Jones v. Mahoning Cnty. Clerk of Court
| Decision Date | 18 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 18 MA 0074 |
| Citation | 2019 Ohio 1097 |
| Parties | AARON L. JONES, SR., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MAHONING COUNTY CLERK OF COURT, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Aaron Jones, Sr., pro se, A511-342, 2500 South Avon Beldon Road, Grafton, Ohio 44044 for Plaintiff-Appellant and Atty. Paul J. Gains, Mahoning County Prosecutor, 21 West Boardman Street, 6th Floor, Atty. Gina Zawrotuk, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 21 West Boardman Street, 5th Floor, Youngstown, Ohio 44503, for Defendant-Appellee.
{¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant Aaron L. Jones Sr. appeals the decision of the Mahoning County Common Pleas Court dismissing the action he filed against Mahoning County Clerk of Court Anthony Vivo. He contends the court erred in not continuing the case to allow for his appearance at a hearing on the Clerk of Court's motion to dismiss and states the trial court should order his production from prison. He also argues the court erred in sustaining the motion to dismiss. For the following reasons, the trial court judgment is affirmed.
{¶2} On March 15, 2018, Appellant filed a pro se action against the Clerk of Courts. His pleading cited R.C. 2743.48 () and asserted he was wrongfully imprisoned for aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery after being convicted in Mahoning County Common Pleas Court Case Number 06 CR 95. On this topic, he set forth the following allegations: ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal; suppression; inadmissible evidence undermining the fairness of trial; due process violations; insufficient evidence of guilt; perjury; weight of the evidence; use of a key to commit burglary; and speedy trial.
{¶3} Amid his allegations on wrongful imprisonment, Appellant also inartfully accused the Clerk of Courts of improperly docketing his April 10, 2013 and March 2, 2018 filings in the criminal case instead of as separate civil actions; he characterized these filings as his attempts to file wrongful imprisonment actions. He quoted R.C. 2743.48(B)(1), which states the "civil action to be declared a wrongfully imprisoned individual" shall be filed in the court of common pleas in the county where the underlying criminal action was initiated and "[t]hat civil action shall be separate from the underlying finding of guilt by the court of common pleas."
{¶4} The Clerk of Courts filed a motion to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The motion set forth two reasons for dismissal. First, the motion argued a clerk of courts is not a proper party in a wrongful imprisonment action under R.C. 2743.48, which demonstrates the state is the real party in interest to such an action and the state bears the ultimate risk of a monetary judgment under the wrongful imprisonment statute. Second, the motion asserted the complaint did not allege the "conviction was vacated, dismissed, or reversed on appeal" which is an element of the claim under R.C. 2743.48(A)(4). It was urged that Appellant admitted this element was not satisfied as he conceded he still "sits in prison" as a result of the criminal case for which he claims wrongful imprisonment and he sought to be released and compensated.
{¶5} Appellant responded to the motion to dismiss criticizing the attorney representing the Clerk of Courts for not realizing that he was not accusing the Clerk of Courts of wrongful imprisonment but was accusing the Clerk of Courts of negligently violating the language in the wrongful imprisonment statute, which defines the action as a civil action to be filed separately from the criminal action. He attached a copy of the docket in the criminal case showing his 2013 and 2018 "demands" for release due to alleged wrongful imprisonment.
{¶6} Still, he presented arguments on wrongful imprisonment and attached this court's December 19, 2017 judgment entry in a post-conviction appeal, wherein we issued a limited remand to the trial court for a nunc pro tunc entry to correct the post-release control portion of Appellant's sentence. Appellant criticized this ruling, claiming a nunc pro tunc entry was improper as his sentence was void due to the post-release control issue.
{¶7} On June 22, 2018, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The court concluded Appellant failed to allege a cognizable action against the Clerk of Courts. The court further found Appellant's pleading failed to assert a claim under R.C. 2743.48 that he was a wrongfully imprisoned individual as his conviction was not vacated, dismissed, or reversed on appeal. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
{¶8} To dismiss a complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, it must appear beyond doubt the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle him to the relief sought. Ohio Bur. of Workers' Comp. v. McKinley, 130 Ohio St.3d 156, 2011-Ohio-4432, 956 N.E.2d 814, ¶ 12. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is a procedural mechanism which tests the sufficiency of the complaint on its face. State ex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 65 Ohio St.3d 545, 548, 605 N.E.2d 378 (1992) (). The allegations of the complaint are assumed to be true and are construed in the non-movant's favor, along with any reasonable inferences. Id.
{¶9} Under the notice pleading required by Civ.R. 8(A), the complaint shall contain: "(1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled." Although a plaintiff is not required to prove his case in the complaint, the complaint must allege the facts constituting the elements of the claim with sufficient particularity so that reasonable notice is given to the opposing party. In re Election Contest of Democratic Primary Held May 4, 1999 for Clerk, Youngstown Mun. Court, 87 Ohio St.3d 118, 120, 717 N.E.2d 701 (1999). Furthermore: "Legal conclusions in a complaint do not enjoy a presumption of truth under a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) review." Marks v. Reliable Title Agency, Inc., 7th Dist. No. 11 MA 22, 2012-Ohio-3006, ¶ 10. In other words, where there is a failure to allege one of the elements of the claim, we do not presume the existence of the element because the plaintiff generally asserted a named claim. The appellate court conducts a de novo review of a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal. McKinley, 130 Ohio St.3d 156 at ¶ 12.
{¶10} Appellant's first two assignments of error provide:
{¶11} After the Clerk of Courts filed the motion to dismiss, two notices of assignment were issued on April 16, 2018, setting a motion hearing and a status hearing for May 18, 2018. An entry filed on May 21, 2018 stated: the case was called for a status hearing; Appellant was unable to appear due to his incarceration; a non-oral hearing on the motion to dismiss would occur on June 20, 2018; and the status hearing would be rescheduled after a ruling on the motion to dismiss. On May 23, 2018, Appellant filed an objection to proceeding without his presence. The court issued the dismissal entry on June 22, 2018.
{¶12} On appeal, Appellant sets forth allegations about: his inquiries as to why he was not transported the day before the hearing from the prison in Lorain County to the hearing in Mahoning County; his mother believing it would be a video hearing; and his suspicion a prison secretary thwarted his appearance by video. Initially, we note the record contains no mention of a video appearance when setting the May 18, 2018 hearing. We also note a request within the complaint to appear in person (and to be transported from prison) if a hearing is granted on the allegations in his complaint is not equivalent to a request to be present at any future status hearing or at any future dismissal hearing if the defendant files a motion to dismiss. In any event, the May 18, 2018 hearing did not proceed as a dismissal hearing, which was reset. The May 18, 2018 status hearing was continued until after the motion to dismiss was resolved; however, because the case was later dismissed, the rescheduled status hearing was never held.
{¶13} As for the rescheduled dismissal hearing, Appellant suggests he had the right to be orally heard on the motion to dismiss and the trial court therefore should have set it for oral hearing (instead of a non-oral hearing) and ensured his presence at the rescheduled hearing. After the dismissal hearing was reset, Appellant did essentially object to proceeding in his absence. (Response 5/13/18). However, the hearing was reset to proceed as a non-oral hearing.
{¶14} Appellant cites Crim.R. 43(A). However, this is a criminal rule providing "the defendant must be physically present at every stage of the criminal proceeding and trial" (except as otherwise provided) and sets forth the procedure for contemporaneous video arrangements upon a waiver of presence. Likewise, his citation to the Confrontation Clause in his reply brief is not pertinent to a civil case. See U.S. Constitution, Sixth Amendment. See also State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lytle, 10th Dist. No. 84AP-424 (1985) (...
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