Jones v. Major, 37576
| Decision Date | 17 September 1957 |
| Docket Number | No. 37576,37576 |
| Citation | 317 P.2d 190 |
| Parties | Wesley JONES, Plaintiff in Error, v. T. F. MAJOR and S. L. Erwin, Defendants in Error. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. In a law action the verdict of the jury is conclusive as to all disputed facts and all conflicting statements, and where there is any competent evidence reasonably
tending to support the verdict of the jury, this court will not disturb its verdict and judgment based thereon.
2. Instructions which submit the vital features of the tenable legal theories of both litigants upon the issues of fact involved are sufficient.
3. In an action to recover a real estate commission it is error for a trial court to render judgment unless the plaintiff has alleged and proved he was a licensed real estate broker, or salesman at the time the alleged cause of action arose.
Appeal from the District Court of Cleveland County; Elvin J. Brown, Judge.
Action to recover broker's commission on sale of real estate. Plaintiffs recovered judgment and defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded with directions.
A. H. Huggins, Norman, for plaintiff in error.
Bailey & Whitlock, Norman, for defendants in error.
Plaintiff brought this action to recover money ($800) alleged to be due and owing to plaintiffs as one-half of the amount of a real estate commission collected by defendant from the sale of land.
The petition in substance alleged plaintiffs were real estate brokers in Chickasha, Oklahoma, and that defendant was a real estate broker located in Norman, Oklahoma. In April, 1954, plaintiff, T. F. Major, entered an oral agreement with defendant whereby he would bring prospective buyers to the Norman area, and in company with defendant would show such prospects various parcels of land listed for sale; the agreement was that any commission received from consummated sales were to be divided equally. Pursuant to such agreement plaintiff brought a prospective farm buyer to look over various properties listed by defendant for sale, and this buyer was shown several farms, including the Brown farm. In June, 1954 the prospective buyer purchased this farm and defendant received $1,600 commission on the transaction, but failed and refused to pay plaintiff any part thereof.
Defendant answered by general denial, other than for specific admission that; defendant was a real estate saleman, had talked with Major in April, 1954 and had agreed if he would bring prospective buyers to Norman and accompany defendant in showing properties defendant would divide any commission received; on April 8, 1954 plaintiff brought a prospect (Walker) who was shown several properties, none of which were suitable, but the Brown farm was not shown to Walker. Defendant requested plaintiff to bring Walker, or any buyer, to Norman but plaintiff failed and refused to comply and completely abandoned the agreement. Defendant specifically denied plaintiffs showed the property purchased, had anything to do with the sale thereof, or furnished the prospective purchaser of the property. The issues raised by these pleadings were tried to a jury.
The evidence presented by the parties in support of their respective positions was conflicting. The nature of the questions urged as grounds for reversal of the judgment do not require an extended narrative of the testimony. The plaintiff, Major, the active participant in the transaction, testified that he knew Walker desired to purchase a farm and so brought the buyer to Norman and the parties showed him several farms; on the return trip to Chickasha Walker was shown the Brown farm, but thought the price too high. Plaintiff later telephoned defendant and advised him of this fact, and asked that he be notified if the price was reduced. Plaintiff heard nothing further of the matter until he learned Walker had purchased the farm through defendant and another broker who had received part of the commission. The plaintiff was corroborated in certain respects by the buyer, Walker, who was shown the farm by plaintiff, but who bought through defendant and another (Moran) after Brown reduced the price.
Defendant's testimony admitted the oral agreement with plaintiff, but was in direct opposition to plaintiff's evidence upon most of the other facts surrounding the transaction. Defendant admitted discussing the Brown farm and the price with plaintiff, who testified to calling defendant and telling him Walker would buy if the price was lowered, and asked that defendant notify him if this occurred; defendant wrote plaintiff asking that the buyer be brought back but received no answer; thereafter had a telephone conversation wherein plaintiff promised to see Walker, but did not hear anything more; the transaction was completed later through Moran, to whom defendant paid a third of the commission.
Consideration of the case under the trial court's instructions, the giving of one of which is asserted to constitute reversible error, resulted in a verdict for plaintiff. Defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was overruled and the judgment appealed from was entered upon the jury verdict.
The various assignments of error urged as grounds for reversal of this judgment are presented by a general argument which, for the sake of clarity, we shall subdivide for consideration. Certain of the assigned error are directed at the sufficiency of the evidence to withstand defendant's demurrer thereto, and to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict of the jury. The conflicting nature of the evidence relative to the handling and culmination of the transaction following the parties' oral agreement, existence of which the defendant admitted, was pointed out above. The verdict rendered by the jury resolved each and every matter presented by the conflicting testimony in the plaintiffs' favor. The judgment which resulted from the jury's finding in this case clearly falls within the rule that a verdict based upon conflicting evidence will not be disturbed on appeal.
The second portion of the argument is derived from assignments of error directed at the amount...
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Markel Service, Inc. v. National Farm Lines
...this statute which are relied upon by appellant are thus distinguishable. E. g., Ratcliff v. Cobb, 439 P.2d 194 (Okl. 1968); Jones v. Major, 317 P.2d 190 (Okl. 1957). Appellant asserts as an affirmative defense that there existed between itself and appellee an implied accord and satisfactio......
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Sarber v. Harris
...the sale of property had been entered into between the parties when plaintiff made the deposit sought to be recovered. See Jones v. Major et al., Okl., 317 P.2d 190. The fact situation in the present case is not analogous to that in Burford v. Bridwell, 199 Okl. 245, 185 P.2d 216, 218, 219,......
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Loftis v. LaSalle
...by the State of Oklahoma at the time this cause of action arose. We, therefore, choose to adhere to the rule announced in Jones v. Majors, Okl., 317 P.2d 190, taking note that the effort of plaintiff here, though failing to establish a legitimate reason for having neglected to comply with t......
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Pointer v. Symonds
...that he or it had a license as required in the Act. The word 'co-partnership' was deleted in a 1953 amendment. We held in Jones v. Major, Okl., 317 P.2d 190, that such requirement is jurisdictional, and because it appeared that the failure of proof in this regard was an oversight, remanded ......