Jones v. State

Decision Date16 February 1945
Citation20 So.2d 901,155 Fla. 558
PartiesJONES v. STATE.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Appeal from Circuit Court, Levy County; John A. H. Murphree, judge.

Scruggs & Carmichael, of Gainesville, for appellant.

J. Tom Watson Atty. Gen., and John C. Wynn, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

BUFORD, Justice.

Appellant was informed against under an information in two counts. He was acquitted on the first count and convicted on the second count, which is as follows:

'And the State Attorney aforesaid, under oath, further information makes that Raleigh Jones of the County of Levy and State of Florida, on the 3rd day of April A.D. 1944, in the County of Levy and State of Florida, did then and there willfully and maliciously kill a steer, a better and more particular description being to the State Attorney unknown, of the property, goods and chattels of a person or persons unknown by shooting the said steer with a rifle.

'Against the form of the statute in such cases made and provided, to the evil example of all others in the like case offending and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida.'

There was a motion to quash the second court of the information, inter alia, on the ground that 'said count fails to charge this defendant with any offense under the laws of the State of Florida.' The charge in the information was attempted under Sec. 828.07, Fla. Statutes 1941, same F.S.A., which is as follows:

'828.07. Maliciously killing animal of another. Whoever willfully and maliciously kills, maims or disfigures any horse, cattle or other beast of another person, or willfully and maliciously administers poison to any such beasts, or exposes any poisonous substance with intent that the same shall be taken and swallowed by them shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding five years, or in the county jail not exceeding twelve months, or by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars.'

A necessary element of the crime denounced by this statute is that the animal must be the property 'of another person.' The information failed to charge this necessary element of the offense. It will be observed that this count of the information did charge that the animal was 'of the property, goods and chattels of a person or persons unknown'.

We do not hold that it was necessary for the information to aver the name of the owner. It is sufficient if the information states the name of the owner or that the owner is unknown. Pippin et al. v. State, 102 Fla. 1134, 136 So. 883; Wharton's Criminal Law, 12th Ed., vol. 2, p. 1503, § 1190. See also 3 C.J. 169, § 558; 3 C.J.S., Animals, § 246, and authorities there cited. But, under a statute such as this, if the owner is not named, then it is necessary to aver that the animal referred to was the property of a person other than the accused, though the identity of such owner may be alleged to be unknown.

Another point which has been presented by the appellant is that when the case was called for trial the accused, through his counsel in open court, announced that he would waive trial by jury and submit himself to trial by the Circuit Judge. The Circuit Judge declined to allow him to do this and required him to go to trial before a jury.

Section 912.01, Fla.Statutes 1941, same F.S.A., provides that trial by jury may be waived by the defendant and prescribes the manner in which such waiver shall be made. The waiver in this case was not made in conformity with the statute, but we think the procedure which was followed was sufficient to have constituted a lawful waiver, had the trial court seen fit to assume the responsibility of trying the case without a jury.

We find nothing in our statutes which requires trial...

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8 cases
  • Sneed v. Mayo
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • 31 d5 Julho d5 1953
    ...of the waiver must appear affirmatively either from the record proper or from the transcript of the trial proceedings. See Jones v. State, 155 Fla. 558, 20 So.2d 901. As to that provision of section 11, Declaration of Rights in the Florida Constitution, which guarantees an accused in a crim......
  • State v. Pandolfo
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • 31 d1 Agosto d1 1959
    ...can not compel the court to so try him, and it is not error for the court to overrule such demand.' To the same effect are Jones v. State, 155 Fla. 558, 20 So.2d 901 and Mitchell v. State, 233 Ind. 16, 115 N.E.2d 595. An extensive note entitled 'Right of accused to insist, over objection of......
  • Russell v. State, 76--293
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 1 d2 Fevereiro d2 1977
    ...the court. Thereafter, the defendant signed a written waiver. The waiver of jury trial was sufficient in all respects. See Jones v State, 155 Fla. 558, 20 So.2d 901; Parks v State, 263 So.2d 642 (Fla.3d DCA 1972); see also Quartz v. State, 258 So.2d 283 (Fla.3d DCA 1972); Kinser v. State, 2......
  • Tosta v. State, 76-2242
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 27 d2 Setembro d2 1977
    ...with the requirement of Rule 3.260. Is it possible for a defendant to give a valid waiver not in writing? The court in Jones v. State, 155 Fla. 558, 20 So.2d 901 (1945), by way of dicta suggests that an oral waiver of jury trial by defense counsel, even though not made in conformity with th......
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