Sanchez v. Griffis
| Decision Date | 02 November 2021 |
| Docket Number | : MO:20-CV-00269-DC |
| Citation | 569 F.Supp.3d 496 |
| Parties | Cruz E. SANCHEZ v. Mike GRIFFIS, FNU Mancha, FNU McNeil, FNU Durham, FNU Galvan, FNU Garcia, FNU Salgado, FNU Ibarra |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
Cruz E. Sanchez, Tulia, TX, Pro Se.
Richard Layne Rouse, Shafer, Davis, O'Leary & Stoker, Odessa, TX, for Sheriff Mike Griffis, Chief Deputy FNU Mancha, Captain FNU McNeil, Lieutenant FNU Durham, Sgt. FNU Galvan, Corporal FNU Garcia, Officer FNU Salgado, Officer FNU Ibarra.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Cruz E. Sanchez seeks "3.5 million dollars" in monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for "pain and suffering" arising from the two-related October 20, 2020 alleged use-of-force incidents1 by two of the named Ector County Defendants2 that occurred while he was a pretrial detainee in the Ector County Detention Center (ECDC).3 [docket number 1 at 6]. For relief, Plaintiff also asks for "Officers Salgado and Ibarra to get charged for assault." [Id. ] (spelling error in original).
The Ector County Defendants filed an Answer on January 18, 2021. [docket number 36]. This Court then entered a Scheduling Order for dispositive motions on January 20, 2021. [docket number 37]. On March 8, 2021, the Ector County Defendants filed both a Motion to Dismiss and a 408-page Motion for Summary Judgment, with a 212-page attachment thereto. [docket numbers 43, 44 & 45, respectively]. On April 13, 2021, Plaintiff filed his Response to the Ector County Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. [docket number 60]. On May 12, 2021, Plaintiff filed his own 29-page Motion for Summary Judgment. [docket number 71]. Therefore, this case is ripe for disposition. After due consideration, the Court will grant the Ector County Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. [docket number 44].
Section 1983 creates a private right of action to redress the violation of federal law by those acting under color of state law. See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. , 465 U.S. 75, 82, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984) ; Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n , 453 U.S. 1, 19, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981) ; Maine v. Thiboutot , 448 U.S. 1, 4, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980). It provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. " Section 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere.’ " Albright v. Oliver , 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan , 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979) ); accord Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 393–94, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) ; City of Okla. City v. Tuttle , 471 U.S. 808, 816, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985) ; Young v. City of Killeen , 775 F.2d 1349, 1352 (5th Cir. 1985) ; Carbonell v. La. Dep't of Health & Human Resources , 772 F.2d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1985).
To prevail on a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must prove that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; Daniels v. Williams , 474 U.S. 327, 330, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986) ; Augustine v. Doe , 740 F.2d 322, 324–25 (5th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must support his claims with specific facts demonstrating a constitutional deprivation and may not simply rely on conclusory allegations. See Schultea v. Wood , 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir. 1995) ; Fee v. Herndon , 900 F.2d 804, 807 (5th Cir. 1990) ; Jacquez v. Procunier , 801 F.2d 789, 793 (5th Cir. 1986) ; Angel v. City of Fairfield , 793 F.2d 737, 739 (5th Cir. 1986) ; Elliott v. Perez , 751 F.2d 1472, 1482 (5th Cir. 1985).
The plaintiff must also prove that the alleged constitutional or statutory deprivation was intentional or due to deliberate indifference—not the result of mere negligence. See Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 828–29, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) ; Davidson v. Cannon , 474 U.S. 344, 348, 106 S.Ct. 668, 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986) ; Daniels , 474 U.S. at 328, 106 S.Ct. 662 ; Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 105, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). The negligent deprivation of life, liberty, or property is not a constitutional violation. See Campbell v. City of San Antonio , 43 F.3d 973, 977 (5th Cir. 1995) ; Fraire v. City of Arlington , 957 F.2d 1268, 1276 (5th Cir. 1992) ; Herrera v. Millsap , 862 F.2d 1157, 1160 (5th Cir. 1989) ; Simmons v. McElveen , 846 F.2d 337, 339 (5th Cir. 1988) ; Young , 775 F.2d at 1353. Moreover, to hold a defendant liable under § 1983, the plaintiff must adduce facts demonstrating the defendant's participation in the alleged wrong. See Murphy v. Kellar , 950 F.2d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1992) ; Jacquez , 801 F.2d at 793.
Allegations made in a pro se complaint are held "to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner , 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). To hold a pro se plaintiff to strict compliance "would be inequitable" as courts would punish a pro se plaintiff "for lacking the linguistic and analytical skills of a trained lawyer." Perez v. United States , 312 F.3d 191, 194–95 (5th Cir. 2002). To avoid such a result, "courts have adopted the rule that a pro se plaintiff's pleadings are liberally construed." Id. Even though pleadings by a pro se litigant are held to a less stringent standard, courts must be able to draw the reasonable inference from the pleadings that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). Courts should not dismiss a pro se complaint without "providing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend, unless it is obvious from the record that the plaintiff has pled his best case." Hale v. King , 642 F.3d 492, 503 (5th Cir. 2011). This Court finds having filed an original Complaint, a Memorandum in Support, an Affidavit in Support, and a Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff has pleaded his best case.
Plaintiff seeks to have the specific guards, Defendants Salgado and Ybarra, who allegedly assaulted him, prosecuted for assault. This allegation fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to have anyone criminally prosecuted. See Oliver v. Collins , 914 F.2d 56, 60 (5th Cir. 1990) (); Green v. Revel , 413 F. App'x 698, 700 (5th Cir. 2011) (). The Supreme Court has held that private citizens lack a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or non-prosecution of another. Linda R.S. v. Richard D. , 410 U.S. 614, 619, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973).
Plaintiff simply has no constitutional right to have an officer criminally prosecuted. Busick v. Neal , 380 F. App'x 392 (5th Cir. 2010) ; Autrey v. State of Mississippi , 66 F. App'x 523 (5th Cir. 2003) ; see also, e.g., Del Marcelle v. Brown Cty. Corp. , 680 F.3d 887, 901 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (Easterbrook, C.J., concurring) (); Parkhurst v. Tabor , 569 F.3d 861, 866 (8th Cir. 2009) (); and Sattler v. Johnson , 857 F.2d 224, 227 (4th Cir. 1988) (). Therefore, this portion of Plaintiff's § 1983 case is dismissed because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The Ector County Defendants move for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [docket number 44]. Under this rule, a reviewing court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A fact is "material" if its resolution in favor of one party might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue is "genuine" if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
If the movant demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-movant to provide "specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). A reviewing court "must view the evidence introduced and all factual inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment[.]...
To continue reading
Request your trial