Jones v. South Carolina State Highway Dept.
| Decision Date | 04 January 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 18442,18442 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | Paul Brooks JONES, Jr., Respondent, v. SOUTH CAROLINA STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT, Appellant. |
Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod, Asst. Attys. Gen., Everett N. Brandon, C. T. Goolsby, Jr., Columbia, for appellant.
Respondent not represented by counsel.
This is an appeal by the South Carolina State Highway Department from an order of the Circuit Court which enjoins it from suspending the driver's license of Paul Brooks Jones, Jr., the respondent herein.
The record shows that on April 16, 1965, the respondent was notified by the Department that his license to drive a motor vehicle in this state was suspended, under the provisions of Section 46-342 of the Code, for a period of three months because of his conviction on March 20, 1965, of reckless driving, such being a third offense within a five year period. He had previously been convicted of reckless driving on July 16, 1960, and on September 1, 1961. Following his conviction on September 1, 1961, the respondent's license to operate a motor vehicle was suspended for three months, in accordance with Section 46-342 of the Code.
The respondent instituted this proceeding in the Circuit Court to vacate the Department's suspension order of April 16, 1965, on the ground that Section 46-196.4 of the Code prohibits it from considering previous reckless driving convictions where suspension of one's driver's license is under Section 46-342 of the Code. The Circuit Judge sustained the position of the respondent and enjoined the Department from suspending his driver's license. This appeal is from such order.
The General Assembly of this State, at its 1955 Session, by Act No. 168, 49 Stats. 249, established a point system for the evaluation of the operating record of persons to whom a license to operate motor vehicles has been granted, and for the determination of the continuing qualifications of such persons for the privileges granted by such license. The point system so enacted has as its basic element a graduated scale of points assigning relative values to the various violations in accordance with a schedule therein fixed, and providing for the suspension of a driver's license when such driver has a total of twelve points assessed against him in the manner provided for in said Act. Section 4(e) of the aforesiad Act has now been codified as Section 46-196.4 of the 1962 Code and provides:
'When the driver's license of a person is suspended under the provisions of this article, all violations considered in such suspension shall be disregarded in so far as any subsequent suspension under this article or under the provisions of § 46-342 is concerned.'
Section 46-342 of the Code, to which reference is made in Section 46-196.4 of the Code, provides:
* * *'
It will be noted that in Section 46-196.4 of the Code above quoted, that when a driver's license of a person is suspended under the provisions of this 'article' that such violation shall be disregarded insofar as any subsequent suspension under this 'article' or under the provisions of Section 46-342 of the Code is concerned. When the original statute was enacted, Section 4(e) of Act No. 168 used the word 'act' rather than the word 'article'. This change in...
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