plaintiff shown that the deed from McAllister to Moody does not contain the contract between the parties?

There must be a meeting of two minds in order to make a contract. The complaint recognizes this, and alleges that both Charles McAllister and Moody understood that E. T. Moody was receiving a conveyance in fee simple. Moody testified: That he married a granddaughter of Charles McAllister. That he rented the land in dispute from him at $6 per month. That W. G. McAllister, a son of Charles and the uncle of Moody's wife, suggested to him that he buy the place, and that he talk to Charles about it. That he (Moody) went to see him (Charles), and the old man talked favorably about the sale. That some time afterwards he saw W. G. McAllister again, and told him that the old gentleman had talked favorably about it. That W. G. McAllister told him that he (W. G.) would see his father, and try to get the deed for him (Moody). That six months afterwards he was given the deed by W. G. McAllister, and executed the notes for the purchase money. W. G. McAllister is also dead. All that is known of Charles McAllister afterwards is that he collected some of the notes, and lived in that community until 1876. There is no word of direct evidence to show what Charles McAllister intended by the conveyance. It is said, however, that Charles McAllister lived close by, and could have seen Moody cut down the timber, and there is no evidence of his objection. That is true, but Moody testified that the timber was "very poor. It had been culled over, and it had pretty well all been burnt over." It is said that the deed was drawn by W. G. McAllister, and he was not skilled in such matters. That is true, but in 1872 Moody sold the land to M. L. Jones. This deed is also said to have been written by W. G. McAllister, and conveys a fee and a warranty that is significant. Judge Prince thinks that that warranty indicates a doubt as to the sufficiency of the title. In this we cannot say he was in error. W. G. McAllister used the word "heirs" in 1872, and used it in an inartificial conveyance. Charles McAllister was then alive and in that community. If the deed did not convey what he intended to convey and what Moody intended to purchase, that was the time to correct the mistake.

But it is said Moody paid full price for a fee, and that entitles him to a conveyance in fee. Full price standing alone has never been held to be conclusive that it was the intention to convey a fee. If a full price is sufficient of itself to carry a fee after the death of the grantor, then a small price after the death of the grantee ought to cut down a fee to a life estate or a term of years. That would be a very dangerous doctrine in this state, where land values are rapidly increasing. That is not the law, and we have not been referred to any case that so holds. The witnesses are not agreed as to whether it was full price or no. Moody paid $500 for land with a dwelling house on it which rented for more than 7 per cent. on $1,000. It is said Charles McAllister did not make any objection to the sale to M. L. Jones. There is no evidence of any objection, but he had no right to object as long as Moody lived. Moody lived until this case was nearly ready for a hearing before Judge Prince and testified in the case. This court cannot find any evidence to contradict the plain import of the deed. There is no evidence that Charles McAllister contracted to convey a fee, and none that even Mr. Moody stipulated for a fee. There was conflicting evidence as to what Mr. Moody thought he was getting. It will be observed that the plaintiff claims that the deed does not convey a fee simple but a life estate, and in the failure to convey a fee it failed to express the contract between the parties. The action is to reform the deed. The plaintiff proved that there was no contract except the deed, and thereby failed utterly to prove the essential fact necessary to reform the deed.

This court holds that the appellant has failed to prove the contract set up in the complaint. The testimony, though formally ruled out by Judge Prince, has been considered by this Court as it is all in the record. It would not have affected the result, and the error, if any, is immaterial. It was not error. The statute of this state excludes the testimony where it "can in any manner affect the interest of such witness or the interest previously owned or represented by him." What a travesty it would be to put a witness on the stand and allow him to state what will relieve him from liability, then release him from liability, and put him back on the stand, and ask him if the things to which he has just sworn are true or false. Our statute prevents just that thing. There was no error in ruling out the testimony of E. T. Moody.

As this court has held that the appellant has failed to establish the contract, the other questions do not arise.

The judgment of this court is that the judgment of the circuit court be affirmed.

GARY, C.J., and HYDRICK and WATTS, JJ., concur.

WOODS J. (dissenting).

The plaintiff, Ella F. Jones, being the holder of the deed to a tract of land hereinafter described, brought this action against all the heirs of Charles McAllister for the reformation of the title whereby Charles McAllister conveyed the land to E. T. Moody, under whom the plaintiff claims. The complaint alleges that on or about the 5th day of October 1868, Charles McAllister executed and delivered his certain deed to E. T. Moody, intending to convey the fee-simple title to 15 acres of land in the incorporate limits of the town of Lake City, county of Williamsburg, for the named consideration of $500; but by a mistake, caused by the deed having been drawn by an unskilled person, the necessary words of inheritance were omitted from the deed. The land was conveyed by E. T. Moody to M. L. Jones January 28, 1872; by M. L. Jones to Pittman Bros.; by Pittman Bros. to B. Wallace Jones, December 17, 1885; by B. Wallace Jones to Pittman Bros. April 17, 1895; by Pittman Bros. to Ella F. Jones, the plaintiff in this action, May 1, 1900. All the deeds made to the land since the transfer from Charles McAllister to E. T. Moody have been fee-simple titles. The deed which the plaintiff seeks to have reformed is as follows: "State of South Carolina, Williamsburg County. Know all men by these presents, that I, Charles McAllister, of the county and state aforesaid, for and in consideration of the sum of five hundred dollars to me paid by E. T. Moody, of Williamsburg county and state aforesaid, have granted, bargained,...

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6 cases
  • Allgood v. Allgood
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • January 28, 1926
    ...Hair, 99 S.E. 810, 112 S.C. 320; and Byrd v. O'Neal, 91 S.E. 293, 106 S.C. 346; Sullivan v. Moore, 75 S.E. 497, 92 S.C. 305; Jones v. Kelly, 78 S.E. 17, 94 S.C. 349; v. Lumber Co., 106 S.E. 478, 115 S.C. 452. In the case of Brock v. O'Dell our Supreme Court says: "The principle upon which c......
  • Gowdy v. Kelley
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • December 8, 1937
    ... ... Mosely, 102 S.C. 361, 86 S.E. 771; McMillan v ... Hughes, 88 S.C. 296, 70 S.E. 804; McMichael v ... McMichael, 51 S.C. 555, 29 S.E. 403; Jones v ... Swearingen, 42 S.C. 58, 19 S.E. 947. As was said by this ... court in Groce v. Benson, 168 S.C. 145, 167 S.E ... 151, 153: "Section 8694, ... intended.' (Italics added.) Sullivan v. Moore, ... 92 S.C. [305], 307, 75 S.E. 497. See, also, Jones v. Kelly, ... 94 S.C. 349, 78 S.E. 17." ...          In this ... case we are confronted with this situation: The deed as drawn ... conveys a life ... ...
  • Atlantic Coast Lumber Corp. v. Langston Lumber Co.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • April 8, 1924
    ... ... Eaddy, bearing date January 27, 1883, also another tract of ... 33 3/4 acres, in the same state and county by title from B ... Wallace Jones, bearing date August 21st, 1891; both of which ... titles were made to Samuel Yarborough." In this ... situation the contents of the deed attached ... ...
  • Groce v. Benson
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • January 5, 1933
    ... ... intended." (Italics added.) Sullivan v. Moore, ... 92 S.C. 307, 75 S.E. 497. See, also, Jones v. Kelly, ... 94 S.C. 349, 78 S.E. 17 ...          We have ... given this case painstaking thought and study. Our first ... reaction to ... ...
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