Jones v. Rocky Cliff Coal Mining Co.
| Decision Date | 24 January 1921 |
| Docket Number | 2405. |
| Citation | 198 P. 284,27 N.M. 41,1921 -NMSC- 017 |
| Parties | JONES v. ROCKY CLIFF COAL MINING CO. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied June 4, 1921.
Syllabus by the Court.
A. and wife owned certain property. They executed a warranty deed in blank as to grantee and delivered it to B., the president of a corporation C., who kept it unchanged for six years, and then had C.'s name written in as grantee and recorded. In the meantime D., who claimed to be the intended grantee in the original deed, secured and recorded a quitclaim deed from A. and wife conveying to her said property for the nominal consideration of $1, while the original deed was still in the possession of B., with no grantee named. B. was acting both for the corporation and for D. in the transaction, and neither C. nor D. knew of the other's claim. Held that, at the time of the execution and delivery of the quitclaim deed, the warranty deed was ineffective as a conveyance, and the title, being in A and wife, passed by the quitclaim deed to D., and this notwithstanding the consideration therefor was only nominal.
Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.
Under a parol agreement to convey land, the payment of the full purchase price, without some further part performance, such as delivery of possession, the making of valuable improvements, etc., is not sufficient to vest an equitable title in the purchaser.
Appeal from District Court, McKinley County; Raynolds, Judge.
Suit by Annie A. Jones against the Rocky Cliff Coal Mining Company and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant named appeals. Affirmed.
J. O Seth, of Santa Fé, for appellant.
E. A Martin and McFie & Edwards, all of Gallup, for appellee.
BRICE District Judge (after stating the facts as above).
Many assignments of error are advanced in this court, but it will be unnecessary to consider them separately. If there was error in the admission of testimony, it was harmless, as will be seen from the view we take of the case.
At the time the quitclaim deed was made to appellee, the title was in the grantors named in that deed, for until some name was inserted as grantee in the original deed it was ineffective as a conveyance.
Allen v. Withrow, 110 U.S. 128, 3 S.Ct. 523, 28 L.Ed. 90.
Even though the deed was delivered to the corporation, and it had implied authority to fill in its name as grantee, following the rule of some courts (1 Dev. on Real Estate [3d Ed.] § 457), there is no evidence from which the court could infer the corporation authorized its name to be inserted as grantee in the deed. But assuming that the corporation did authorize Canavan to authorize Bushman to fill in its name as grantee in the deed, at the time this was done the appellee had obtained title through the quitclaim deed from the Wilsons. Mabie-Lowrey Hdwre. Co. v. Ross et al. (N. M.) 189 P. 42. The consideration of $1 given for the quitclaim deed is sufficient consideration to pass title, unless it was made in bad faith. 2 Dev. on Real Estate (3d Ed.) §§ 813, 814. Whether or not a purely nominal consideration is a sufficient protection of a bona fide purchaser against a holder of an unrecorded deed is not necessary to determine (Ten Eyck v. Witbeck, 135 N.Y. 40, 31 N.E. 994, 31 Am. St. Rep. 809); for it is our conclusion that, at least until the grantee's name had been inserted in the original deed, the title remained in the Wilsons, for the deed was ineffective until some grantee was named therein. Allen v. Withrow, supra; Board of Education v. Hughes, 118 Minn. 404, 136 N.W. 1095, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 637.
The deed under which appellant claims being ineffective as a conveyance at the time of the execution and delivery of the deed to appellee, and she having no knowledge of any interests of the appellant in the property, the quitclaim deed conveyed a good title.
Courts have long disagreed over the construction of deeds executed without a grantee being named therein. Some hold that such a deed is absolutly void; others that an agent duly authorized in writing only could fill in the name of the grantee; others that parol authority could be given, but the grantee's name must be written in before delivery; others that such parol authority could be exercised after delivery; others that the delivery of such a deed would carry with it implied authority for the intended grantee to fill in his own name as grantee at any time. The most extreme cases are to the effect that when such deed is duly executed and delivered to the intended grantee, who long thereafter held the property in actual, open, adverse possession, that such possession coupled with the deed was effective in passing title, although the name of the grantee was never supplied.
The following authorities contain the several views of the courts on the subject: Barden et al. v. Grace et al., 167 Ala. 453, 52 So. 425, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 537 and note at page 538; Allen v. Withrow, 110 U.S. 128, 3 S.Ct. 517, 28 L.Ed. 90; Montgomery v. Dresher, 90 Neb. 632, 134 N.W. 251, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 423 and note; Guthrie v. Field, 85 Kan. 58, 116 P. 217, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 326; McGrew v. Lamb, 60 Colo. 463, 154 P. 91; U.S. v. Lumber & Mfg. Co. (D. C.) 198 F. 893; Reed v. Reed, 98 Miss. 354, 53 So. 691, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 1194; Lafferty v. Lafferty, 42 W.Va. 789, 26 S.E. 264; Cribben v. Deal, 21 Or. 215, 27 P. 1047, 28 Am. St. Rep. 749; Sayles v. Queirolo, 71 Misc. 566, 130 N.Y.S. 806; 3 Washburn on Real Property (6th Ed.) § 2091; 2 Tiffany on Real Property, § 434 (p. 1597), also section 461 (p. 1745); Board of Education v. Hughes, 118 Minn. 404, 136 N.W. 1095, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 637; Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 54 How. Prac. 250; 1 Devlin on Real Estate (3d Ed.) § 457; Osby v. Reynolds, 260 Ill. 576, 103 N.E. 556, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 387, and note at page 390; Threadgill v. Butler, 60 Tex. 599; 8 R. C. L. p. 956.
We do not find it necessary to pass upon this question, as the deed under which appellant claims contained the name of no grantee, nor was he ever in possession of the property so far as the record shows, at the time of the execution, delivery, and recording of the quitclaim deed to appellee; and this falls short of coming within any of the rules of construction we have found.
It follows that the judgment of the district court ought to be and is affirmed, and it is so ordered.
On Motion for Rehearing.
The appellant has filed a motion for rehearing, in which it is claimed that at the time the quitclaim deed was made to appellee the appellant had the equitable title to the property in controversy, which equitable title was created by or resulted from appellant's paying the Wilsons the purchase price for said premises, together with the fact of the execution of the deed by the Wilsons with the name of the grantee blank and its delivery to appellant.
Assuming that the quitclaim deed, bearing a nominal consideration, was not effective as against a prior equitable title (which question it is unnecessary to decide), then, if appellant was possessed of such...
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