State v. Boyles

• Decision Date: 30 July 2015
• Docket Number: No. 20130578–CA.,20130578–CA.
• Citation: 2015 UT App 185,356 P.3d 687
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Evan D. BOYLES, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

356 P.3d 687

2015 UT App 185

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee

v.Evan D. BOYLES, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 20130578–CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

July 30, 2015.

Evan D. Boyles, Appellant Pro Se.

Dee W. Smith, Branden B. Miles, and Brody E. Flint, Attorneys for Appellee.

Judge JOHN A. PEARCE authored this Opinion, in which Judges STEPHEN L. ROTH and MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN concurred.

Opinion

PEARCE, Judge:

¶ 1 This case considers whether police officers executing a search warrant for a single-level, three-bedroom house needed to obtain a new warrant after they encountered a locked interior door sporting a no-trespassing sign. We conclude that the trial court did not err by determining that the locked door and sign were insufficient to provide a reasonable officer notice that the bedroom behind the door was a separate residence.¹ We therefore affirm the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence found in that bedroom.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 A confidential informant told the police that he had purchased methamphetamine from James Fitts on multiple occasions. According to the informant, he had purchased the drugs at Fitts's residence and Fitts stored his merchandise in his bedroom.

¶ 3 Under police direction, the informant then made two controlled purchases of drugs from Fitts. The informant first went to the house and bought methamphetamine from Fitts using marked money. After this purchase, the informant reported that three people lived in the house: James Fitts, Evan D. Boyles, and K.Z. The second controlled purchase also took place at the house. The informant noted that Boyles had been “present at the location” during the second transaction.

¶ 4 The police sought a search warrant. The affidavit supporting the warrant request recounted the facts the informant provided. The affidavit also detailed Fitts's and Boyles's criminal histories. The affidavit noted that Boyles resided at the house, that he had “an extensive history of Possession of Illegal Narcotics,” and that four of Boyles's nine prior convictions had involved drugs.² The police requested a search warrant to seize methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia from James Fitts, the house, and the house's curtilage. Specifically, the affidavit described the property to be searched as including “all outbuildings, garages, sheds, vehicles, trailers, boats, locked containers, and other property contained within the property lines (curtilage).” Citing officer safety and the possibility of evidence being destroyed, the affidavit asked “that the police officers executing the search warrant not be required to give notice of authority (no-knock) and be able to execute the search warrant day or night.” A district court judge reviewed the affidavit and issued a warrant to search Fitts and the house.

¶ 5 Police officers executed the warrant on July 12, 2011. When the officers arrived, Boyles and his girlfriend were in the backyard. Boyles and Fitts were detained while the officers searched the house. While the officers did not know the “entire layout of the home” when they entered, one officer later testified that he “had an idea” which room was Fitts's.

¶ 6 While searching the house, the officers encountered a locked door with a no-trespassing sign hanging on it. Officers broke down the door and discovered a bedroom containing drug paraphernalia. When asked, Boyles admitted that the locked bedroom was his. The officers also found heroin in another room, later identified as Fitts's bedroom.³

¶ 7 The State charged Boyles with possession of drug paraphernalia. Boyles elected to represent himself at the pretrial proceedings and at trial. Boyles filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered in his bedroom. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court found that the officers had acted in good faith in obtaining the warrant and that the warrant allowed the officers to search the entire property. The trial court further found (1) that Boyles “maintain[ed] a separate, locked bedroom within the home”; (2) that although “the officers had reason to believe there were multiple people living in the home, there is no evidence that the police officers knew that [Boyles] maintained exclusive control over a particular bedroom”; and (3) that there “was no indication that the bedroom was intended to be a separately occupied portion of the home like an apartment.” The court concluded that the “scope of the search warrant reasonably included [Boyles's] room” and therefore denied the motion to suppress. A jury convicted Boyles of possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor. Boyles appeals.⁴

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8 Boyles contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress. He argues that the officers lacked probable cause to search his bedroom and that the warrant failed to properly describe the place to be searched. In an appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we review the trial court's factual findings for clear error and its conclusions of law for correctness. State v. Rogers, 2014 UT App 89, ¶ 4, 325 P.3d 884.

ANALYSIS

¶ 9 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” “[T]he touchstone of [Fourth] Amendment analysis has been the question whether a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.” Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We assume, without deciding, that Boyles had a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to his bedroom independent of that which he enjoyed as to the house as a whole.

¶ 10 Police officers generally need a warrant to search a place in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978) (“The bulwark of Fourth Amendment protection, of course, is the Warrant Clause, requiring that, absent certain exceptions, police obtain a warrant from a neutral and disinterested magistrate before embarking upon a search.”). Before issuing a search warrant, a magistrate must determine that probable cause exists to conduct the search, id.; often, this determination is based upon an affidavit filed by the investigating officer. “[A] warrant affidavit must set forth particular facts and circumstances underlying the existence of probable cause, so as to allow the magistrate to make an independent evaluation of the matter.” Id. at 165, 98 S.Ct. 2674.

I. Validity of the Search Warrant

¶ 11 Boyles contends that the affidavit in his case “misrepresented the true nature of the living arrangement” and was therefore invalid. He argues that “[t]his deprived the magistrate of the ability to accurately assess probable cause for the entire structure, since he did not know that Mr. Boyles had a separately accessed and rented space.”⁵ He asserts that, “[h]ad the court known that fact, it would have granted the search warrant, but excepted Mr. Boyles' room from the search.”

¶ 12 “When the Fourth Amendment demands a factual showing sufficient to comprise ‘probable cause,’ the obvious assumption is that there will be a truthful showing.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 164–65, 98 S.Ct. 2674 (emphasis omitted) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “This does not mean ‘truthful’ in the sense that every fact recited in the warrant affidavit is necessarily correct, for probable cause may be founded upon hearsay and upon information received from informants, as well as upon information within the affiant's own knowledge that sometimes must be garnered hastily.” Id. at 165, 98 S.Ct. 2674. Rather, a warrant affidavit “is to be ‘truthful’ in the sense that the information put forth is believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant as true.” Id.

¶ 13 A warrant is not necessarily invalidated by the later discovery that some of the information supporting the warrant is inaccurate. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85–86, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987). In Garrison, police officers possessed a valid warrant to search “the person of Lawrence McWebb and ‘the premises known as 2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment’ ” for drugs. Id. at 80, 107 S.Ct. 1013. When the police applied for the warrant and when they began their search, they reasonably believed there was only one apartment on the third floor. Id. While executing the warrant, the officers entered a vestibule on the third floor and encountered two open doors. Id. at 81, 107 S.Ct. 1013. They began searching and discovered incriminating evidence including heroin. Id. However, they then realized that the third floor was in fact divided into two apartments—one occupied by McWebb and the other by Garrison. Id. The officers stopped searching Garrison's apartment once the separate nature of the apartments became apparent. Id. Garrison was charged with and convicted of drug possession on the basis of the heroin found in his apartment. Id. at 80, 107 S.Ct. 1013.

¶ 14 The United States Supreme Court framed the question before it as, “[W]hether that factual mistake invalidated a warrant that undoubtedly would have been valid if it had reflected a completely accurate understanding of the building's floor plan.” Id. at 85, 107 S.Ct. 1013. The Court noted that the warrant's “description of [the place to be searched] was broader than appropriate because it was based on the mistaken belief that there was only one apartment on the third floor of the building at 2036 Park Avenue.” Id. But “the discovery of facts demonstrating that a valid warrant was unnecessarily broad does not retroactively invalidate the warrant.” Id. Because the officers could not have reasonably known of their factual mistake at the time they applied for the warrant, the Court concluded that the warrant was validly issued. Id. at 85–86, 107 S.Ct. 1013.

¶ 15 Boyles...