Jones v. State

• Decision Date: 03 March 1983
• Docket Number: No. F-78-604,F-78-604
• Citation: 660 P.2d 634
• Parties: William Denton JONES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

Page 634

660 P.2d 634

William Denton JONES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.

No. F-78-604.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

March 3, 1983.

An appeal from the District Court, Garfield County; J. Russell Swanson, Judge.

William Denton Jones, appellant, was convicted of Murder in the First Degree in Garfield County Case No. CRF-78-487, was sentenced to death and appeals. The judgment and sentence is MODIFIED from death to a term of life imprisonment, and AS SO MODIFIED, is AFFIRMED.

Stephen Jones, James Craig Dodd, Enid, for appellant.

Jan Eric Cartwright, Atty. Gen., Mary Bryce Leader, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

OPINION

BUSSEY, Presiding Judge:

Appellant, William Denton Jones, hereinafter referred to as the defendant, was convicted of Murder in the First Degree in the District Court of Garfield County, in Case No. CRF-78-487. The jury sentenced him to death after hearing evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. In accordance with 21 O.S.1981, § 701.13, this Court has reviewed both the appropriateness of the sentence of death and the errors of law raised on appeal.

I THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE TRIAL

In his first assignment of error the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the trial. The standard of review when this issue is raised is whether or not the State presented a prima facie case. Hunt v. State, 601 P.2d 464 (Okl.Cr.1979). In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Renfro v. State, 607 P.2d 703 (Okl.Cr.1980). The jury was responsible for resolving conflicts in the evidence, and it resolved them in the State's favor.

The evidence presented at the trial was primarily circumstantial, but it was very strong. Jones was at the victim's place of employment when the victim was last seen alive, at about 11:00 a.m. on April 28, 1978. Although he was supposed to relieve a co-worker at a gas station at noon, Jones had not appeared by 12:15, at which time the worker left for lunch; when the defendant did arrive at work after lunch, he had changed his work boots for dress shoes. According to the State's chemist, soil samples taken from the defendant's clothes and from the pickup truck, which was driven solely by the defendant on the morning of the 28th, were consistent with soil samples taken where the body was found, and were dissimilar to the soil around Jones' home or workplaces. Also, a strand of hair found in Jones' pickup was microscopically analyzed and was found to be similar to the victim's hair. Further, a pubic hair found in the victim's vagina was similar to the defendant's hair and unlike either the victim's, her boyfriends' or her employer's hair. The State also introduced a fiber of cloth which was found under the victim's fingernail, and which a State's chemist testified was like the material in the defendant's shirt. A doctor who had studied artificial limbs testified that marks in the mud where the victim's body was found appeared to be marks that would be left by someone wearing an artificial leg, which the defendant had. Additionally, there was testimony that Jones frequently supported himself on his knuckles when he wasn't wearing his prosthesis, and that there were other marks in the mud like those of knuckle impressions. Finally, the defendant made an incriminating statement to a jailmate, saying he had not meant to kill the woman.

The defendant's argument divides the evidence into three categories. First he claims that the testimony of the people involved in his and the victim's day-to-day lives, when properly construed, not only failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty, but in fact established conclusively that he could not have committed the crime. The defendant then argues the evidence in detail, dwelling on inconsistencies and emphasizing interpretations favorable to him.

Second, the defendant urges that the testimony of Theodore King, that the defendant had stated that he did not mean to kill the woman, should not have been admitted. Jones asserts that King's extensive criminal record and his admission that he made his living as a con artist reduced his credibility to a point that his testimony was unbelievable. King's criminal record was made known to the jury and was heavily argued by defense counsel during his closing argument.

Third, Jones challenges the reliability of the scientific tests. He presents technical discussions of the formation and composition of soil and hair, seeking to establish that the comparison tests made by the O.S.B.I. chemist were so simplistic as to be of no evidentiary value. He also alleges that the chemist's test of the cloth fiber found under the victim's fingernail destroyed it, depriving him of the opportunity of having independent tests made; however, this allegation is contradicted by the record.

None of the defendant's arguments are appropriate appellate arguments; he simply argues the weight and credibility of the evidence, which are questions of fact for the trier of fact to resolve. Hunt v. State, supra. This assignment of error is without merit.

II SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION

The defendant next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the preliminary examination; his demurrer at that hearing and his motion to quash were both denied. The defendant maintains that under the language of our statutes, 22 O.S.1981, §§ 262 and 264, "sufficient cause" means a prima facie case must be established. We do not agree. As we stated in Tabor v. State, 582 P.2d 1323 (Okl.Cr.1978):

The State is not required at preliminary hearing to present evidence which would be sufficient to convict at trial. State v. Edmondson, 536 P.2d 386 (Okl.Cr.1975). It is well established that a preliminary hearing is not a trial to determine the guilt of the accused, but only the two issues: Was a crime committed, and is there reasonable cause to believe the defendant committed said crime. Roberts v. State, 561 P.2d 511 (Okl.Cr.1977). We find from our review of the transcript that testimony taken at the preliminary hearing presented sufficient evidence by the State from which the examining magistrate could find the public offense alleged in the information had been committed, and there was sufficient cause to believe the defendant had committed the offense. Turner v. State, 549 P.2d 1346 (Okl.Cr.1976). And where there is competent evidence in the record the reviewing court will not interfere with the determination of the finder of fact.

This assignment of error is without merit.

III THE STANDARDS OF PROOF FOR INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION

The defendant further complains of the preliminary examination in that he believes the State discriminated against him by not seeking a grand jury indictment. He claims that his prosecution by information denied him his constitutional right to equal protection of the law. The defendant's argument may be summarized as follows. Under 22 O.S.1981, §§ 262 and 264, the State's burden of proof at a preliminary examination is "that any public offense has been committed, and that there is sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof, ..." 22 O.S.1981, § 264. This is usually referred to as a showing of probable cause, and as discussed earlier, the showing does not have to be enough evidence to support a conviction. On the other hand, under 22 O.S.1981, § 336, a grand jury may return an indictment "when all of the evidence before them ... would, if unexplained or uncontradicted, warrant a conviction by the trial jury." In other words, a prima facie case. The defendant argues that these two findings, by the magistrate and by the grand jury, occupy correlative positions in their respective avenues of procedure and that it is improper to have two separate and distinct burdens of proof. He argues that the action of the district attorney in deciding to prosecute some defendants by information and some by indictment creates two classes of people who are treated differently: The State is put to a harder test to obtain a grand jury indictment than to get someone bound over for trial by a magistrate. ¹ Since the defendant was prosecuted by information and the State "only" had to show probable cause, and since, according to the defendant, the State would not have been able to establish a prima facie case, the defendant claims he was greatly prejudiced. The defendant does not contend that preliminary examinations should be eliminated, only that the burden of proof should be the same in both proceedings.

The same issue was raised in Collins v. State, 561 P.2d 1373 (Okl.Cr.1977). In that case this Court addressed the issue as follows:

The defendant also argues that it is a violation of the equal protection clause not to require 'the same quantum of evidence to hold one for trial by information as for indictment.' We have repeatedly held that prosecution by indictment and by information are alternative remedies available to the State, In re McNaught, 1 Okl.Cr. 528, 99 P. 241 (1909); Stone v. Hope, Okl.Cr., 488 P.2d 616 (1971); and that the State commits no violation of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by electing one over the other, Sisson v. State, Okl.Cr., 426 P.2d 379 (1967); Stevenson v. State, [486 P.2d 646 (Okl.Cr.1971) ]. This covers equal protection as well as due process. The underlying concept of the equal protection clause is that of discrimination. The clause was designed to protect a person or class from being singled out as the subject of hostile or discriminatory legislation. In order to raise a claim under this doctrine a person must be able to show that he or she is a member of a class which has in fact been set apart by action of the legislature. This the defendant has not done. The procedural statutes challenged--22 O.S.1971, §§ 264 and 336 do not in fact...