Jones v. Ridgely Communications, Inc.
| Decision Date | 06 May 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 23397,23397 |
| Citation | 304 S.C. 452,405 S.E.2d 402 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | Charles T. JONES, Respondent-Appellant, v. RIDGELY COMMUNICATIONS, INC., and Robert Kramer of whom Ridgely Communications, Inc., is Appellant-Respondent, and Robert Kramer is Respondent. |
W. Joseph Isaacs, Columbia, for appellant-respondent and respondent.
Victoria L. Eslinger and Deborah R.J. Shupe, Columbia, for respondent-appellant.
Respondent-Appellant Charles T. Jones (Jones) and Appellant-Respondent Ridgely Communications (Ridgely) appeal the judgment of the trial court in this breach of contract suit. 1 We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.
This action grows out of Ridgely's termination of Jones' employment as General Manager of two radio stations. Jones brought suit against Ridgely and its agent, Robert Kramer (Kramer), alleging five causes of action; 1) breach of contract, 2) fraudulent misrepresentation, 3) breach of oral contract, 4) outrage, and 5) slander. Ridgely counterclaimed, asserting two causes of action; 1) breach of contract, and 2) breach of loyalty. Kramer counterclaimed, asserting a cause of action for slander.
Jones and Kramer dismissed their respective causes of action for slander prior to trial, and stipulated that the cause of action for breach of contract was against Ridgely only. During the trial, the judge directed a verdict against Jones on his causes of action for outrage and breach of oral contract. The judge also directed verdicts against Ridgely on both of its counterclaims, leaving only Jones' two causes of action for breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation to be submitted to the jury. The jury awarded Jones $130,000 actual damages on his cause of action for breach of contract. The jury returned a verdict for Ridgely and Kramer on Jones' action for fraudulent misrepresentation.
Ridgely appeals the trial judge's direction of verdict on its counterclaims. Ridgely contends the evidence showed, or an inference could be drawn therefrom, that Jones breached his contractual duties by mismanaging personnel and resources and permitting revenue to decline substantially.
On review of an order granting a directed verdict, the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the verdict was directed. A jury issue exists where the evidence is susceptible of more than one reasonable inference. Burgess Brogdon, Inc., v. Lake, 288 S.C. 16, 339 S.E.2d 507 (1986), Barnes v. Jones Chevrolet Co., Inc., 292 S.C. 607, 358 S.E.2d 156 (Ct.App.1987).
Under his employment contract, Jones' duties included "... establishing and working to achieve budgetary goals, growth in market share and effective management of station's personnel and resources ..."
The trial record contains testimony by several witnesses that Jones mismanaged employees by fostering a tense working atmosphere which detrimentally affected sales, revenue, and the existence of an adequate sales force. There is testimony that revenue decreased during Jones' employment, jeopardizing Ridgely's financial status. There is also testimony that Jones failed to maintain the stations' financial performance at the level agreed upon, failed to submit monthly reports as requested, and failed to develop and achieve budgetary goals. Additionally, there is evidence Jones arranged for personal trade and recklessly incurred personal expenses, all to Ridgely's financial detriment.
We find in the record before us evidence sufficient to create a jury issue as to whether or not Jones breached his contractual duty to Ridgely. Hence, the order granting Jones a directed verdict on Ridgely's counterclaims for breach of contract is reversed.
Ridgely next asserts the trial judge erred in denying its requests for specific instructions to the jury....
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