Jones v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., 6 Div. 680.

• Decision Date: 14 June 1930
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 680.
• Citation: 221 Ala. 547,130 So. 74
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Parties: JONES v. SLOSS-SHEFFIELD STEEL & IRON CO.

130 So. 74

221 Ala. 547

JONES v. SLOSS-SHEFFIELD STEEL & IRON CO.

6 Div. 680.

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 14, 1930

Rehearing Denied Oct. 9, 1930.

Petition for Certiorari to Circuit Court, Jefferson County; C. B Smith, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Mary Jones against the Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Company, employer to recover compensation for the death of Fred Henry employee. Judgment denying compensation, and petitioner brings certiorari. Transferred from Court of Appeals.

Writ denied.

Windham & Countryman, of Birmingham, for appellant.

Bradley, Baldwin, All & White, W. M. Neal, and L. B. Bewley, all of Birmingham, for appellee.

GARDNER J.

Petitioner seeks recovery under our Workmen's Compensation Statute (Code 1923, § 7543 et seq.) for the death of her son, Fred Henry, an unclassified laborer in defendant's mine, who met his death by accident in the slope of the mine in the early morning while presumably on his way to his place of work at the bottom of the mine one-half mile distant from where his body was found. This slope was a dangerous, unlighted, and narrow place upon which trip cars were operated frequently and rapidly without lights. Employees were forbidden the use of this slope, either to ride the trip of cars or walk upon it, and such prohibitory rule was known to deceased. The defendant provided a walkway, called "manway," as a means of ingress and egress to and from the mine for the use of employees.

The trial court concluded from the proof that at the time of his death the employee "was in a dangerous zone, contrary to the orders of the defendant, communicated to him, and where his services did not require his presence, and *** voluntarily placed himself in a dangerous and hazardous position, outside the sphere of his employment." So concluding, compensation was denied.

We are of the opinion the ruling is correct. "It is not sufficient that the injury occurs in the course of the employment. It must also arise out of the employment. *** It must be an accident resulting from a risk reasonably incidental to the employment." Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Jones, 220 Ala. 10, 123 So. 201, 202. The authorities are in general agreement that the employer has the right to limit the sphere of employment of the workman and prohibit him from working in a dangerous place. Numerous cases, both English and American, touching this question, are reviewed and discussed by the Michigan court in Gacesa v Consumers' Power Co., 220 Mich. 338, 190 N.W. 279, 24 A. L. R. 675. The principle above noted was recognized by this court in Ex parte Little Cahaba Coal Co., 213 Ala. 244, 104 So. 422, 424, where was used the following language: "If the employee leaves his post and goes without cause into a place of known danger against orders, *** he may, *** so place himself outside the course of employment as to defeat the right of compensation." And in the still more recent case of Blocton Cahaba Coal Co. v. Campbell, 219 Ala. 529, 122 So. 806, the rule announced in section 113 of Honnold on Workmen's Compensation was expressly approved as...