Jones v. State

• Decision Date: 15 December 1999
• Docket Number: No. 29, No. 12
• Citation: 742 A.2d 493,357 Md. 141
• Parties: Jerry Cornelius JONES v. STATE of Maryland. State of Maryland v. Douglas C. Tederick.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

742 A.2d 493

357 Md. 141

Jerry Cornelius JONES v. STATE of Maryland.

State of Maryland v. Douglas C. Tederick.

Nos. 12, 29, Sept. Term, 1999.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

December 15, 1999.

Geraldine K. Sweeney, Assistant Public Defender (Peter F. Rose, Assistant Public Defender and Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner, in No. 12 Sept. Term, 1999.

Celia Anderson Davis, Assistant Attorney General (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, on brief), Baltimore, for respondent, in No. 12 Sept. Term, 1999.

M. Jennifer Landis, Assistant Attorney General (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner, in No. 29 Sept. Term, 1999.

Geraldine K. Sweeney, Assistant Public Defender (Peter F. Rose, Assistant Public Defender and Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for respondent, in No. 29 Sept. Term, 1999.

Argued before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, and ROBERT L. KARWACKI (retired, specially assigned), JJ. RAKER, Judge.

The common question we must decide in these two consolidated cases is whether multiple punishments may be imposed for the single criminal act of driving a motor vehicle while the operator's driving privileges were both suspended and revoked in violation of Maryland Code (1977, 1999 Repl.Vol., 1999 Supp.) § 16-303 of the Transportation Article¹. In Jones v. State, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgments of the Circuit Court for Harford County, thereby answering the question in the affirmative. In State v. Tederick, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the Circuit Court for Washington County, thereby answering the same question in the negative. We granted the petitions for certiorari in both cases and consolidated them for review to resolve the issue. In Tederick, we shall affirm; in Jones, we shall reverse.

I.

A. Jones v. State, No. 12.

Petitioner Jerry Cornelius Jones was charged in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Harford County, with multiple traffic violations arising from a single incident of driving while his privilege to drive was suspended in violation of § 16-303(c) and revoked in violation of § 16-303(d). He was sentenced on count three, attempting to elude police by willfully failing to stop a vehicle when signaled to do so by an official police vehicle, to a term of imprisonment of one year, all but six months suspended; on count four, exceeding the speed limit, a fine of $500, all suspended; on count seven, driving on a suspended license, to a term of imprisonment of one year, consecutive to count three; on count eight, driving on a revoked license, to a term of imprisonment of one year, suspended, consecutive to counts three and seven; on count nine, fleeing police on foot, to a term of imprisonment of one year, suspended, consecutive to counts three, seven and eight; and on count ten, driving without a license, to a term of imprisonment of one year, suspended, consecutive to counts three, seven, eight and nine.² The court placed Jones on probation for the suspended portions of the sentences.

The events which led to the suspension and revocation of Petitioner's driving privileges in Maryland are as follows. At age 16, Jones was convicted of attempting to drive on a highway without a license. At age 17, he was convicted for driving on a highway without a license. He did not pay the fine imposed by the District Court for that offense and the Motor Vehicle Administration (hereinafter MVA) suspended his privilege to drive for failure to pay the fine. See § 27-103(a)(2). At age 18, he was convicted of driving while his privilege to drive was suspended, in violation of § 16-303(h). As a result of these convictions, he had accumulated a total of 13 points within a two-year period; pursuant to § 16-404(a)(3)(ii), on May 30, 1997, the MVA revoked his privilege to drive. Consequently, on August 12, 1997, the date of the offense in this case, Jones's privilege to operate a motor vehicle in this State was both suspended and revoked.

On August 12, 1997, Jones was operating a motor vehicle on the public roads in Harford County. The police attempted to stop Jones's vehicle to investigate what appeared to them to be a faulty braking mechanism. Jones stopped the car at the side of the road, but immediately sped away. He stopped the car a minute later, and then took off on foot. The officer caught up with him, and determined that Jones had no license to drive in the State of Maryland, and that his privilege to drive was also suspended and revoked. The officer issued citations for attempting to elude a police officer by failing to stop the vehicle, exceeding the permissible maximum speed limit, negligent driving, reckless driving, attempting to elude a police officer, driving while one's privilege is suspended, driving while one's privilege is revoked, and driving without a license. Jones prayed a jury trial and the cases were transferred from the District Court to the circuit court. He was convicted on all counts.

Jones noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Before that court, he argued, inter alia, that the trial court erred by imposing separate convictions and separate sentences for driving without a license or privilege to drive, driving while one's license or privilege to drive is revoked, and driving while one's privilege to drive is suspended. His primary argument was that his convictions for driving suspended and driving revoked should merge under the required evidence test— the driving while suspended being the lesser included offense of driving while revoked. He reasoned that suspension is the temporary counterpart to revocation, the permanent measure. Because the permanent measure necessarily included the temporary measure, driving while suspended is a lesser included offense of driving while revoked. Thus, the legislature must have intended that the two restrictions be treated as one. In the alternative, he argued the rule of lenity.

The Court of Special Appeals rejected his arguments and affirmed the judgments. The court noted that "suspend" is defined in the Transportation Article as "to withdraw temporarily, by formal action of the Administration, an individual's license to drive a motor vehicle on highways in this State" for a period specifically designated by the Administration. See § 11-164. "Revoke," as defined in the Transportation Article, means "to terminate, by formal action of the Administration, an individual's license to drive a motor vehicle on highways in this State." See § 11-150. Nonetheless, because Jones's suspension and revocation restrictions were each imposed for distinct reasons, i.e., suspension for failure to pay District Court fines, and revocation for point accumulation, the court held that they are each different statutory offenses. The court determined that the two charges, that is, those leading to the license restrictions, did not arise from the same criminal act, and therefore it was proper for the trial court to maintain separate convictions.

As for the multiple punishments, the Court of Special Appeals rejected Jones's lenity argument. In doing so, the court focused on the nature of the traffic violation that led to the suspension and the revocation and noted that there are certain instances, as in the present case, where one's suspension and revocation could result from distinct and unrelated conduct. On the other hand, there may also be circumstances in which the behavior leading to one's suspension might also result in revocation. The court concluded that

[a]s a result, no single conclusion may be established regarding whether the legislature intended that the convictions for these two criminal acts merge. Rather, it seems that the proper approach is to determine the merger question on a case-by-case basis, reviewing the circumstances and underlying reasons for each driving restriction and then evaluating whether maintaining distinct convictions for each infringes upon one's right against double jeopardy.

The court held that because the conduct leading to Jones's suspension is distinct from the action resulting in his revocation, the rule of lenity does not require merger of the two offenses. Accordingly, it was not plain error for the trial court to maintain separate convictions and sentences for the two offenses.

B. State v. Tederick, No. 29

Respondent Douglas C. Tederick was convicted in the Circuit Court for Washington County of driving while his license was revoked, driving while his license was suspended, fleeing and eluding a police officer, driving through a red signal, negligent driving, speeding, and consuming alcohol while driving. The court sentenced him on the driving while revoked charge to a term of imprisonment of one year, consecutive to the one-year sentence the court imposed for the fleeing and eluding conviction. On the driving while suspended charge, the court sentenced Tederick to a term of incarceration of one year, to be served concurrently with the sentence imposed on the driving while revoked charge.

The events which led to Tederick's suspension and revocation are as follows. Tederick's license was revoked in December of 1990 due to accumulation of points. His privilege to drive was suspended in June of 1997 for non-compliance with the terms of his child support order. See § 16-203(b).³

On November 2, 1997, Tederick was driving a motor vehicle in West Virginia when a West Virginia state trooper, responding to an unrelated emergency call, engaged his emergency lights in an attempt merely to pass Tederick. Instead of pulling over, Tederick sped up, and as a result, the trooper pursued Tederick's vehicle. Tederick drove into Maryland, where he was stopped by deputies of the Washington County Sheriff's Department and placed under arrest. Tederick was charged by citation and he prayed a jury trial in the District Court. The cases were...