Jones v. Perkins

• Decision Date: 06 January 1977
• Docket Number: No. 75--234,75--234
• Citation: 248 N.W.2d 468,75 Wis.2d 18
• Parties: John M. JONES and Sharon R. Jones, his wife, Plaintiffs, v. John P. PERKINS and Farmers Insurance Exchange, a Foreign Insurance Corporation, Appellants, and Lawrence D. Call and Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company, Defendants. John P. PERKINS and Farmers Insurance Exchange, a Foreign Insurance Corporation, Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, a Foreign Corporation, Third-Party Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 468

248 N.W.2d 468

75 Wis.2d 18

John M. JONES and Sharon R. Jones, his wife, Plaintiffs, v. John P. PERKINS and Farmers Insurance Exchange, a Foreign

Insurance Corporation, Appellants,

and

Lawrence D. Call and Employers Mutual Liability Insurance

Company, Defendants.

John P. PERKINS and Farmers Insurance Exchange, a Foreign

Insurance Corporation, Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, a Foreign Corporation,

Third-Party Defendant-Respondent.

No. 75--234.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Argued Dec. 1, 1976.

Decided Jan. 6, 1977.

Thomas E. Greenwald, East Tory (argued), of counsel, Pfeil & Graves, Elkhorn, on the brief, for appellants.

Joseph D. McDevitt, Milwaukee (argued), Borgelt, Powell, Peterson & Frauen, Milwaukee, on the brief, for respondent.

HANLEY, Justice.

Three issues are presented on this appeal:

1. Is the insurer entitled to summary judgment because the vehicle involved was 'furnished or available for the regular use' of the insured?

2. Is the insurer entitled to summary judgment on the ground that the insured failed to give timely notice under the policy?

3. Is the insurer collaterally estopped from challenging the apportionment of negligence?

Vehicle Furnished for Regular Use

The insurance policy under consideration in this case provides that

'AETNA CASUALTY will pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which the Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage, arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of an owned automobile or a non-owned automobile. . . .' (emphasis added).

The squad car operated by the insured, Lawrence Call, at the time of the collision in this case was clearly not an 'owned automobile,' and hence to determine if there is coverage for liability, it is necessary to determine whether the squad car qualified as a 'non-owned automobile' under the policy. The policy states:

"non-owned automobile' means an automobile not owned by or furnished or available for the regular use of either the named Insured or any resident of the same household, and includes, while used therewith, a home trailer not owned by the named Insured or a utility trailer, but 'non-owned automobile' does not include a temporary substitute automobile;' (emphasis added).

Thus, if the squad car operated by Call was 'furnished or available for the regular use' of Call, then it was not a 'non-owned automobile,' and no coverage was afforded under the policy while he was driving it.

The interpretation and application of the term 'regular use' depends upon the particular facts and circumstances in each case, Le Mense v. Thiel, 25 Wis.2d 364, 367, 130 N.W.2d 875, 876 (1964). As with all factual questions, however, the insufficiency of the proof may be a question of law. Where the material facts are not in dispute, the question of whether a vehicle was 'furnished for the regular use' of its driver is proper for determination on a motion for summary judgment. Moutry v. American Mutual Liability Insurance Co., 35 Wis.2d 652, 151 N.W.2d 630 (1967); Le Mense v. Thiel, supra.

Appellants contend the regular use provision should be interpreted in favor of the insured because it is not clear whether it refers to personal or business use or both. Although some courts have concluded the 'regular use' provision is ambiguous, the authorities indicate that the majority of the jurisdictions have not found such an ambiguity but have interpreted the provision in relation to the particular circumstances of each case. See 13 Couch on Insurance 2d secs. 45:1051, 45:1054 (1965); Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 937, sec. 6 (1962).

This court has previously found this exclusion to be unambiguous. Giese v. Karstedt, 30 Wis.2d 630, 634, 141 N.W.2d 886, 888 (1966); Lontkowski v. Ignarski, 6 Wis.2d 561, 566--67, 95 N.W.2d 230, 233 (1959). In Moutry v. American Mutual Liability Insurance Co., supra, the court noted:

"The general purpose and effect of this provision of the policy is to give coverage to the insured while engaged in the only infrequent or merely casual use of an automobile other than the one described in the policy, but not to cover him against personal liability with respect to his use of another automobile which he frequently uses or has the opportunity to do so." Moutry, supra, 35 Wis.2d at 657, 151 N.W.2d at 632, quoting Campbell v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 211 F.2d 732, 736 (4th Cir. 1954).

In the present case Aetna submitted the affidavit of Kenneth Curtis, a captain with the Rock County Sheriff's Department. The evidentiary matters contained in that affidavit must be deemed uncontroverted for the failure of appellant to file counteraffidavits. Leszcznski v. Surges, 30 Wis.2d 534, 539, 141 N.W.2d 261, 265 (1966); Hein v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 29 Wis.2d 702, 706, 139 N.W.2d 611, 613 (1966). In his affidavit Curtis states that he is familiar with the procedures for assigning Rock County Sheriff's Department vehicles to deputy sheriffs and that it was the policy of the department to assign to a patrolman...