Jones v. Lyon Stores, 8510SC1207
| Decision Date | 05 August 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 8510SC1207,8510SC1207 |
| Citation | 82 N.C.App. 438,346 S.E.2d 303 |
| Parties | Lizzie JONES, v. LYON STORES, d/b/a Peace Street Open Air Market. |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Teague, Campbell, Dennis and Gorham by C. Woodrow Teague and Linda Stephens, Raleigh, for plaintiff-appellant.
Bell, Davis and Pitt, P.A. by William Kearns Davis and Stephen M. Russell, Winston-Salem, for defendant-appellee.
The only issue before this Court is whether the entry of summary judgment was appropriate. To be entitled to summary judgment, the moving party must establish that there are no triable issues of material fact, with all factual inferences arising from the evidence being drawn against the movant. King v. Allred, 309 N.C. 113, 305 S.E.2d 554 (1983).
A store owner's duty to invitees to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition extends to the manner in which the store owner deals with the criminal acts of third persons. Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 303 N.C. 636, 281 S.E.2d 36 (1981). The issue then is whether in the case sub judice defendant breached that duty.
Foreseeability is the test for determining a business owner's duty to safeguard his business invitees from the acts of third persons. Id. As stated in Foster,
If an invitee, such as the plaintiff in this case, alleges in a complaint that he or she was on the premises of a store owner, during business hours for the purpose of transacting business thereon, and that while he or she was on the premises injuries were sustained from the criminal acts of a third person, which acts were reasonably foreseeable by the store owner, and which could have been prevented by the exercise of ordinary care, then the plaintiff has set forth a cause of action in negligence which, if proved, would entitle that plaintiff to recover damages from the store owner.
Id. at 640, 281 S.E.2d at 39 (emphasis added).
The instant case differs from Foster in that the third party conduct causing injury is not an intentional criminal act such as an assault, but rather conduct incident to a nonviolent criminal act. In the process of fleeing, the apprehended shoplifting suspect knocked plaintiff down. The questions raised by these facts are whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the suspect would bolt and whether it was reasonably foreseeable that by locking the "Out" door, the defendant's employees increased the risk of harm to invitees on the premises, including plaintiff. In other words, under the circumstances was injury to someone more likely to occur if the suspect could only exit through the "In" door? "An act is negligent if the actor intentionally creates a situation which he knows, or should realize, is likely to...
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Giant Food, Inc. v. Mitchell
...evidence of negligence toward invitees using the entrance doors to prevent summary judgment for the defendant in Jones v. Lyon Stores, 346 S.E.2d 303 (N.C.Ct.App.), cert. denied, 349 S.E.2d 861 (N.C.1986). The design of the store doors in that case was apparently similar to that of the door......
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Mitchell v. Giant Food, Inc.
...did not impress the court as being unforeseeable. Summary judgment for a store owner was also reversed in Jones v. Lyon Stores, 82 N.C.App. 438, 346 S.E.2d 303 (1986). The practice in these stores was to lock the exit doors when a shoplifting was in progress and call the police. The system ......
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Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp.
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Betts v. Jones
...safe condition extends to the manner in which the store owner deals with the criminal acts of third persons." Jones v. Lyon Stores, 82 N.C.App. 438, 440, 346 S.E.2d 303, 304, disc. review denied, 318 N.C. 506, 349 S.E.2d 861, (1986). Our Supreme Court has held that "[o]rdinarily the store o......