Smith v. Seaman & Schuske Metal Works Co.

• Decision Date: 20 April 1939
• Docket Number: 35668
• Citation: 127 S.W.2d 435,344 Mo. 559
• Parties: Gertrude Barbara Smith, Widow of Walter Earl Smith, Walter Earl Smith, Jr., and William Wayne Smith v. Seaman & Schuske Metal Works Company, a Corporation, and United States Casualty Company, Appellants
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

127 S.W.2d 435

344 Mo. 559

Gertrude Barbara Smith, Widow of Walter Earl Smith, Walter Earl Smith, Jr., and William Wayne Smith v. Seaman & Schuske Metal Works Company, a Corporation, and United States Casualty Company, Appellants

No. 35668

Supreme Court of Missouri

April 20, 1939

Appeal from Buchanan Circuit Court; Hon. Ferd J Frankenhoff, Judge.

Reversed.

Alva Lindsay, Waldo Edwards and Wallace W. Fry for appellants.

(1) There is no evidence that the deceased received any injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment. The deceased was not engaged in or about the premises where his duties were to be performed or where his services required his presence as a part of such services at the time of his injury. His injuries are not compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Law. Sec. 3305 (c), R. S. 1929; Laws 1931, p. 382; Hall v. Austin-Western Road Machinery Co., 250 N.W. 258. (2) There is no competent evidence upon which the court or Workmen's Compensation Commission could base a finding that the deceased had started towards his home for the purpose of changing his clothes so that he could perform his work "with greater efficiency." (3) Even if it were assumed that the deceased started towards his home to change his clothes for the comfort of himself resulting in greater efficiency in his work which would contribute to the furtherance of his employer's business (which we deny), the deceased was at the time he received the injuries engaged in a self-determined voluntary act, not known to or accepted by his employer, and outside the duties for which he was employed or where his duties required his services, or any act, task or mission which formed a part of his services. Cassidy v. Eternit, 32 S.W.2d 75; Smith v. Levis-Zukoski Mercantile Co., 14 S.W.2d 470; Bise v. Tarlton, 35 S.W.2d 993; Probst v St. Louis Basket & Box Co., 52 S.W.2d 501; Duggan v. Toombs-Fay Sash & Door Co., 66 S.W.2d 973; Mountain v. Ind. Acc. Comm., 267 P. 913; Buff v. Ind. Acc. Comm., 28 P.2d 9; Hall v. Austin-Western Road Machinery Co., 250 N.W. 258; Board of Education, City of Chicago, v. Ind. Comm., 321 Ill. 23, 151 N.E. 499; Markowitz v. Natl. Hardware Co., 210 N.Y.S. 693; Bryant v. Fissell, 84 N. J. L. 72, 86 A. 458; O'Neil v. Casley, 218 N.Y. 414, 113 N.E. 406; In re Borin, 227 Mass. 452, 116 N.E. 817; Utah Copper Co. v. Industrial Comm., 62 Utah 33. (4) And especially is that true since the rule of the shop in question restricted the orbit and sphere of the workman's employment. In re Borin, 227 Mass. 452, 116 N.E. 817; Dickey v. Pittsburgh, 297 Pa. 172; Fournier's Case, 120 Me. 236, 113 A. 270; Rendino v. Continental Can Co., 226 N.Y. 565, 123 N.E. 886; Hyatt v. U.S. Rubber Reclaiming Co., 243 N.Y.S. 474; Fralongo v. Stanley Works, 104 Conn. 331, 133 A. 98; Jones v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron So., 221 Ala. 547, 130 So. 74.

Mayer, Conkling & Sprague and Edw. B. Wilkinson for respondents.

(1) The Workmen's Compensation Act of Missouri should be and is liberally construed with a view to public welfare, and in order to effectuate the legislative intent to afford compensation to an injured employee, or his dependents, rather than strictly and technically construed in order to deny compensation; and compensation is awarded where a broad and liberal construction will justify it. Doubt, if any, respecting the right to compensation is construed in favor of the employee or dependent. R. S. 1929, sec. 3374; Maddux v. K. C. Pub. Serv. Co., 100 S.W.2d 540; Pruitt v. Harker, 328 Mo. 1200, 43 S.W.2d 773; Schultz v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 331 Mo. 616, 56 S.W.2d 126; Allen v. St. L.-S. F. Ry. Co., 338 Mo. 402; Sawtell v. Stern Bros. & Co., 44 S.W.2d 269. (2) The finding of facts and award of the commission have the force and effect of the verdict of a jury. In determining whether the evidence sustained the commission's findings and award, respondent is entitled to a consideration of the competent evidence most favorable to her, together with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in support of the commission's findings. If, upon a consideration of the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the award, there is any substantial evidence to support the award, the commission's findings and award are binding and conclusive upon an appellate court and questions of the weight of the evidence and credibility of witnesses cannot be here considered. The value of the evidence as well as the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom is for the commission to determine, not the constitutional courts. On appeal the reviewing court will presume that the commission resolved all conflicts in the evidence in such way as to support the award made. Maddux v. K. C. Pub. Serv. Co., 100 S.W.2d 535; Elsas v. Elev. Co., 330 Mo. 596; Phillips v. Air Red. Sales Co., 337 Mo. 587; Crutcher v. Airplane Co., 331 Mo. 169; Moscicki v. Foundry Co., 103 S.W.2d 491; Decker v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co., 336 Mo. 1116; Teague v. Products Co., 331 Mo. 147. (3) The evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom show a causal connection between the conditions under which the work was required to be done and the injury, and further show deceased was engaged in doing something incidental to and connected with his employment. Leilich v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 328 Mo. 112; Wahlig v. Grocer Co., 325 Mo. 677, 29 S.W.2d 128; Phillips v. Air Reduction Sales Co., 337 Mo. 587; Crutcher v. Airplane Mfg. Co., 331 Mo. 169; Jackson v. Euclid Pine Co., 22 S.W.2d 850; Pearce v. Gravel Co., 99 S.W.2d 850; Teague v. Products Co., 331 Mo. 147. (4) Under all the circumstances of this case, deceased was doing an act which his employer reasonably might have anticipated deceased would do, which act was not beyond or disconnected from his employment. An injury which occurs while the employee is doing what he might reasonably do at the time and place is compensable, if it occurs while at any place where the employee's services, or any act, task, or mission or trip which forms a necessary part of his services, may reasonably require him to be. The motives, purposes, and intent which at the time controlled the employee's conduct, together with the other facts and circumstances in evidence, amply support the findings and award of the commission. O'Dell v. Lost Trail, Inc., 339 Mo. 1116; Wahlig v. Grocer Co., 325 Mo. 677, 29 S.W.2d 128; Teague v. Clay Products Co., 331 Mo. 147; Sawtell v. Stern & Co., 44 S.W.2d 269; Metting v. Lehr Const. Co., 225 Mo.App. 1156; 1 Schneider on Workmen's Compensation Law, p. 502. (5) The competent evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom support the finding that deceased started "to his home for the purpose of changing his clothes so that he could perform his work with greater comfort to himself and with greater efficiency and thus contribute to the furtherance of his employer's business." O'Dell v. Lost Trail, Inc., 339 Mo. 1108, 100 S.W.2d 289; Teague v. Clay Products Co., 331 Mo. 147; Wahlig v. Grocer Co., 325 Mo. 677; Clawson v. Motor Co., 131 N.E. 914.

Westhues, C. Cooley and Bohling, CC., concur.

OPINION

WESTHUES

This review involves an award of $ 9517.65, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, to Gertrude Barbara Smith, widow, and Walter Earl Smith, Jr., and William Wayne Smith, minor children, for the death of the husband and father, Walter Earl Smith.

Walter Earl Smith was an employee of Seaman & Schuske Metal Works Company, a corporation engaged in a general sheet metal, roofing, air-conditioning and furnace business, in St. Joseph, Missouri. The company operated under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Employees reported to the office at 8:00 A. M. and L. W. Cramer, the superintendent, assigned them to various jobs the company might have on hand and gave them a ticket for the job to be performed. On the morning of June 29, 1936, Mr. Smith reported for work and was first given a ticket for the job of repairing a gutter, but before he departed Cramer gave him a ticket calling for the repair of a furnace at the Noyes School, directing him to go there first. Although the company furnished a truck for the purpose of taking employees to their jobs, Smith often drove his own automobile, as did other employees, and on the morning in question took Arthur Keener, a helper, to the Noyes School, where another employee, Ed Hausman, met them and showed them what work was to be done on the furnace, after which Mr. Hausman departed. Keener testified that he and Smith "sized" up the job. The furnace was to be "calked" and some warped grates repaired, which called for work inside as well as outside of the furnace. Smith and Keener went upstairs and Smith told Keener "he was going home to change some clothes." A few minutes thereafter, about fifteen blocks from the Noyes School, at Thirty-second and Eugene Field Road, and on a direct route from the school to Smith's home, Smith had an automobile accident in which he was seriously injured. He was unconscious four or five days, and after that was stuporous and mentally confused. He left the hospital July 24, but according to the physician he did not act mentally like a normal person. On September 4, 1936, his body was found not far distant from his home. Other facts will be stated in the course of the opinion.

Section 3301, Revised Statutes 1929 (Mo. Stat. Ann., p. 8232), makes employers, coming under the Workmen's Compensation Act, liable to furnish compensation for the death of an employee "arising out of and in the course of his employment." Section 3305, subdivision (c), Revised Statutes 1929 (Mo. Stat. Ann., p. 8238), provides:

"Without otherwise affecting either the meaning or interpretation of the abridged clause, 'personal injuries arising out of and in the...