Jones v. Shields

• Decision Date: 17 December 1999
• Docket Number: No. 99-1869,99-1869
• Citation: 207 F.3d 491
• Parties: (8th Cir. 2000) R.D. JONES, DEFENDANT - APPELLANT, v. THUWORN SHIELDS, PLAINTIFF - APPELLEE. Submitted:
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 491

207 F.3d 491 (8th Cir. 2000)

R.D. JONES, DEFENDANT - APPELLANT, v. THUWORN SHIELDS, PLAINTIFF - APPELLEE.

No. 99-1869

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Submitted: December 17, 1999

Decided: March 23, 2000

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

Before Richard S. Arnold, and Loken, Circuit Judges, and Webb,¹ District Judge.

Webb, District Judge.

I.

Thuworn Shields, an inmate incarcerated at the Cummins Unit of the Arkansas Department of Corrections (ADC), brought this pro se Section 1983 action against corrections officer R.D. Jones, alleging Jones inflicted cruel and unusual punishment upon Shields by unjustly spraying Shields with "capstun." Jones appeals interlocutory the District Court's denial of his motion for judgment as a matter of law based upon qualified immunity. We reverse.

II.

A Magistrate Judge conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Shields' allegations warranted a jury trial.² The following facts were adduced, which we view in the light most favorable to Shields.

Shields testified he was working in the prison kitchen on March 12, 1996, when his supervisor instructed him to mop the floor. Shields refused, prompting the supervisor to order him to the east kitchen riot gate, where he was met by Jones. Jones informed Shields he would be placed on "disciplinary court review" (DCR) for his refusal to work, and ordered Shields to the hall desk. Shields "questioned" this order, but Jones rebuked "you just do like you're told." Shields proceeded to the desk and provided Jones his name and prisoner number.

Jones then ordered Shields to his barracks. As Shields departed, Jones asked "Inmate Shields, what barracks you out of?" Shields turned and replied, "10 Barracks," and continued toward the same. Jones repeated the question, "with . . . aggressiveness in his voice." When Shields turned to respond, Jones sprayed Shields in the face with capstun. Shields was immediately pushed against the wall and handcuffed by Officer Robert Spencer. Shields remained against the wall for "10 or 15, maybe 20 minutes[,] . . . . just standing there . . . . drooling . . . snot and everything."

After this time, Spencer delivered Shields to the infirmary, where a nurse flushed his eyes with water. Shields was then escorted to administrative segregation, but returned a short time later complaining of lingering effects. A dentist's assistant flushed Shields' eyes with water again and directed officers to take him outside for air. While outside, the wind agitated Shields' eyes. By this time very upset, Shields was taken to mental health for about 20 minutes before returning to administrative segregation.

Shields estimated he suffered the effects of the capstun for "a good 30 or 45 minutes." Shields returned to the infirmary the following day complaining his left eye "felt irritable," but admitted the attending nurse "found nothing wrong." A medical report indicated Shields visited the infirmary ostensibly to have a wart removed. Shields contested the accuracy of this report.

Shields was found to have committed two disciplinary violations during the incident; one for his refusal to work (which he did not contest), and another for failure to obey an order from Jones, and use of abusive, obscene language toward Jones.³ Shields was docked 60 days good time for the former and 90 days for the latter.

Jones did not testify at the hearing, but portions of his incident report were read into the record. According to Jones, Shields objected profanely when ordered to his barracks and informed he would be placed on DCR. When Jones stopped Shields and repeated the order, Shields "got very loud and became argumentative." Jones sprayed Shields with capstun in response to this outburst.

Officer Spencer testified at the hearing. Spencer recalled witnessing Shields "charge toward" Jones, whereupon Jones "pulled out his . . . capstun, and gave [Shields] a small burst," lasting no longer than "half a second." Spencer then handcuffed Shields and immediately delivered him to the infirmary, where a nurse directed Spencer to take (an unruly) Shields to the shower. Spencer subsequently heard Shields tell the nurse he was "fine," and returned Shields to administrative segregation. Spencer noted Shields was much larger than the 5'6" Jones.

Rex Gaylon Lay, the Assistant Warden in charge of security at the Cummins Unit, also testified. Lay stated the use of capstun is authorized "[t]o prevent injury to [oneself], a third party, inmate on inmate, to compel an inmate to move from one area to another if he's refusing to move[][,]" and to prevent an escape. Lay also stated corrections officers must be certified in the use of capstun, and must undergo a training regimen during which they are sprayed with the agent. Lay recalled being sprayed with capstun during an altercation; "[i]t stung for a little bit, you know, for a few minutes . . . , but it kind of dissipated and went away."

Darlene Hall, an ADC training officer and instructor on the use of chemical agents, also testified. Hall stated capstun is a non-lethal agent composed of cayenne pepper (ground to an oil base) and alcohol. An officer typically dispenses the agent in a one-second burst from a small can with a trigger, and the spray normally ranges about three feet.⁴

Hall stated capstun is water soluble, and produces no permanent effects. After a direct spray to the face, effects upon the eyes, nose and mouth normally "clear" within 10 minutes. Effects may linger when the agent is trapped in the pores of the skin, but even under such circumstances, Hall could not recall anyone "hav[ing] any problems after 45 minutes." Hall had sprayed some 300 employees with the agent, including herself.

At the close of Shields' testimony, and again at the close of the hearing, Jones moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing Shields' injuries were de minimis for purposes of the Eighth Amendment, and Jones was entitled to qualified immunity. The Magistrate Judge recommended the district court deny the motion, finding the pain and suffering alleged by Shields amounted to a cognizable injury, and finding questions of material fact remained surrounding what knowledge Jones possessed, and what occurred during the incident, precluding a grant of qualified immunity. Reviewing de novo, the district court adopted the Magistrate Judge's recommendation, and this appeal ensued.

III.

We have jurisdiction to review interlocutory a denial of qualified immunity to the extent it turns on an issue of law, see Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525, 530 (1985); Mettler v. Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1202 (8th Cir. 1999), but not where it turns upon the merits of the case or the sufficiency of the evidence, see Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995); Lyles v. City of Barling, 181 F.3d 914, 916-17 (8 th Cir. 1999). We review the denial of qualified immunity de novo. Estate of Davis ex rel. Ostenfeld v. Delo, 115 F.3d 1388, 1394 (8 th Cir. 1997).

When qualified immunity is asserted in a § 1983 action, we "must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all . . . ." Wilson v. Layne, 119 S. Ct. 1692, 1697 (1999)(citing Conn v. Gabbert, 119 S. Ct. 1292, 1295 (1999)); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 1714 n.5 (1998). See Berryhill v. Schriro, 137 F.3d 1073, 1075 (8 th Cir. 1998). Only then do we ask "whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation." Layne, 119 S. Ct. at 1697 (citing Conn, 119 S. Ct. at 1295); Lewis, 118 S. Ct. at 1714 n.5 (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991)).

Jones contends the district court erred when it answered the constitutional question in the affirmative.⁵ Jones argues the pain Shields experienced was de minimis for purposes of the Eighth Amendment, and further claims his actions were neither repugnant to the conscience of mankind, nor malicious or sadistic. Shields maintains he suffered extreme pain, and the application of capstun in this case was malicious, sadistic, and served no useful purpose. We agree with Jones, and hold Shields has failed to establish an Eighth Amendment violation.

The Eighth Amendment protects incarcerated prisoners from cruel and unusual punishment, and this protection is grounded upon their right to be free from unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain at the hands of correctional officers. Parkus v. Delo, 135 F.3d 1232, 1234 (8 th Cir. 1998)(citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992)). Not every governmental action affecting the interests or well-being of a prisoner is subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny, however. Only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the "core judicial inquiry" is whether the force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21). Factors which inform this inquiry include the need for the application of physical force; the relationship between the need for physical force and the amount of force applied; and the extent of injury suffered by the inmate. Id. at 7 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320).

Not every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action. Id. at 9 (citations omitted). "The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind." Id. at 9-10 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327)(internal quotations omitted)....