Jones v. State
| Decision Date | 09 April 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. A--14341,A--14341 |
| Parties | Riley Mitchell JONES, Plaintiff in Error, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Defendant in Error. |
| Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The jury has no absolute right, in the absence of statute, to have the court reporter's notes read to them upon their request.
2. It is within the trial judge's discretion to grant or deny the jury's request that certain testimony be read to them.
3. When a jury in the trial of a criminal case has retired for deliberation, if there be disagreement between them as to any part of the testimony, they may require the officer in charge of them to conduct them into court, where the information required, if proper, may be given to them.
4. The length of time during which a jury should be required to consider a case is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and this court will not interfere with the exercise thereof, unless manifestly abused.
An appeal from the District Court of Tulsa County; Raymond W. Graham, Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction by jury for the crime of Grand Larceny, After Former Conviction of a Felony, wherein Plaintiff in Error was sentenced to nine years confinement in the state penitentiary. Judgment and sentence affirmed.
Jay D. Dalton, Tulsa, for plaintiff in error.
G. T. Blankenship, Atty. Gen., Hugh H. Collum, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.
Plaintiff in error, Riley Mitchell Jones, was convicted by a jury in a two stage trial in the district court of Tulsa County. He was convicted for the offense of Grand Larceny, After Former Conviction of a Felony, and was sentenced to serve nine years in the state penitentiary. This appeal is from that judgment and sentence. Hereafter, plaintiff in error will be referred to as defendant.
A man and a woman were observed 'stripping' a Plymouth Barracuda automobile about nine or ten o'clock in the morning on February 2, 1966 in the outskirts of the City of Tulsa, Oklahoma. The woman plead guilty to the charge and was sentenced, and served one year in the state penitentiary. The witness, who observed the stripping of the automobile, identified the defendant in the courtroom. The woman, who had previously plead guilty, testified that this defendant was not the man who committed the larceny with her. However, she was unable to name the other man, except by the nick-name of 'Rags.' Defendant was found guilty and on December 27, 1966, judgment and sentence was imposed, sentencing him to the penitentiary.
This appeal is pressed on two propositions: First, that the trial court erred in not permitting the reading a second time certain testimony of one witness, when requested by the jury foreman; and secondly, that the trial court erred by making certain remarks to the jury which, in effect, coerced the jury into reaching a verdict.
Defendant's first proposition is premised upon Title 22, O.S.A. § 894, which provides:
The record reflects that the jury communicated with the trial judge and requested that the testimony of one witness be read to the jury. The trial judge declined the request for two reasons: first, that reading the testimony of one witness a second time would be repetitious; and secondly, that a second reading would add undue emphasis to that portion of the testimony read. Defendant contends that the statute is mandatory, and the court committed error when the jury's request was denied. In support of his proposition, defendant cites Bonner v. State, 82 Okl.Cr. 381, 170 P.2d 1020, and Williams v. State, 4 Okl.Cr. 523, 114 P. 1114.
From our reading of the Bonner case, supra, the judgment and sentence was modified for reasons other than the failure of the court to read requested testimony to the jury upon their request.
The only comment in that case, concerning the section of the statute now under consideration, merely sets forth the reason why the testimony was not read back to the jury. Likewise, the Williams case, supra, concerns itself with the misrepresentation of testimony by the prosecuting attorney during his closing argument, as related of section 6823 of Snyder's Compiled Laws of Oklahoma 1909, now codified as Title 22 O.S.A. § 831, which pertains to trial proceedings after the jury is impaneled.
The Attorney General sets forth in his brief that the only two cases which make reference to the section of the Statutes now under consideration are: Bonner v. State, supra, (also cited by defendant) and Buffalow v. State (1955), Okl.Cr., 279 P.2d 1103. But neither case specifically deals with the interpretation of the section of the Statutes under consideration. The Attorney General also cites cases from other jurisdictions, which he relates support his position that the application of the Statute lies within the discretion of the trial court. The first case cited is: Morman v. State, 110 Ga. 311, 35 S.E. 152, which provides:
And the court may, of its own motion, have the stenographic report of a witness's testimony read to the jury in the trial of a criminal case, where they differ as to the testimony of the witness, and, coming into court, make this difference known.
The second case cited from another jurisdiction is: State v. Manning, 75 Vt. 185, 54 A. 181, which recites:
But the jury have no absolute right, in the absence of statute, to have the stenographer's notes of the testimony taken in the case read to them. Whether their request, in regard, should be complied with, rests in the discretion of the court.
Thus, the trial judge, in his discretion may grant or deny the jury's request, upon their return into court, that certain testimony be read to them.
And his third citation is People v. Shuler, 136 Mich. 161, 98 N.W. 986, which states with respect to judicial discretion:
It is within the discretion of the court to comply with the request of the jury, made after they have retired to consider their verdict, for information as to certain testimony which had been produced before them.
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Gardner v. State
...to be repeated are within the discretion of the trial court. See, Savage v. State, 525 P.2d 1219 (Okl.Cr., 1974); Jones v. State, 456 P.2d 610 (Okl.Cr., 1969); Smith v. State, 509 P.2d 1391 (Okl.Cr., 1973); Fosberry v. State, 509 P.2d 911 (Okl.Cr., 1973). Even where the provision that the "......
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Ake v. State
...testimony, we note that the decision to allow or disallow the jury's request lies within the discretion of the trial court. Jones v. State, 456 P.2d 610 (Okl.Cr.1969). The appellant contends that, as evidenced by the "choppy record," it was difficult for the jury to understand Dr. Garcia's ......
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McKinney v. State
...In concluding that the jury's uncertainty amounted to "disagreement" under their statute, the court quoted from Jones v. State, 456 P.2d 610, 612 (Okla.Crim.App.1969): We interpret the mandatory aspect of 22 O.S.A. § 894 to be that which provides for the return of the jury to the courtroom,......
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Engram v. State, F--75--410
...or not to allow testimony to be read to the jury after the case is submitted to them is within the judge's discretion. Jones v. State, Okl.Cr., 456 P.2d 610 (1969), but that such discretion is subject to review. See, Fosberry v. State, Okl.Cr., 509 P.2d 911 (1973) and Lovelady v. State, Okl......