Jones v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, Inc.

• Decision Date: 02 March 1932
• Docket Number: 598.
• Citation: 162 S.E. 741,202 N.C. 328
• Parties: JONES v. STANDARD OIL CO. OF NEW JERSEY, Inc., et al.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

162 S.E. 741

202 N.C. 328

JONES v. STANDARD OIL CO. OF NEW JERSEY, Inc., et al.

No. 598.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

March 2, 1932

Appeal from Superior Court, Buncombe County; Stack, Judge.

Action by W. M. Jones against the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, Incorporated, and another. From the judgment, both plaintiff and defendants appeal.

Modified and affirmed on defendants' appeal. Affirmed on plaintiff's appeal.

Every court has inherent power to determine whether it has jurisdiction of pending action.

The plaintiff brought suit against the defendants in the general county court of Buncombe county to recover damages for personal injury alleged to have been caused by the negligent acts of the defendants, which are specifically set forth in the complaint. The defendants filed a demurrer on the ground that the general county court has no jurisdiction of the action for the reason that the public statutes under which the court purported to exercise jurisdiction conflict with the Constitution of North Carolina and are therefore void. Thereafter, in deference to the decision in Ellis v Perley, 200 N.C. 403, 157 S.E. 29, a consent order was entered disallowing the demurrer. The defendants then filed a verified answer in bar and abatement of the plaintiff's action. The plaintiff prayed judgment on the pleadings saying that his demand was in effect a demurrer to the defendants' pleas and an admission of the facts therein stated. The general county court gave judgment overruling the answer and plea in abatement and adjudging:

1. That the defendants are in default and that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment by default and inquiry.

2. That the plaintiff have and recover of the defendants such amount of damages as upon proper inquiry may be found by a jury.

3. That this cause be and the same is hereby continued to the July term, 1931, for trial of the issue as to the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff.

The defendants excepted and appealed to the superior court, and Judge Stack rendered the following judgment:

"The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the question of jurisdiction of the County Court cannot be raised by the defendants in this action in the manner attempted before the County Court and upon the appeal to this Court; but if the jurisdiction can be thus raised in this cause, this Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the County Court has jurisdiction to hear and try the case.

"This Court is further of the opinion that the defendants in good faith challenged the jurisdiction of the County Court by the answer filed, and that when said Court overruled the pleas contained in said answer it should have allowed the defendants to file an answer upon the merits and not render a judgment by default and inquiry.

"Wherefore, it is considered and adjudged, upon this appeal, that the judgment by default and inquiry rendered by the County Court be, and the same is, hereby reversed and overruled and the defendants are allowed twenty days from this date, to-wit: July 25, 1931, to file an answer to the allegations in the complaint of the plaintiff. The cause is remanded to the County Court, there to proceed according to the ruling of this Court and the Code of Civil Procedure."

From this judgment both parties appealed upon assigned error.

Vonno L. Gudger, Geo. O. Perkins, and J. Will Pless, all of Asheville, for plaintiff.

Lee & Lee and Carter & Carter, all of Asheville, for defendants.

ADAMS J.

In the exercise of its legislative power the General Assembly has made provision for the establishment and organization of general county courts. N.C. Code of 1931, c. 27, subch. 5, § § 1608 (f)-1608 (dd). By the act of 1929 these statutes were made applicable to Buncombe county. Pub. Laws 1929, c. 159. Section 1608 (f) 1 provides that if in their opinion the public interest will best be promoted thereby, the commissioners of any county may establish a general county court by resolution reciting the reasons for their action together with the opinion that the call of an election is not necessary. The right of appeal is preserved. Section 1608 (cc).

Pursuant to authority thus conferred, the board of commissioners of Buncombe county on September 30, 1929, formally established a general county court, appointed a judge and a prosecuting officer, prescribed their terms of office, and fixed their respective salaries, which were to be payable monthly.

On October 24, 1930, the plaintiff instituted the present action to recover damages for personal injury suffered through the alleged negligence of the defendants. After their demurrer was overruled the defendants filed a plea purporting to be in bar and in abatement of the action. The asserted ground is the want of jurisdiction; and in support of their plea the defendants assail certain statutes purporting to authorize the creation of the court which, they say, are in conflict with the Constitution. They specifically impeach the validity of the following sections: 1608 (g), which provides that if the public interest calls for such action the county commissioners may appoint the judge and prescribe his term of office; section 1608 (u), which permits, if it does not presume, the waiver of a trial by jury; section 1608 (f) 2, which invests the board with power to abolish the court; section 1608 (t), which assimilates process, pleadings, and rules of procedure to the practice in the superior court; and section 1608 (n), which confers upon the general county court jurisdiction concurrent with the superior court in all actions founded on contract, in all actions not founded on contract, in all actions to try title to land and to prevent trespass and restrain waste, and to issue restraining orders and injunction in all actions pending in the county court.

Before entering upon an examination of the objections interposed to the constitutionality of the several statutes under which the court in question was created, we may take notice of the preliminary proposition urged by the plaintiff and sustained in the judgment; that is, that the jurisdiction exercised by the county court cannot be questioned in this proceeding. The defendants say their plea is not an attack upon the constitutionality of the county court in toto or a denial of its right to perform legitimate functions; that the power of the Legislature to authorize the creation of a county court with capacity to exercise inferior criminal and civil jurisdiction is admitted, provided the jurisdiction is in accord with the fundamental law. The plea is intended to raise only one question: Whether the county court has jurisdiction of the cause of action set forth in the complaint. The jurisdiction of a court is generally prescribed and defined, and as a rule every court has the inherent power to determine whether it has jurisdiction of a pending action. A justice of the peace, for example, may adjudge whether a cause of action is within or beyond his jurisdiction. So it is with the superior court, and indeed with all other courts. On this point the citation of authority is not necessary. It is no less manifest that in such instances the decision of the lower court is subject to review on appeal. Hence we need consume no time in comparing or distinguishing State v. Shuford, 128 N.C. 588, 38 S.E. 808; Virginia Carolina Chemical Co. v. Turner, 190 N.C. 471, 130 S.E. 154, and analogous cases, which were cited in the briefs or in the oral argument; and as the statutes under which the court was established are neither local, private, nor special, we need only remark that its creation is not within the inhibition of the twenty-ninth section of article 2. The single question raised by the appellants directs attention to the allotment and distribution of that portion of the power and jurisdiction of the judicial department which does not pertain to the Supreme Court.

In the Constitution of 1868, art. 4, § 4, it was provided that the judicial power of the state should be vested in a court for the trial of impeachments, a Supreme Court, superior courts, courts of justices of the peace, and special courts; and in section 19 that the General Assembly should provide for the establishment of special courts for the trial of misdemeanors in cities and towns. These were the only special courts. State v. Pender, 66 N.C. 314. Article 4, § 15, provided that the superior court should have exclusive original jurisdiction of all civil actions, whereof exclusive original jurisdiction was not given to some other courts and of all criminal actions in which the punishment did not exceed a fine of $50 or imprisonment for one month. The convention of 1875 in amending the Constitution retained section 19, which is now article 4, § 14, but substituted the following for the fourth and fifteenth sections:

"The judicial power of the State shall be vested in a court for the trial of Impeachments, a Supreme Court, Superior Courts, Courts of Justice of the Peace, and such other Courts inferior to the Supreme Court as may be established by law." Article 4, § 2.

"The General Assembly shall have no power to deprive the Judicial Department of any power or jurisdiction which rightfully pertains to it as a co-ordinate department of the government; but the General Assembly shall allot and distribute that portion of this power and jurisdiction which does not pertain to the Supreme Court, among the other Courts prescribed in this Constitution or which may be established by law, in such manner as it may deem best; provide also a proper system of appeals, and regulate by law, when necessary, the methods of proceeding in the exercise of their powers, of all the Courts below the Supreme Court, so far as the same may be done without conflict with

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