Jones v. Moore

Decision Date31 March 1868
Citation42 Mo. 413
PartiesCHARLES JONES, Defendant in Error, v. GEORGE W. MOORE and BENJAMIN F. HICKMAN, Plaintiffs in Error.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Error to St. Louis Circuit Court.

This was a suit brought by Jones, defendant in error, against Moore and Hickman, plaintiffs in error, upon two promissory notes for $1,500 each, payable to the order of James W. Wilson. To secure payment of the notes, Moore and Hickman executed to James M. Ming, as trustee of Wilson, a deed of trust on certain land in Franklin county. Hickman and Moore subsequently, in 1860, sold the land to Josiah Thornburgh, who assumed payment of the incumbrance. Wilson, the payee of the notes, indorsed the same to the plaintiff, Jones, who commenced suit in 1863, after the notes matured. After the commencement of the suit, Thornburgh conveyed the land to Hickman, who filed a supplemental and amended answer, alleging, among other things, that by the terms of the deed of trust, if the notes should not be paid at maturity, then the said Ming or his legal representative, or the sheriff, might sell the property or any part thereof at public vendue, to the highest bidder, at Union, in Franklin county, for cash--first giving thirty days' public notice of the time, terms, and place of the sale and of the property to be sold, by advertisement in some newspaper printed in St. Louis and Franklin county. The answer alleged that Ming had not followed the power given him by the deed of trust; that he had not advertised the sale in any newspaper printed in St. Louis; but at the instance of Jones, the owner of said notes, he caused an advertisement to be published in some newspaper printed in Franklin county, that he would, on the 28th day of November, 1861, in the town of Union, county of Franklin, proceed to sell said real estate; that on the day and place appointed said Ming exposed the same for sale in a lump, and that the same was purchased by Jones for $2,700; that by collusion with Jones he had prevented the land from bringing a fair price at the sale by demanding payment of the bid in gold coin instanter upon striking off the property to the highest bidder; that on account of the condition of the country it was unsafe for a man to take the amount due upon the notes in coin to Union at the sale; that he had made arrangements for the coin, and had the same in bank at St. Louis, to meet the amount of the bid; that he sent an agent to bid for the property at the sale, with authority to state that the gold was in bank to meet the bid and would be forthcoming; and that Jones, the plaintiff, at the sale publicly stated and declared that gold would be required immediately upon declaring the land struck off; and that Ming, the trustee, allowed himself to be controlled by Jones; and that by these means Jones bought the land for $2,700, when it had cost $8,000 and was worth that sum or more. The answer set out substantially the same aver ments as the petition in Thornburgh v. Jones, 36 Mo. 515.

Plaintiff filed his replication denying most of the matter set up as a defense in defendant's answer.

At the trial the plaintiff presented the notes and rested his cause.

The defendant read in evidence a copy of the deed of trust to Ming as trustee, dated April 25, 1859, duly certified from the record of deeds in Franklin county, requiring the advertisement to be published in some newspaper published in St. Louis Franklin county.” The plaintiff, in his rebuttal, produced the original deed, which appeared to read “St. Louis or Franklin county,” and evidence was given to show that this word “or” was in the original at the time it was written, and consequently that the recorder, in recording the deed, had committed an error.

The proof shows that the sale was made November 28, 1861, at Union, in Franklin county, and notice was published in a newspaper published or printed at Washington in said county.

Defendant then called several witnesses, who testified as to the condition of affairs caused by the rebellion, and that it would have been unsafe for persons to travel with a large amount of gold through Franklin county.

Testimony was given to show how the sale was conducted, and that Ming, the trustee, allowed Jones to proclaim that payment of the bid in gold would be required instanter; and that, when spoken to before the sale and shown a letter to give assurance that upon the bid of Hickman's agent the gold would be paid, he expressed a willingness to accept the bid, but was afraid of the plaintiff, Jones. Testimony was offered going to show that, but for the proclamation of Jones, the property would have been bid up to $4,000 or $4,500. The defendant also offered testimony to show that the value of the property was about $8,000.

Plaintiff offered testimony in rebuttal as to the condition of the country, and as to the value of the property and the conduct of the sale. He also offered in evidence a notice he had served upon defendant Hickman, offering him the property for the amount due upon the notes and that bid at the sale and the expenses.

C. C. Whittelsey, for plaintiffs in error.

I. At the date of the sale by the trustee, Thornburgh was the owner of the land, and as to him the deed as it was recorded showed the powers of the trustee, and he had notice only of the deed as it stood of record. As the trustee did not pursue the powers as recited in the recorded deed, the sale was void, and Thornburgh had a right to redeem the land from the purchaser after the sale, and his deed conveys the right of redemption. (Thornburgh v. Jones, 36 Mo. 514; Le Neve v. Le Neve, 2 Wh. & Tud. L. C. Eq., ed. 1852, Am. Notes, 125; 2 Am. Law Reg., N. S., October 1863, §§ 21, 22.)

II. Hickman, as a purchaser from Thornburgh, is protected as a purchaser through a purchaser without notice. (Bassett v. Nosworthy, 2 Wh. & Tud. L. C. Eq., ed. 1852, Am. Notes, p. 50.

III. The conduct of the trustee, Ming, and of the cestui que trust and purchaser, Jones, was oppressive, unjust, and unequitable.

Jones, for defendant in error.

I. The points relied on by defendants, Moore and Hickman, in this action, are, first, that the advertisement by which the land was to be sold was to be in some newspaper printed in St. Louis and in Franklin county, and that such was the understanding of Wilson and defendants, Moore and Hickman, and that the word and was omitted. To overthrow this allegation, the original deed of trust is interposed and offered in evidence to the tribunal trying the case, by which it is seen that the instrument referred to by defendants was not a true copy of the original, and that it was provided in the original deed of trust that said notice should be published in some newspaper published in St. Louis or Franklin county. H. R. Sweet, who drew the deed of trust, was present, and was examined by the defendants, and was their own witness, and he stated that he wrote the deed, and that he made the original deed as it is offered, with the word “or” in it, and gave as his reason for so writing it that there were times when there was no newspaper published in Franklin county, and that when there were none it might be published in St. Louis county. No objection was made to the publication of it prior to the sale.

Glover & Shepley, for defendant in error.

I. There is nothing saved by the record and assignment of errors upon which to ground a judgment of reversal. 1. The suit was a suit at law to recover the amount due upon three promissory notes made by said defendants to one Wilson and indorsed to plaintiff. The fact that the notes were secured by a deed of trust upon certain land out of...

To continue reading

Request your trial
39 cases
  • Magwire v. Tyler
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • October 31, 1870
    ...Peyton v. Rose, 41 Mo. 257; Curd v. Lackland, 43 Mo. 139; Young v. Coleman, id. 179; Gray v. Payne, id. 203; Wynn v. Cory, id. 301; Jones v. Moore, 42 Mo. 413; Lambert v. Blumenthal, 26 Mo. 471; Gott v. Powell, 41 Mo. 416.) It is a grave error--an entirely mistaken notion--to suppose that a......
  • Zickel v. Knell
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • March 8, 1948
    ...asking affirmative relief was properly dismissed, because: A counterclaim which wholly defeats plaintiff's demand is not allowable. Jones v. Moore, 42 Mo. 413; Hauser v. Burge, 121 S.W.2d 314; Glaus Gosche, 118 S.W.2d 42. (7) A final judgment should dispose of all issues. Hence the counterc......
  • Schwartzman v. London & Lancashire Fire Ins. Co., Limited, of Liverpool, England
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • February 4, 1928
    ... ... Fire Ins. Co., 55 W.Va. 286; Mason v. Ins. Co. (Mo ... App), 258 S.W. 759; Bishop v. Ins. Co., 130 ... N.Y. 563; Jones v. Northern Assur. Co., 182 Ky. 701 ... (3) Trevor's visit to the scene of the fire did not ... render him incompetent, since under the law ... Real Estate Co., ... 150 Mo. 377; Crowe v. Peters, 63 Mo. 435; ... McFarland v. Railway Co., 125 Mo. 275; Jones v ... Moore, 42 Mo. 413; Blair v. Railroad Co., 89 ... Mo. 383; Henderson v. Dickey, 50 Mo. 166; ... Stevenson v. Judy, 49 Mo. 227; Paddock v. Somes, ... ...
  • Schwartzman v. Fire Insurance Co.
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • February 4, 1928
    ...Ry. Co., 162 Mo. 424; Cornwall v. Real Estate Co., 150 Mo. 377; Crowe v. Peters, 63 Mo. 435; McFarland v. Railway Co., 125 Mo. 275; Jones v. Moore, 42 Mo. 413; Blair v. Railroad Co., 89 Mo. 383; Henderson v. Dickey, 50 Mo. 166; Stevenson v. Judy, 49 Mo. 227; Paddock v. Somes, 102 Mo. DAVIS,......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT