Jones v. State
| Decision Date | 26 July 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. F-80-509,F-80-509 |
| Citation | 1982 OK CR 112,648 P.2d 1251 |
| Parties | D. L. JONES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma |
D. L. Jones, appellant, was convicted of Murder in the First Degree in Comanche County District Court, Case No. CRF-79-372. The jury imposed the death penalty for the First Degree Murder conviction. Jones was also convicted on two (2) counts of Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon in Case No.'s CRF-79-373 and CRF-79-374. The jury set punishment at twenty (20) years and twelve (12) years, respectively. The appellant perfected an appeal to this Court. AFFIRMED.
Mitchell A. Lee, Stipe, Gossett, Stipe, Harper & Estes, Oklahoma City, for appellant.
Jan Eric Cartwright, Atty. Gen., Robert W. Cole, Asst. Atty. Gen., Oklahoma City, for appellee.
The appellant, D. L. Jones, was convicted of Murder in the First Degree and received the death penalty. He was also found guilty on two counts of Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon and was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment, and twelve years' imprisonment, respectively.
In the guilt phase of the trial proceedings the appellant raises two interrelated propositions of error. Jones argues that his defense of insanity and his defense of unconsciousness, as a matter of law, require acquittal. He also contends that the application of the M'Naghten rule for insanity violates the due process clause of the United States and Oklahoma Constitutions.
On March 14, 1979, Jones was drinking at the Wichita Lounge in Lawton, Oklahoma. While he was seated at the bar, the barmaid noticed a pistol protruding from his boot. She asked Jones to cover the pistol with his pant leg. Jones told her to shut her mouth or he would blow her head off. Seconds later, the appellant, for no apparent reason, pulled the pistol from his boot and shot a woman who had accompanied him to the bar. After shooting his female companion, Jones turned around to Stanley Buck, Sr. and his son, Stanley Buck, Jr., and asked them, "What the hell are you doing in here?" Jones proceeded to shoot Stanley Buck, Jr. He then turned to Stanley Buck, Sr. and shot him twice in the head at point blank range.
Realizing that Stanley Buck, Jr. was still alive, Jones vowed, "Now I'm going to get you." He further stated, "If I let you live, you'll tell the cops, won't you?" At this point Jones shot Stanley Buck, Jr. again. As one lay dead and two others critically wounded, Jones proclaimed, "I've killed every son-of-a-bitch in here, I guess I'll get me a beer."
The appellant's shooting spree resulted in the death of Stanley Buck, Sr. Jones' female companion was critically injured, requiring the removal of her spleen. Stanley Buck, Jr., spent three weeks in intensive care and is paralyzed on his left side. He was also given a tracheotomy to save his life.
Jones testified that on the day of the murder he had probably taken a prescribed drug, Ativan, in combination with alcohol. He attempted to prove that the interaction between the medication and the alcohol rendered him unconscious of his acts. Jones concludes that the trial court should have directed a verdict on a lesser charge or directed an acquittal, since he introduced evidence of being unconscious at the time of the crime.
The appellant's apparent reliance upon an insanity defense is misplaced. Jones in essence argues that the voluntary ingestion of drugs and alcohol, resulting in temporary insanity, standing alone, should provide a complete defense and thus negate criminal responsibility. Oklahoma follows the M'Naghten test of legal insanity. 21 O.S.1981, § 152; Garrett v. State, 586 P.2d 754 (Okl.Cr.1978). The defendant must demonstrate at trial that during the commission of the crime he was suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him unable to differentiate between right and wrong, or unable to understand the nature and consequences of his acts.
It has long been the rule in this jurisdiction that voluntary intoxication, resulting in temporary mania, does not constitute a mental defect or disease required for a valid insanity defense. Cheadle v. State, 11 Okl.Cr. 566, 149 P. 919 (1915). To constitute legal insanity, caused by intoxication, the mental disease must result from chronic alcoholism; not merely a temporary mental condition. Cheadle, supra; See also, Mott v. State, 94 Okl.Cr. 145, 232 P.2d 166 (1951). Insanity, induced through long periods of excessive alcohol or drug consumption resulting in a continuing mental disease or defect may render a person irresponsible for his conduct, if he is deprived of the mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong. Myers v. State, 83 Okl.Cr. 177, 174 P.2d 395 (1946).
Title 21, Section 153 of the Oklahoma Statutes provides that "(n)o act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication shall be deemed less criminal by reason of his having been in such condition." 21 O.S.1981, § 153. This principle is premised upon the public policy that one who voluntarily consumes alcohol or narcotics should not be relieved from all criminal responsibility merely because the chemical impaired his mental capacity. The voluntary use of intoxicants has been found to be a significant factor in the increase in crime, resulting in an increased danger to the safety and welfare of our citizens. 1
In Couch v. State, 375 P.2d 978 (Okl.Cr.1962), this Court applied the law of voluntary intoxication where narcotics are used as the intoxicating medium. In Couch, this Court held that where drugs are voluntarily taken, the law of voluntary intoxication shall apply. The Couch Court quoted People v. Lim Dum Dong, 26 Cal.App.2d 135, 78 P.2d 1026, 1028 (1938), which articulated the public policy considerations underlying the limited intoxication defense. The California Appeals Court stated:
' which will relieve one of the responsibility of his criminal act.
See also Gibson v. State, 501 P.2d 891 (Okl.Cr.1972); Myers v. State, 83 Okl.Cr.App. 177, 174 P.2d 395 (1948). In this case, Jones voluntarily mixed alcohol with prescribed medication. This places his conduct within the area of voluntary intoxication.
Therefore, in the area of voluntary intoxication we find that our statutes are controlling. The Oklahoma legislature has determined that voluntary intoxication should not completely relieve one of criminal responsibility. Any change in this public policy statement must come from that branch of government and not from the judiciary.
The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that while voluntary intoxication is not a complete defense to criminal culpability, it may be considered in determining whether the accused possessed the requisite criminal intent during the commission of the crime. In Miller v. State, 567 P.2d 105 (Okl.Cr.1977), we stated:
See also Johnson v. State, 621 P.2d 1162 (Okl.Cr.1980); Biggerstaff v. State, 491 P.2d 345 (Okl.Cr.1971); Copperfield v. State, 37 Okl.Cr. 11, 255 P. 590 (1927); Beshirs v. State, 14 Okl.Cr. 578, 174 P. 577 (1918).
Stated simply, voluntary intoxication is no defense to a crime, except to the extent that the intoxication rendered the defendant incapable of forming the necessary mental element. To constitute insanity, caused by intoxication, whether alcohol or drug induced, it must be caused from prolonged use of the intoxicant resulting in a fixed state of mental disease or defect; not merely a temporary mental condition existing during commission of the crime. The determination as to whether the prolonged use of the intoxicant has caused a fixed mental disorder is a question of fact for the jury.
A review of the trial transcript reveals that the appellant did not introduce sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether he was suffering from a mental disorder due to prolonged alcohol or drug use. In support of his insanity defense he called two psychiatrists, Dr. Charles Beck, and Dr. Lawrence Wharton, who specializes in alcohol and drug addiction problems.
Dr. Beck testified that he had examined the appellant for two hours on October 8, 1978. Dr. Beck conducted several psychological tests with Jones. The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory disclosed Jones to be dissatisfied, depressed, discouraged, withdrawn, and worried. This test also suggested he experienced some anxiety, obsessive and compulsive traits. Dr. Beck also administered the Cognitive Capacity Screening test which evaluates whether any brain damage or toxicity is present. Jones scored twenty-eight out of thirty, clearly indicating a lack of organic brain syndrome.
Dr. Beck diagnosed Jones as a borderline schizophrenic. He stated that the interrelationship between...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Addison
...death penalty cases have taken different approaches. Some states have compared pre-Furman cases. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 648 P.2d 1251, 1260 (Okla.Crim.App.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155, 103 S.Ct. 799, 74 L.Ed.2d 1002 (1983) ; Gall v. Com., 607 S.W.2d 97, 113–14 (Ky.1980), cert. den......
-
Nuckols v. State
...heinous, atrocious, or cruel." See Stafford v. State, 669 P.2d 285, 299 (Okl.Cr.1983); Ake v. State, 663 P.2d at 11; Jones v. State, 648 P.2d 1251, 1259 (Okl.Cr.1982). The appellant argues, however, that the suffering of the victim is the major factor to consider in evaluating this aggravat......
-
State v. Price
...v. Blazak, 131 Ariz. 598, 643 P.2d 694 (Sup.Ct.1982), cert. den. 459 U.S. 882, 103 S.Ct. 184, 74 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982); Jones v. State, 648 P.2d 1251 (Okla.Cr.App.1982), cert. den. 459 U.S. 1155, 103 S.Ct. 799, 74 L.Ed.2d 1002 (1983); State v. Johnson, 632 S.W.2d 542 (Tenn.1982), cert. den. 45......
-
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Todd
...515 (1988). Involuntary intoxication by duress of another is also deemed a complete defense to a criminal charge. Jones v. State, Okl.Cr., 648 P.2d 1251, 1258 [1982]; see also in this connection City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 306 Minn. 462, 238 N.W.2d 851, 855-856 [1976].10 Cessante ration......
-
Punishing Temporary Drug-induced Insanity: an Analysis Ofstate v. Hotz, 281 Neb. 260, 795 N.w.2d 645 (2011)
...73. See State v. Hall, 214 N.W.2d 205, 207 (Iowa 1974); Parker v. State, 254 A.2d 381, 388 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1969); Jones v. State, 648 P.2d 1251, 1254 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982); State v. Sexton, 904 A.2d 1092, 1110 (Vt. 2006). State legislatures have shared the same view as their courts. S......
-
§ 24.05 VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION: INSANITY
...on that ground, as considered in § 24.03, supra.[64] . 1 Hale at *32; Ellis v. State, 969 N.E.2d 35, 38 (Ind. 2012); Jones v. State, 648 P.2d 1251, 1255 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982).[65] . People v. Chapman, 418 N.W.2d 658, 659 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).[66] . 1 Hale at *32.[67] . Bieber v. People, ......
-
§ 24.05 Voluntary Intoxication: Insanity
...supra.[64] 1 Hale at *32; Berry v. State, 969 N.E.2d 35, 38 (Ind. 2012); Commonwealth v. Dunphe, 153 N.E.3d at 1264; Jones v. State, 648 P.2d 1251, 1255 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982).[65] People v. Chapman, 418 N.W.2d 658, 659 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).[66] 1 Hale at *32.[67] Bieber v. People, 856 P.......
-
TABLE OF CASES
...94, 98 Jones v. City of Tulsa, 857 P.2d 814 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993), 276 Jones v. State, 43 N.E.2d 1017 (Ind. 1942), 104 Jones v. State, 648 P.2d 1251 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982), 311 Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1962), 103 Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983), 322, 33......