Lafferty v. Lafferty
| Citation | 26 S.E. 262,42 W.Va. 783 |
| Parties | LAFFERTY v. LAFFERTY et al. |
| Decision Date | 12 December 1896 |
| Court | Supreme Court of West Virginia |
Submitted June 6, 1896
Syllabus by the Court.
1. An infant is as much bound by a decree, and it is as final upon his rights while it stands, as an adult; but he has until 6 months after attaining 21 years of age to show cause against it, by showing such error, fraud, or surprise as would reverse or set it aside at the instance of an adult.
2. An infant may show cause against a decree by bill, bill of review, supplemental bill in nature of bill of review petition, or answer.
3. On application in any form proper, showing cause against a decree by an infant, the whole record will be examined to find such error, just as on an appeal by an adult.
4. A blank in a deed left for grantee's name may be filled by agent under authority given by parol by the maker of such deed.
5. Laches forbidding relief. Ignorance of the fraud.
Appeal from circuit court, Marshall county.
Bill by James W. Lafferty against Jacob Lafferty and Lulu Lafferty. To the decree for plaintiff, defendants Sarah A. Thatcher and others file a bill for review. To the bill, Lulu Lafferty demurred. From a judgment sustaining the demurrer, Sarah A Thatcher and others appeal.
J Howard Holt, for appellants.
J. B McLure and Robert White, for appellees.
James W. Lafferty brought a chancery suit against Jacob Lafferty and Lulu Lafferty to cancel a deed from Oldham to Elizabeth Lafferty for fraud in its execution, and obtained a decree canceling it; and then Lulu Lafferty, within six months after becoming of age, filed a petition showing cause against the decree, based on error in it, and obtained a decree setting aside the first decree; and then Sarah Thatcher, James W. Lafferty, and Jacob Lafferty filed a bill of review to reverse the second decree, which was dismissed; and then they appealed to this court. It thus becomes necessary to inquire whether there is error in the first decree canceling the deed warranting the court in setting aside that decree upon Lulu Lafferty's petition showing cause against it.
The decree canceling the deed to Elizabeth Lafferty from Oldham was such a decree as prejudiced Lulu Lafferty, her sole child and heir, Elizabeth being deceased, for it took away from her the lots conveyed by the deed to Elizabeth and descending on her death to Lulu. It is argued that it has nothing to do with her estate Though she was not required to do any affirmative act, the decree was none the less destructive of her interest, as it destroyed her title by descent, and passed it, by a commissioner appointed to convey it, to James W. Lafferty as much as if it had required her to convey it. Any decree which in any way prejudices an infant, as it would an adult, may be attacked by an infant within six months after majority, under the right to show cause against it given by section 7, c. 132, Code 1891. But an infant cannot annul a decree without cause, simply because of infancy, as the statute demands that he show cause. An infant is as much bound by a decree as an adult. It is just as final and conclusive as to matters properly adjudged, only that he is saved the right, without regard to limitation barring adults, until six months after his majority, without going to an appellate court, to show cause to the same court which rendered the decree why it ought to set it aside. That cause must be just what would relieve an adult from it,--error in the record, fraud, or surprise. Hull v. Hull's Heirs, 26 W.Va. 1; Barton, Ch. Prac. 130; 10 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 694; Pierce's Adm'r v. Trigg's Heirs, 10 Leigh, 429; Parker v. McCoy, 10 Grat. 604; Zirkle v. McCue, 26 Grat. 517. The infant, if his cause against a decree be error of law in the case, may proceed by bill of review, or supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of review, showing error of law; and in such bill of review I do not think the infant would be confined to merely such matters, to show error, as appear on the face of the decree, as in ordinary cases; and he need not have leave of court to file it, as in ordinary cases of bill of review. In re Hoghton, L. R. 18 Eq. 573. He may proceed by original bill, for not only fraud, but for error of law. He may proceed by petition, which is but another name for a bill. He may introduce new matter against it, so it existed at the date of decree. He is given the broad right to show cause against it, and under any of these pleadings he is given relief co-extensive with the right. There seems to be great liberality in this matter of procedure. 1 Daniell, Ch. Prac. 164, 174; 2 Beach, Mod. Eq. § 883; Loyd v. Malone (Ill.) 74 Am.Dec. 179; Kingsbury v. Buckner, 134 U.S. 650, 10 S.Ct. 638; Ewing v. Winters, 39 W.Va. 490, 20 S.E. 572. The ground of assault on the decree in this instance is error of law, and the pleading calls itself a "petition," but it makes formal parties, some of them new parties, and assigns errors in the record as cognizable on an appeal; and hence I regard it as a bill, or a supplemental bill in the nature of a bill, or review, though called a "petition," and is entirely a proper pleading to review the decree under the authority above cited. What is in the name of a pleading, so it contain the proper matter to obtain the relief it asks? We can and ought to treat it as the proper pleading, though called another. Martin v. Smith, 25 W.Va. 579, 583. The law looks through names, and sees only the things,--the real things the name stands for. While on this subject I may say that an infant, within six months after majority, may file an answer making defenses not before in, and thus reopen the case. 1 Daniell, Ch. Prac. 173; Opinion in Parker v. McCoy, 10 Grat. 604. He surely can introduce new defense, and it is immaterial, practically, how he does so. It is argued that, on the petition, which is full and well drawn, the court cannot look into the depositions; the idea being that the petition is to be regarded as an ordinary bill of review. Obviously, on an application to show cause against a decree, for error of law, we can look into pleadings and evidence, just as on an appeal, in order to see whether there is error. But, though new defense may be made against the decree, the cause shown against it must be cause existing at its date,--not such as arises afterwards; the question being whether any cause existing at its date shows that the decree ought not to have been pronounced. Walker's Ex'r v. Page, 21 Grat. 636, 645.
I come now, to inquire whether there is any error in the decree canceling the deed. There is a question arising which is of importance and interest. The bill to cancel the deed alleges that Jacob and James Lafferty together bought the lots, and, as James had done certain work for his father, Jacob, and had paid part of the purchase money, he was to own them entirely, and the deed was to be made to him, and that he was hesitating whether to have them conveyed to his mother or to himself, and therefore Oldham had, at the father's request, executed the deed with a blank in it for the name of the grantee, and had committed it to Criswell with instructions to him to insert such name as grantee as Jacob Lafferty should designate, and that, while it remained with Criswell, Elizabeth, the second wife of Jacob Lafferty, whose first wife had in the meantime died, had gone to Criswell, and, by the false statement that her husband had authorized her to have her name inserted in the blank as grantee, had caused Criswell to insert it. Now, it is proven by Criswell that the deed was so blank when it came to his hands, and that he inserted Elizabeth Lafferty's name on such representation. The question, then, arises, is this a valid deed? Could such blank be filed by an agent without authority under seal? That a deed without a grantee is no deed is elementary law, and so is the rule that an agent to make a deed must be authorized by a sealed power. The whole includes all its essential parts, and essential parts are indispensable; and therefore, as it is said, it requires the same authority to make one of the essential parts of a valid deed--for instance, the insertion of a grantee--as to make the whole deed, and the authority to do so can no more be authorized by parol than authority to make a deed outright. Evidently there is a difference, which I need not enforce by argument, as it is self-apparent. So it is different where one puts his name on a clear piece of paper, and gives one verbal authority to make a deed out of it, in his absence. Duncan v. Hodges, 17 Am.Dec. 734. Where a man makes a deed, complete in all respects save that it is blank as to the grantee, it evinces clearly an intent to pass the estate; and when he tells his agent to insert the name of the purchaser, or such name as he may designate, he evinces a full intent to pass it to either the purchaser or such other person; and nothing but the technical rule that an agent to make a deed must be empowered by deed stands in the way. The statute of frauds is satisfied, unless we are so technical as to make it be an instrument to further fraud and defeat intention. The law ought to rule so that solemn acts shall avail and execute the intention and further justice, rather than prove abortive at the bidding of argument which, while plausible, as based on general rules, is yet only technical, as applied in the given instance. I know that the ancient rule required a deed to be complete, and would overthrow this deed; and yet Lord Mansfield, in Texira v. Evans, cited in 1 Anstr. 229, held that a writing made to borrow...
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