Jones v. Runyon

• Decision Date: 17 August 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-1230,93-1230
• Citation: 32 F.3d 1454
• Parties: 65 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1066 Julius J. JONES, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Marvin T. RUNYON, Postmaster General, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Page 1454

32 F.3d 1454

65 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1066

Julius J. JONES, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Marvin T. RUNYON, Postmaster General, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 93-1230.

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.

Aug. 17, 1994.

Barry Douglas Roseman, Denver, CO, for plaintiff-appellant.

Wendy M. Keats (R. Andrew German, Chief Counsel, and Robert Sindermann, Jr., U.S. Postal Service, Frank W. Hunger, Asst. Atty. Gen., James R. Allison, U.S. Atty., and Robert S. Greenspan, Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, with her on the brief), Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee.

Before BRORBY and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, ^* Senior United States District Judge.

BRORBY, Circuit Judge.

We are asked to determine the statute of limitations applicable to federal employees challenging an adverse decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 633a. Mr. Julius Jones, Jr. appeals the dismissal of his age discrimination claim after the district court determined the claim was filed outside a thirty-day limitations period imposed similarly on Title VII claims. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

On November 7, 1986, the United States Postal Service denied Mr. Jones the position of ad hoc EEO counselor. Mr. Jones previously worked as an advocate and counselor regarding equal employment opportunities during his long tenure with the Postal Service. Because he believes the denial of this position evidences discrimination on the basis of race, gender, and age, and shows unlawful retaliation for his past protests against alleged unlawful employment practices, he filed an administrative complaint on December 8, 1986. The EEOC issued Mr. Jones a final administrative decision of no discrimination On September 16, 1991, almost five years after the alleged discriminatory act and over one year after the final decision of the EEOC, Mr. Jones refiled his discrimination complaint in district court. The Postmaster General moved to dismiss the action as time-barred. The district court granted this motion, holding the thirty-day limitation period then applicable to federal employees filing suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-16(c), ¹ applied to bar all of Mr. Jones's claims. ² Jones v. Frank, 819 F.Supp. 923 (D.Colo.1993). As to the age discrimination claim, the district court adopted the same limitations period as found in Title VII's federal employment provisions. "[B]orrowing [Title VII] section 2000e-16's limitation period is appropriate because section 2000e-16 was 'actually designed to accommodate a balance of interests very similar to that at stake' here and 'is in fact, an analogy' to [ADEA] section 633a." Id. at 925 (quoting DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2293, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983)). Mr. Jones does not appeal the dismissal of his non-age based discrimination claims. His appeal of the age discrimination claim contends his complaint was timely if considered under the six-year statute of limitations of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2401(a).

dated August 28, 1990. He then filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado on September 28, 1990, but that complaint was later dismissed without prejudice for failure to properly serve the Postmaster General and the United States under Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(4) and (5). Jones v. Frank, No. 90-B-1743 (D.Colo. Aug. 16, 1991) (bench ruling), aff'd, 973 F.2d 872 (10th Cir.1992).

DISCUSSION

Statutory limitations on suits against the government involve the government's waiver of sovereign immunity. See Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 94, 111 S.Ct. 453, 456-57, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990); United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 841, 106 S.Ct. 2224, 2229, 90 L.Ed.2d 841 (1986). As such, a rule more favorable to litigants against the government than to litigants against private employers seems unlikely. See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96, 111 S.Ct. at 457-58 (refusing to extend the doctrine of equitable tolling in a federal sector Title VII action beyond general principles applicable to private employer actions). Because of congressional silence as to the appropriate limitations period for ADEA claims against the federal government, we are asked to choose between two statutory limitations periods. We choose the one most likely to reflect Congress's balancing of the unique interests of a federal employer with the concerns of discrimination in government employment.

The ADEA provides a federal employee two alternative routes for pursuing an age discrimination claim. An employee may bring the action directly to federal district court in the first instance, so long as the employee gives the EEOC notice of intent to sue within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act and then waits thirty days before filing the action. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 633a(d); Stevens v. Department of Treasury, 500 U.S. 1, 7, 111 S.Ct. 1562, 1566-67, 114 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991). Conversely, an employee may invoke the EEOC's administrative process and then file a civil action in federal district court if unsatisfied with administrative remedies. 29 U.S.C. Secs. 633a(b)-(c). Mr. Jones attempted this route. The ADEA, however, is silent on how long action may be filed in district court after a final agency decision.

Although declining to fill that silence, the Supreme Court explained the proper analysis is to "assume, as we have before, that Congress intended to impose an appropriate period In borrowing a statute, a reasonable source is a "statute of limitations actually designed to accommodate a balance of interests very similar to that at stake here--a statute that is, in fact, an analogy to the present lawsuit." DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 169, 103 S.Ct. at 2293; see Lavery, 918 F.2d at 1025. If another federal statute exists that clearly reflects the interests Congress intended to protect in the silent statute, we will apply it. Barnett, 738 F.2d at 363.

                borrowed either from a state statute or from an analogous federal one."  Stevens, 500 U.S. at 7, 111 S.Ct. at 1567 (citing Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 146-48, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 2762-63, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987)).  As this is a question of first impression for this circuit, we note the Courts of Appeals are divided on whether to "borrow" an analogous limitations period from Title VII, Long v. Frank, 22 F.3d 54 (2d Cir.1994);  Lavery v. Marsh, 918 F.2d 1022 (1st Cir.1990), or from the general limitations period for nontort actions against the federal government, Lubniewski v. Lehman, 891 F.2d 216 (9th Cir.1989). 3  We rule out the applicability of state statutes.  To adopt varying state rules would burden administrative efforts of the EEOC and prove an "unsatisfactory vehicle[ ] for the enforcement of federal law."  DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 161, 103 S.Ct. at 2289;  see Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 97 S.Ct. 2447, 53 L.Ed.2d 402 (1977) (declining to apply state limitations period to Title VII enforcement suits brought by EEOC);  Barnett v. United Air Lines, Inc., 738 F.2d 358 (10th Cir.)  (declining to apply state limitations to hybrid breach of contract/duty of fair representation claim brought under Railway Labor Act), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1087, 105 S.Ct. 594, 83 L.Ed.2d 703 (1984)
                

Here, as the district court noted, the limitations period for federal employee actions under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-16(c), ⁴ is more analogous to ADEA than the general limitations period for nontort actions against the federal government, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2401(a). ⁵ This conclusion is borne out by our similar analysis of other limitations periods in Title VII and the ADEA. "Since the ADEA and Title VII share a common purpose, the elimination of discrimination in the workplace," since the language of Sec. 633a(a) & (b) is "almost in haec verba " with Sec. 2000e-16(a) & (b), and since the legislative history of the ADEA section indicates Title VII was its source, we conclude the two limitations periods are analogous. See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756, 99 S.Ct. 2066, 2071-72, 60 L.Ed.2d 609 (1979) (comparing Title VII and ADEA private sector limitations in deferral states); Smith v. Oral Roberts Evangelistic Ass'n, 731 F.2d 684, 688 (10th Cir.1984) (same). The first two sections of ADEA Sec. 633a were "patterned after" similar sections in Title VII Sec. 2000e-16. Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 163-64 Mr. Jones responds Congress could not have intended Sec. 633a to follow Title VII because a Senate committee rejected a version of Sec. 633a(c) drafted identical to Title VII Sec. 2000e-16(c). See Lubniewski, 891 F.2d at 220-21. When Senator Bentsen introduced the substantive provisions for federal employee age discrimination claims, he proposed Sec. 633a(c) would give an employee only one route to federal court: a civil action filed within thirty days of a final agency decision. 118 Cong.Rec. 15,894-95 (1972) (introducing amendment to S. 1861). The committee version of the bill deleted this proposal, without explanation, and drafted Sec. 633a(c) in its current codified fashion. 118 Cong.Rec. 23,955-56 (1972). ⁶ Also instituted with the committee version was the addition of a second route allowing a federal employee to directly file a claim in federal court. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 633a(d).

101 S.Ct. 2698, 2703, 69 L.Ed.2d 548 (1981) (citing remarks of Senator Bentsen, principal sponsor of ADEA Sec. 633a, 118 Cong.Rec. 24,397 (1972)). In offering the first two sections to the Senate, Senator Bentsen stated "[t]he measures used to protect Federal employees [from age discrimination] would be substantially similar to those incorporated" in the recently amended Title VII protections for federal employees. 118 Cong.Rec. 24,397 (1972); see Lehman, 453 U.S. at 167 n. 15, 101 S.Ct. at 2705 n. 15.

We follow the views of the Second and First Circuits who...