Jones v. State

• Decision Date: 16 June 1894
• Citation: 26 S.W. 1082
• Parties: JONES v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

26 S.W. 1082

JONES v. STATE.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 16, 1894.

Appeal from district court, Dallas county; Charles Fred Tucker, Judge.

R. H. Jones was convicted of murder, and appeals. Reversed.

R. B. Seay, Bassett & Muse, and S. H. Russell, for appellant. R. L. Henry, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

DAVIDSON, J.

Appellant was convicted of murder in the first degree, his punishment being assessed at a life term in the penitentiary. In extenuation of the homicide, he introduced evidence to show the killing occurred on account of insulting conduct towards his wife. In this connection it was testified by the wife of the accused that while she was a widow, and prior to her marriage with appellant, the deceased, W. G. Veal, approached her bed, and had enforced sexual intercourse with her; that deceased, subsequent to her marriage to appellant, visited her home, knocked at the door, and was admitted by the servant girl, and upon another occasion visited her house. Both visits occurred in the absence of her husband. Testifying in regard to the former visit, Mrs. Jones said: "Capt. Veal came in and spoke to me. I don't remember what he said. I suppose he said `Good morning' or `Good evening.' I stood up and said: `What do you come here for? You know you are not welcome in my house.' He did not leave then right away. I do not know what he said exactly. I kept insisting, and tried to drive him or kept trying to get him to go away, saying I did not want him there, or something like that. He turned as if he would go, but stood a moment, and then he came towards me. He came towards me just this way, with his arms stretched out. (Witness stood up and showed how it was.) I said: `Don't you come here, Capt. Veal. You forget where you are. You forget that I have a husband to protect me.' He turned and left the room." In reference to the second visit she stated: "About eight years ago he came to my house again. * * * This was in the daytime too, but I do not know what time in the day, or the date. I was in the kitchen then, busy at work. One of my little children came into the kitchen, and said: `Mamma, there is a gentleman at the door.' I went out there without knowing or dreaming who it was. He was standing in the front door, and I only went as far as the back door, and I saw him there, and I said: `What do you come here for? You know it makes me miserable to see you. You know better than to come to my house.' It seems to me that he said something, but I don't remember what it was. I think he remarked that he was taking a walk, and thought he would come in and see how I was getting along, or something like that. He did not make any movement or gesture towards me, but turned and left the house." About a year before the homicide, these matters were communicated to the appellant by his wife, and produced a decided and marked impression upon his mind and life, as testified by the wife, and thenceforward his life and conduct underwent a great change. Speaking of the effect of her communication to her husband, she testified that "Dr. Jones was terribly shocked and distressed when I told him the story. He said: `My God! How could it be true? How could it have happened?' He said: `If an archangel had told me, I could not have believed it. I could not have believed anybody on earth but yourself.' He did not sleep any more that night that I know of. I saw what effect it had on him, and I saw that he was so distressed I regretted telling him. I did not sleep any more myself. I always felt as if I could not die satisfied, and could never be utterly happy, until I did tell him. I told him that I could not have died satisfied without telling him. These things have been the subject of discussion between Dr. Jones and myself often, both in the daytime and night, but mostly at night, as he is away in the daytime most all the time. He could never speak of it without almost crying like a child. It almost unmans him. He was nervous and restless. He did not sleep well at night. He was just mortified and distressed more than he could bear, almost. I have noticed the expression of his eyes when he would speak about it. He always had a troubled and sad look and expression. He always seemed terribly grieved over it. He has not hardly seemed like the same man since. * * * All of this was not his way of doing before I told him."

While there is more of this same character of evidence, we have quoted enough to illustrate the question in regard to the failure of the court to instruct the jury upon the principles of manslaughter, and his refusal to give special instructions asked in this respect. There is a serious conflict in the testimony as to whether appellant had ever met deceased prior to the killing, after being informed of his conduct towards Mrs. Jones. Evidence was also introduced tending to show that appellant killed Veal because of reasons and motives other than the insulting conduct towards his wife. In regard to the condition of appellant's mind at the time of the homicide, the testimony is also conflicting. It was stated by some of the witnesses that he was very much excited, while others testified that he was not more so than a slayer would usually be when a homicide had been committed. There was a conflict in the evidence in regard to these various issues. In such state of case it is the duty of the court to instruct the jury in regard to the law applicable to the issues thus presented, leaving the weight of the testimony and the credibility of the witnesses to be decided by the jury. Whatever may be the views entertained by a court as to the truth or falsity of evidence adduced, it is incumbent on him to charge the jury, under appropriate instructions, the law applicable to every phase of the testimony adduced on the trial. This is expressly commanded by the statute. To hold otherwise would authorize the trial judge to submit the law applicable only to such evidence as he might deem worthy of credit, discarding such as he believed unworthy of credence, and often, doubtless, thus impressing the minds of the jurors with the fact that the testimony was fabricated or false, and in this way it would be used strongly against the accused by the jury. The only safe rule is to follow the statutory law of the state in all criminal trials.

Under our statute, "insulting words or conduct of the person killed towards a female relative of the party guilty of the homicide" is deemed adequate cause to reduce a homicide from murder to manslaughter. Pen. Code, art. 597, subd. 4. In such state of case it is further provided that "* * * it must appear that the killing took place immediately upon the happening of the insulting conduct, or the uttering of the insulting words or so soon thereafter as the party killing may meet with the person killed after having been informed of such insults." Id. art. 598. We are dealing in this case only with that clause of the statute which reduces the homicide to manslaughter when the killing occurs upon the first meeting after the party killing has been informed of the insulting conduct on the part of the party killed. It will be borne in mind that subdivision 1 of article 594, which provides "that the provocation must arise at the time of the commission of the offense, and that the passion is not the result of a former provocation," has no application to the case in hand. The insulting conduct did not occur in the presence of Jones. He was informed of it, and in such state of case he could kill as soon as he should meet Veal after learning of the conduct, and be guilty of no higher crime than manslaughter, provided the other constituent elements of that offense were present. As was correctly said by Presiding Judge White, in the Eanes Case, 10 Tex. App. 421: "Up to the time of his first meeting, the law prescribes no limit for the subsidence of the passion supposed to be engendered by the information received." The length of time in such state of case does not control the condition of the mind. If the killing takes place on the first meeting, then it is true in this as in all other cases that, in order to reduce the offense to manslaughter, it is necessary, not only that the adequate cause (insulting words or conduct) existed to produce anger, rage, resentment, or terror in a person of ordinary temper sufficient to render the mind incapable of cool reflection, but such state of mind must actually exist at the time of the commission of the offense. Pen. Code, arts. 593, 602. "There must exist, not only the adequate cause, coupled with the defendant's knowledge of its existence, but the disturbed condition of the mind and the necessary passion must also exist in order to reduce the killing from murder to manslaughter." Massie v. State, 30 Tex. App. 64, 16 S. W. 770. "Adequate cause," unattended by the requisite "passion" rendering the mind incapable of cool reflection, may become evidence of highly probative force, showing murder upon express malice. So, in this case, the court, having failed and refused to instruct the jury in regard to the insulting conduct, left this evidence bearing alone upon the question of murder. It then may have become evidence of a most cogent nature tending to show the killing to have been upon express malice; and the evidence adduced and relied on by him to mitigate his crime and punishment was resolved adversely to him by the action of the court refusing to submit the issue of manslaughter. The truth or probable truthfulness of his extenuating evidence was thus decided against him by the court. If the insulting conduct towards Mrs. Jones by Veal was the real cause of the homicide, or there was a reasonable doubt of that fact, and the killing occurred at the...