Jones v. Sanderson

• Decision Date: 01 April 1921
• Docket Number: No. 21733.,21733.
• Citation: 229 S.W. 1087,287 Mo. 176
• Parties: JONES et al. v. SANDERSON
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

229 S.W. 1087

287 Mo. 176

JONES et al. v. SANDERSON

No. 21733.

Supreme Court of Missouri, in Banc.

April 1, 1921.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Audrain County; Ernest S. Gantt, Judge.

Petition by James C. Jones and others against Judson Sanderson, seeking to disbar defendant from practicing law. Charges sustained. Defendant disbarred for period of 12 months, and he appeals. Proceedings dismissed.

This suit was instituted in the circuit court of Callaway county, by plaintiffs and against the defendant, seeking to disbar him from practicing law in the courts of, this state. The trial court sustained the charges made against him, and disbarred him for a period of 12 months from and after March 28th, 1919. In due course the defendant appealed the cause to this court.

The record in the case is very long, covering about 270 pages of printed matter, and the statement of counsel for appellant covers about 50, but, from the view we take of the case, it will be unnecessary for us to go into detail of the facts of the case. It will suffice to state that the Klick brothers, five in number, during the war were charged with being in sympathy with Germany, and made some very violent language against this country and in favor of Germany. This was called to the attention of the counsel foe the defense, which caused charges to be prepared against them in the United States District Court at Jefferson City, Mo., charging them with disloyalty, etc. They were duly arrested upon those charges, and arraigned before the commissioner of that court, whereupon the appellant, who was a duly licensed and practicing attorney at law of this state, was employed by the Klick brothers to defend them against those charges.:n the performance of that duty, it is charged that appellant was guilty of unbecoming and improper conduct, in that he attempted to induce the witnesses against the flicks to change their testimony, in other words, was guilty of an attempt of subornation of perjury. These are the matters that constitute the basis of the charges against the appellant in this case, which, as before stated, the trial court found to be true.

R. D. Rodgers, of Mexico, Mo., and Mc-Baine, Clark & Rollins, of Columbia, for appellant

James C. Jones, of St. Louis, and, Charles W. German, of Kansas City, for respondents.

WOODSON, J.

(after stating the facts as above). [1] The offense charged in the disbarment proceedings against the appellant is conceded to be an indictable offense, and under the law of this state, as declared by this court in the case of State ex rel. Selleck v. Reynolds, 252 Mo. 369, 158 S. W. 671, he cannot be disbarred or suspended for a definite term as a punishment before having been indicted and convicted by a jury of his country. That being the law, and there being no pretense that appellant has been indicted or convicted, this proceeding must he dismissed, and it is so ordered.

All concur, GRAVES, J., in separate opinion in which all concur.

GRAVES, J. (concurring).

I agree with my learned Brother wherein he says that this case should be ruled against the officers of the State Bar Association and in favor of the appellant, Sanderson, in obedience to the law as declared in State ex rel. Selleck v. Reynolds, 252 Mo. 369, 158 S. W. 671. Sanderson was proceeded against under the same statutes as was Selleck. The laws were not changed until 1919 (Laws of 1919, p. 151), and this cause was begun before the Act of 1919 became effective. The trial was had and the judgment entered before the Act of 1919 became effective. So that the Statutes of 1909, as quoted in Selleck's Case, supra, was the governing law.: would not add this separate concurrence but for the fact that the learned representatives of the State Bar Association urge that Selleck's Case sustains this judgment. As the writer of the Selleck opinion,: feel called upon to disabuse the minds of counsel upon this contention.

The petition for disbarment in this case clearly charges indictable offenses both as against the state and federal laws, and this is not seriously controverted by learned counsel for the Bar Association. What they contend is that, under the rule in Selleck's Case, the court had the right to suspend Sanderson, because the charges were of indictable offenses, and Sanderson could not complain because his suspension was for only 12 months. They contend that the suspension might have run for the statutory period of limitation for the prosecution of the crimes. The trouble with learned counsel is that they overlook their own judgment in the case. This judgment does not suspend Sanderson until an indictment might be secured, and he tried thereon, but the judgment is one finally disposing of the case, and thereto is added a judgment for costs against Sanderson.

The whole conduct of this case conflicts with Selleck's Case, and our learned Brothers of the bar will see it when their attention is called to portions of that opinion not appearing in their brief. Section 960, R. S. 1909, reads:

"When the matter charged is not indictable, a trial of the facts alleged shall be...