Jones v. Prince George's County
Decision Date | 13 November 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 42,42 |
Citation | 835 A.2d 632,378 Md. 98 |
Parties | Prince Carmen JONES, Sr., et al. v. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, Maryland, et al. |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Terrell N. Roberts, III (Roberts & Wood, Riverdale; Patrick Malone of Stein, Mitchell & Mezinnes, Washington, DC), all on brief, for Appellants.
Michael S. Rosier (Law Offices of Michael S. Rosier and Associates, Oxon Hill), on brief; Rhonda L. Weaver, Associate County Atty. (Leonard L. Lucchi, County Atty, and John A. Bielec, Deputy County Atty., Upper Marlboro), on brief, for Appellees.
Argued before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, and BATTAGLIA, JJ ELDRIDGE, Judge.
The principal issue in this case concerns the proper party or parties to bring a wrongful death action, under Maryland Code , § 3-901 et seq. of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, where some of the alleged wrongful acts occurred in Maryland, where other alleged wrongful acts took place in Virginia, and where the death occurred in Virginia.1 We shall hold that Maryland law determines the threshold matter of whether a particular party may bring the suit. We shall also hold that the Circuit Court erred in ruling that Virginia tort law applied to the alleged wrongful acts of all of the defendants. In addition, we shall conclude that the Circuit Court improperly dismissed the action on the ground of forum non conveniens.
Since the Circuit Court for Prince George's County granted a motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' action as to all defendants, we shall set forth the facts of the case in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Rite Aid v. Hagley, 374 Md. 665, 684, 824 A.2d 107, 118 (2003) (); Messing v. Bank of America, 373 Md. 672, 683-684, 821 A.2d 22, 28 (2003); International Broth. of Teamsters v. Corroon Corp., 369 Md. 724, 728, 802 A.2d 1050, 1052 (2002); Home For Incurables v. University of Maryland Medical System Corp., 369 Md. 67, 70, 797 A.2d 746, 747 (2002); Lovelace v. Anderson, 366 Md. 690, 695, 785 A.2d 726, 728-729 (2001) ().
On September 1, 2000, Corporal Carlton B. Jones and Sergeant Alexandre Bailey, of the Prince George's County Police Department, driving separate vehicles, followed a vehicle driven by Prince Carmen Jones, Jr. from the District of Columbia into Prince George's County, Maryland, back through the District of Columbia and into Fairfax County, Virginia. Prince Carmen Jones, Jr. was a resident of Maryland and was driving to Virginia in order to visit his fiancee, Candace Jackson, who resided in Virginia. The police officers were each driving unmarked sports utility vehicles. When Prince Carmen Jones, Jr. pulled into a driveway in a street in Fairfax County, Virginia, Corporal Jones pulled up behind him and blocked his exit.2 Corporal Jones exited his vehicle, exhibited his weapon, but allegedly failed to identify himself as a police officer. Prince Carmen Jones, Jr. attempted to flee the scene, and Corporal Jones fired sixteen shots at him, five of which hit Prince Carmen Jones, Jr. in the back, and one in the arm. Sergeant Bailey was not on the scene at this time. Prince Carmen Jones, Jr. died a short time later in Virginia.
Following the death of Prince Carmen Jones, Jr. his mother, Mabel S. Jones, was appointed, by the Register of Wills of Prince George's County, Maryland, to be the personal representative of Prince Carmen Jones, Jr.'s intestate estate.3 At the time of his death, Prince Carmen Jones, Jr. was unmarried but engaged to be married to Candace Jackson, the mother of Nina Jones. Nina had been born on October 2, 1999, and Prince Carmen Jones, Jr. had openly acknowledged her as his daughter. Candace Jackson consented to Mabel being the personal representative on behalf of her daughter as a beneficiary of the estate of Prince Carmen Jones, Jr.
The complaint further asserted that Sergeant Bailey, the Prince George's County Chief of Police, the Prince George's County Police Department, and Prince George's County were vicariously liable for Corporal Jones's actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior. In addition, the complaint alleged that these same defendants were directly liable for their own tortious conduct. The plaintiffs contended that Corporal Jones's use of excessive force was "part of a pattern of excessive force by Prince George's police officers" and was "the result of a municipal policy and custom, implemented and controlled by Chief Farrell, of providing inadequate training and supervision for its officers in how to handle street encounters with civilians without unnecessary use of lethal force." It was alleged that the Prince George's County Police Department "had a policy of tolerating and even encouraging these episodes of excessive force by failing to investigate and take appropriate disciplinary and restraining actions against the officers involved," and that the Police Chief "knew... that county police officers were repeatedly injuring civilians by use of excessive force." The plaintiffs claimed that Prince George's County's failure and/or refusal to provide proper supervision and training to its police officers "led directly to the death of Prince Jones, Jr." The complaint also alleged violations of Prince Carmen Jones, Jr.'s constitutional rights under Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
The complaint asserted that some of "the wrongful conduct causing the death of Prince Jones occurred in Virginia" and was, therefore, governed by "Virginia substantive law." The complaint also asserted that, "because some of the negligent and wrongful conduct described herein occurred in Maryland," to some "extent ... this action is ... governed by Maryland substantive law." The plaintiffs sought both compensatory and punitive damages.
Mabel S. Jones, whom the Prince George's County Register of Wills had appointed to be personal representative of the estate of Prince Carmen Jones, Jr., filed a motion to intervene which the Circuit Court granted. Mabel Jones then filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the plaintiffs' entire action on the ground that Virginia law controlled and that, under Virginia law, she, as the personal representative of Prince Carmen Jones, Jr.'s estate, was the only person authorized to bring a wrongful death action.4 In her motion for summary judgment, Mabel Jones stated that she had brought a wrongful death action, based on the death of Prince Carmen Jones, Jr., in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.5 The defendants Carlton Jones, Alexandre Bailey, Police Chief John Farrell, the Prince George's County Police Department, and Prince George's County also sought a dismissal of the plaintiffs' action on the ground of forum non conveniens.
As earlier indicated, the Circuit Court for Prince George's County granted Mabel Jones's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the entire action. The Circuit Court held that, "[u]nder Maryland law, in a wrongful death action where the wrongful death occurs in another State, `a Maryland Court shall apply the substantive law of that jurisdiction.'" The court went on to hold that the proper party to bring a wrongful death action was a matter of substantive law which was controlled by the law of Virginia, and that, under Virginia law, only Mabel Jones was entitled to bring the action.6 The Circuit Court also agreed with the defendants'"position that Virginia is a more convenient forum" because 7
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, challenging all three rulings by the Circuit Court.8 Prior to oral argument in that intermediate appellate court, we issued a writ of certiorari. Jones v. Prince George's County, 369 Md. 570, 801 A.2d 1031 (2002). We shall address all three issues raised by the plaintiffs,...
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