Jones v. Providence Redevelopment Agency

• Decision Date: 09 March 1961
• Docket Number: No. 10160,10160
• Parties: James JONES et ux. v. PROVIDENCE REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY. Ex.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 156

168 A.2d 156

92 R.I. 285

James JONES et ux. v. PROVIDENCE REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY.

Ex. No. 10160.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

March 9, 1961.

Archie Smith, providence, for petitioners.

Timothy J. McCarthy, Vincent J. Baccari, James G. Dolan, Jr., Providence, for respondent.

CONDON, Chief Justice.

This is a petition for assessment of damages which was brought in the superior court pursuant to G.L.1956, chap. 45-32, as a result of condemnation proceedings. After a trial the jury returned a verdict for the petitioners for $15,200. However, they were dissatisfied with that sum and filed a motion for a new trial which the trial justice denied. Thereafter they duly prosecuted the instant bill of exceptions to this court.

Under their exceptions which relate to certain rulings on the admission or exclusion of certain evidence and to an objection to a portion of the charge to the jury they have briefed and argued four points. I. Proffered evidence of the availability of real property of the type which was taken in the condemnation proceedings was erroneously excluded. II. The trial justice erred in allowing one of petitioners' expert witnesses to be interrogated on the sale price of certain parcels of real estate in the vicinity of petitioners' property without first requiring respondent to establish that such real estate was comparable. III. The trial justice erred in allowing respondent's expert witness to testify that certain properties in another section of Providence were comparable to those in petitioners' locality. IV. The trial justice erred in charging the jury that they should decide the value of petitioners' property without regard to the fact that it was occupied by the owner and that only in this way could they decide in accordance with the law. We shall discuss those points in that order after briefly summarizing the undisputed facts in evidence.

The petitioners, a Negro couple, are husband and wife and owned a certain parcel of real estate on Olney street on the east side of Providence, which parcel was condemned by respondent for redevelopment. It comprised 10,774 square feet of land on which were located two frame dwellings of three tenements each. The petitioners occupied the second floor tenement of one house and rented all the other tenements. They claimed that the fair value of their property, considering that it was owner-occupied and available to members of their race and that such property was in dwindling supply in Providence, was at least $23,000. In support of that claim they presented the testimony of two expert real estate witnesses.

Samuel Wilk, a real estate broker of about ten years' experience whose office averaged ninety sales a year and who, himself, owned real estate in the vicinity of petitioners' property, testified that in his opinion such property had a fair market value of $23,000. He based his opinion in part on the rentals received therefrom and in part on recent sales of comparable property in the neighborhood. He added that values were a little higher there than in other sections of Providence and that Negroes paid higher prices for such property.

Their other expert was Andrew S. Heyman, a broker who also resided on the east side of Providence and based his opinion on 'what the rental income would normally be' from real estate similarly situated in the locality and available to Negroes. He also took into consideration recent sales and estimated that petitioners' property had a fair market value of $23,700.

The respondent presented the testimony of one expert, Peter A. Laudati, Jr., who was its appraiser for about 300 parcels of real estate condemned by respondent in petitioners' neighborhood and who had done similar appraisals of parcels of property which were condemned in other sections of Providence. He was a real estate broker in from 40 to 50 transactions in the two years immediately preceding his appraisal of petitioners' property. In his appraisal he used a formula of capitalization of income which he described generally as 'how much * * * the average investor looking to purchase this property, would want, as a return on his money.' Based on such formula, he estimated the fair market value of petitioners' property to be $15,200. As a check only on such formula he referred to comparable recent sales. In so doing he did not confine his testimony to the section where petitioners' property was situated but also referred to other sections which he testified, over petitioners' objection, were comparable.

To rebut the relevancy of Mr. Laudati's testimony based on the formula he used, petitioners presented the testimony of Stephen L. Reed, a professional appraiser and an instructor in the appraisal of real estate at the University of Rhode Island. He testified that such formula was not approved except for the appraisal of mines, forests, mineral resources and other wasting assets.

The petitioners' first point is based on their exceptions 1 and 2 and relate to substantially the same matter. Exception 1 is to the trial justice's ruling striking petitioner James Jones' answer 'Yes, sir' to the question 'Have you made any attempt to locate another place for yourself?' On the face of the record the ruling was harmless. But petitioners' counsel claimed the purpose of the question was to lay the foundation for showing the availability of such property as petitioners' and therefore that striking it was prejudicial. Exception 2 is to the...