Jones v. State
| Citation | 473 P.3d 1190 |
| Decision Date | 27 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 20180722-CA,20180722-CA |
| Parties | Michael JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Utah, Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Utah |
Michael Jones, Appellant Pro Se
Sean D. Reyes, Salt Lake City, and Shane D. Smith, Attorneys for Appellee
Opinion
¶1 In 2010, Michael Jones was convicted of murder, aggravated robbery, and unlawful distribution of a controlled substance. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. In 2016, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he raised numerous grounds for a new trial or resentencing. The State moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the State's motion and denied the petition. Jones now appeals, and we affirm.
¶2 In February 2004, officers on patrol spotted a blue Honda "just parked there by itself." When they looked inside, they found Tara Brennan2 deceased with a belt around her neck, stab wounds
to her face, defensive wounds to her hands, and a "significant slash" to her neck. The car's interior bore signs of a struggle: shoe scuff marks on the ceiling and a window, a broken rearview mirror, and "blood throughout" the back of the car.
¶3 The killer had taken Brennan's life, her wallet, and about $200 cash but had left behind his Y-chromosome DNA under her fingernails and on the belt used to strangle her. The Y-chromosome profile was rare; it excluded 99.6% of males. Jones's DNA was found on a cigarette butt in the front seat of the car, and he could not be excluded as a possible contributor of the Y-chromosome DNA found on the belt and under Brennan's fingernails.
¶4 Jones admitted to being with Brennan on the night she was murdered, buying crack cocaine with her and smoking crack and cigarettes with her. When Jones talked to police, he claimed to have stayed the night at the homeless shelter, but the shelter logs did not show that he checked in that night. And while he claimed to have worn a purple down jacket that night, police could not find it. He told police that he gave the coat to his mother, but even after they executed a warrant on the mother's house, the coat was never recovered.
¶5 Brennan's mother (Mother) testified at trial that on the day before the murder, she and Brennan went to the bank to cash a check of Brennan's for about $350. Mother also testified that Brennan gave her $100 for car insurance and spent about $50 on a new battery for her Honda.
¶6 After running errands with Mother, Brennan drove the car around, ostensibly to see if it still ran well after having sat in Mother's driveway for a year. Mother testified that she believed Brennan had about $200 with her—the amount remaining from the cashed check after the insurance and battery payments. Brennan habitually carried a wallet in which she kept her money and identification. But when the police found Brennan's body the next day, the wallet and money she had the day before were gone.
¶7 The State charged Jones with murder, aggravated robbery, and unlawful distribution of a controlled substance. Jones moved to exclude the Y-chromosome DNA evidence. The trial court3 denied the motion.
¶8 At trial, the jury heard the Y-chromosome DNA evidence, which consisted of results from Y-STR DNA testing.4 Such testing focuses only on the Y chromosome and enables analysts to identify a very small amount of male DNA that might otherwise go undetected in the presence of a large amount of female DNA. But because the Y chromosome is usually identical up and down paternal lines, Y-STR DNA testing can only exclude suspects rather than affirmatively identify them. Yet some Y-chromosome profiles, or haplotypes, are rarer than others.
¶9 Defense counsel cross-examined one of the State's investigators about a blond hair found on the side of the Honda. The investigator testified that it appeared to be the blond crime lab technician's hair, so it was not processed. The investigator also testified that the State did not have the technology necessary for testing the hair for DNA at the time of the 2004 investigation.
¶10 Defense counsel also cross-examined investigators about not following up on one of Jones's associates—Carlaya Yazzie. Officers received information that Yazzie may have been with Jones on the night of the murder. Jones told officers that he knew Yazzie from his time at the homeless shelter, but he denied that he had been with Yazzie that night.
¶11 Defense counsel elicited testimony that Yazzie was one of about forty people interviewed who may have had contact with Brennan on the night of the murder. Counsel further elicited that Yazzie was the only female person of interest in the case and that officers did not obtain a DNA sample from her. Yazzie was a convicted felon. Thus, officers had reason to believe that she would be in the criminal database against which DNA samples are run to find matches.
¶12 In closing argument, defense counsel argued that the blond hair on the side of the Honda may have belonged to a man a witness saw cleaning the vehicle on the morning after the murder. Counsel argued that investigators’ failure to test the blond hair was an "oversight" in the investigation. Counsel also suggested that Yazzie could have been the murderer because she was a suspect and the State had not excluded her as a potential contributor to the DNA found at the crime scene.
¶13 The jury convicted Jones on all counts. At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel raised several concerns with the presentence investigation report and asked the court to correct several items on it, including a minimum mandatory sentence of twenty-four years. Counsel then asked that the court sentence Jones to concurrent, rather than consecutive, sentences. The State responded by arguing for consecutive sentences, citing the circumstances of the murder and noting that Jones committed the murder only five months after being released from prison and had been arrested on another felony shortly after the murder.
¶14 After reviewing the presentence investigation report, noting defense counsel's objections to the report, hearing from Mother, and considering the State's request, the trial court sentenced Jones to five years to life in prison for the murder, five years to life for the aggravated robbery, and one to fifteen years for the drug conviction. The court ordered the prison terms to run consecutively.
¶15 On direct appeal, Jones argued that (1) "the trial court erred when it admitted Y-STR DNA evidence linking [him] to the murder weapon," (2) "the trial court erred when it denied admission of [his] second police interview" or his counsel was ineffective in failing "to put his statements during the police interview into context," (3) the trial court erred when it admitted testimony that Jones believed was "anecdotal statistical evidence," (4) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in making certain statements in closing argument, and (5) "the State's evidence was insufficient to sustain convictions for murder or aggravated robbery." State v. Jones , 2015 UT 19, ¶ 1, 345 P.3d 1195. The Utah Supreme Court rejected Jones's arguments and affirmed his convictions. Id.
¶16 In 2016, Jones filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief in which he raised numerous grounds for relief. He claimed that the trial court had committed several errors and that he had received constitutionally ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel in other various ways. The State moved for summary judgment on every ground. According to the State, Jones's claims were either procedurally barred or failed on their merits. Jones opposed the State's motion, arguing, among other things, that the procedural bars are unconstitutional.
¶17 After a hearing, the district court granted the State's motion. The court ruled that Jones's claims of trial court error were procedurally barred, that his constitutional challenge to the procedural bars were meritless, and that his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel all failed as a matter of law. Accordingly, the district court granted the State's motion for summary judgment and denied Jones's petition for post-conviction relief. Jones appeals.
¶18 Jones contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the State and denying his petition for post-conviction relief. We give no deference to the district court in reviewing its grant of summary judgment or its order denying a petition for post-conviction relief. Ross v. State , 2012 UT 93, ¶ 18, 293 P.3d 345. We review such rulings for correctness. Id. We will affirm the grant of summary judgment "when the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Id. (cleaned up); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a). "In making this assessment, we view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to" Jones, the nonmoving party. See Ross , 2012 UT 93, ¶ 18, 293 P.3d 345 (cleaned up).
¶19 At the outset, we recognize that Jones is a pro se litigant. "Appellate courts are generally lenient with pro se litigants," Chaparro v. Torero , 2018 UT App 181, ¶ 33, 436 P.3d 339 (cleaned up), and extend "every consideration that may reasonably be indulged," Allen v. Friel , 2008 UT 56, ¶ 11, 194 P.3d 903 (cleaned up). But "reasonable indulgence is not unlimited indulgence," and generally parties who represent themselves "will be held to the same standard of knowledge and practice as any qualified member of the bar." Id. (cleaned up). Thus, while a "lack of technical knowledge of law and procedure should be accorded every consideration that may reasonably be indulged," pro se litigants are still "required to adhere to procedural rules and the law." State v. Boyles , 2015 UT App 185, ¶ 18 n.7, 356...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Littlejohn
...any such information might have made a difference to the outcome of Littlejohn's sentencing. See Jones v. State , 2020 UT App 125, ¶ 40, 473 P.3d 1190 (rejecting a challenge where the defendant had "not proffered what specific evidence further investigation would have yielded and how that e......
-
Calder v. State
...attempts to cast his equal protection and vagueness claims as ineffective assistance claims. See Jones v. State , 2020 UT App 125, ¶ 32, 473 P.3d 1190 (stating that "a claim in a post-conviction petition that could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal is not barred if the fail......