Jones v. State

Decision Date23 August 2012
Docket NumberNo. 2010–CT–00202–SCT.,2010–CT–00202–SCT.
Citation95 So.3d 641
PartiesEddie Ray JONES v. STATE of Mississippi.
CourtMississippi Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Eddie Ray Jones, appellant, pro se.

Office of the Attorney General by Ladonna C. Holland, attorney for appellee.

EN BANC.

CARLSON, Presiding Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. Henry Taylor and Eddie Ray Jones were tried jointly for aggravated assault and possession of a firearm by a felon. Taylor was found guilty on both charges, and Jones was acquitted on the latter charge but convicted on the former charge. Jones appealed his aggravated-assault conviction, and the Court of Appeals affirmed Jones's conviction and sentence. After the Court of Appeals denied his motion for rehearing, Jones filed a petition for writ of certiorari which we granted to consider, inter alia, Jones's claims of inconsistent verdicts and erroneous jury instructions. We now find that Jones's claims of error are without merit; thus we affirm the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the Circuit Court for the Second Judicial District of Bolivar County.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT

¶ 2. At the outset, we mention that the State's theory at trial was that Jones and Taylor committed aggravated assault, individually or as aiders and abettors, in connection with firing the bullet that struck Camisha Cleveland.

¶ 3. We set out the facts of today's case in the light most favorable to the jury verdict as to the aggravated-assault conviction. At approximately 6:30 p.m. on March 22, 2007, a shooting occurred on White Street in Cleveland, near the intersection of White Street and Highway 61. Latoya Sellers was driving her white Nissan Altima east on White Street. Her boyfriend, Maurice Williams, was in the passenger seat. They passed a large crowd of people heading west toward Highway 61. According to Sellers, someone in the crowd hollered what unquestionably would be considered an inflammatory remark. Williams jumped out of the car with a gun and said “what did you say?” Then Williams started firing shots west toward the intersection of White Street and Highway 61. At that point, a person or persons in the crowd returned fire, shooting in an easterly direction, and struck Camisha Cleveland, who was driving her car west on White Street. The bullet traveled through the windshield of Cleveland's car, shattered Cleveland's cheekbone, and damaged her ear. The State sought to prove that Jones or Taylor individually had fired the shot that struck Cleveland, and that the other had aided and abetted in the crime.

¶ 4. Several witnesses testified about what they had observed. Frank Edwards testified that it was daylight when the shooting occurred. He was outside a trailer on White Street when he saw the crowd and spotted Taylor and Jones in the crowd. He saw Taylor point a gun in an easterly direction. He did not see Jones or anyone else with a gun. Michael Whitten, who worked at a package store on the corner of Highway 61 and White Street, heard five to seven gunshots and then saw Taylor running with something short and silver in his hand. Whitten did not see Jones at all. Virginia Hunter, who lived on White Street, saw Taylor pointing a gun away from Highway 61. She did not see Jones.

¶ 5. Cedrick Hampton testified that he was not present at the shooting, but that he had seen Jones and Taylor in a car prior to the shooting. He admitted he had given a statement to the police in which he had stated that, when he had seen them, Taylor and Jones had guns. Hampton testified that he had lied to the police because he had been angry with Jones and Taylor due to a misunderstanding. He testified that, in fact, he had not seen Taylor and Jones with guns.

¶ 6. Sellers testified that she had given three statements to the police. In her first and second statements, she had omitted the fact that Williams had a gun. She testified that she had lied because she had been trying to protect herself from prosecution. In her third statement, Sellers stated that Williams and Jones had guns. She stated that, after Williams jumped out of her car, she quickly glanced in the rear-view mirror and saw Jones running behind her car, holding a gun. She heard shooting. She said Williams never fired his gun, and that her statements were not an effort to protect Williams. Jones's counsel cross-examined Sellers, using her prior inconsistent statements in an effort to impeach her testimony before the jury. Sellers was unable to say whether Jones had been wearing a shirt, and she was unable to describe the gun.

¶ 7. George Serio, Investigator for the Cleveland Police Department, testified that Jones, Taylor, Williams, and Sellers had been arrested and charged in connection with the shooting. He stated that Jones and Taylor had tested negative for gunshot residue, and Williams's test was ambiguous. He testified that another person had confessed to the shooting, but that the investigation had discredited that person's confession.

¶ 8. Jones and Taylor stipulated to their prior felonies. During the defendants' case-in-chief, several relatives of the defendants testified that they had been in the crowd, and that neither Jones nor Taylor had been involved in the shooting. The jury found Taylor guilty of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm by a felon, and it found Jones guilty of aggravated assault but acquitted him of possession of a firearm by a felon. Jones was sentenced to serve twenty years as a habitual offender in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Jones appealed, and this Court assigned his appeal to the Court of Appeals.

PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

¶ 9. Before the Court of Appeals, Jones raised two issues: (1) whether, during voir dire, the trial court erred in reading the portion of Count II of the indictment concerning Jones's prior conviction of sale of cocaine as an element of the crime of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; 1 and (2) whether the evidence adduced at trial was legally sufficient to sustain his aggravated-assault conviction. In a majority opinion authored by Judge Carlton, the Court of Appeals discussed the issues, found them to be without merit, and affirmed. Jones v. State, 95 So.3d 672, 674–80, ¶¶ 1–22 (Miss.Ct.App.2011), r'hg denied (November 29, 2011).

¶ 10. Judge Russell, joined by Presiding Judge Irving, dissented, finding the evidence insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict for aggravated assault; Judge Russell opined that Jones's aggravated-assault conviction should be reversed and a judgment of acquittal rendered in Jones's favor. Additionally, although Jones did not challenge on appeal the jury instructions or the weight of the evidence, Judge Russell, in applying plain-error review, found fault with the aiding-and-abetting language of the aggravated-assault instruction which the trial court submitted to the jury, and she found that the guilty verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence, thus requiring at least a reversal of the judgment of conviction and sentence and a remand to the trial court for a new trial. Jones, 95 So.3d 672, 680–84, ¶¶ 23–41, (Russell, J., dissenting, joined by Irving, P.J.)

¶ 11. Once the Court of Appeals denied his motion for rehearing, Jones filed his petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted. Jones v. State, 82 So.3d 620 (Miss.2012).

DISCUSSION

¶ 12. In his petition for writ of certiorari, Jones asserts: (1) during voir dire, the trial court erred in reading to the jury that portion of Count II of the indictment (convicted felon in possession of a firearm) concerning Jones's prior conviction for sale of cocaine; (2) the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain the conviction for aggravated assault; (3) more specifically, the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain the jury's finding that Jones had aided and abetted Henry Taylor in committing the crime of aggravated assault; and (4) by applying plain-error review on appeal, the trial court had erred in giving the tendered aggravated-assault instruction with the faulty “aiding-and-abetting” language, and the jury's guilty verdict as to the aggravated-assault charge was contrary to the weight of the evidence.

¶ 13. As noted supra, Jones raises several issues in his petition for writ of certiorari; but this Court may limit the issue(s) we wish to address upon a grant of certiorari. McCain v. State, 81 So.3d 1055, 1059 n. 5 (Miss.2012); Glidden v. State, 74 So.3d 342, 345 (Miss.2011); seeM.R.A.P. 17(h). Thus, today, we will discuss those issues we deem appropriate.

I. WHETHER THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN JONES'S CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED ASSAULT.

¶ 14. Challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, Jones argues that, viewed alongside Taylor's convictions, his acquittal on felony possession of a firearm meant that the jury had found that he (Jones) had not possessed or fired a gun. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, reasoning that, when the verdicts are inconsistent, the reviewing court properly considers whether evidence was sufficient to support only those counts on which a conviction is returned. Jones, 95 So.3d 672, 679, ¶ 17. Because Sellers's testimony that she had seen Jones facing east holding a gun and then had heard gunshots was sufficient to support his conviction of aggravated assault, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at 680, ¶ 22. The Court of Appeals majority noted that “where a multi-count verdict appears inconsistent, the appellate inquiry is limited to a determination of whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the counts on which a conviction is returned. What the jury did with the remaining counts is immaterial.” Jones v. State, 95 So.3d 672, 679, ¶ 17 (Miss.Ct.App.2011) (citing Edwards v. State, 797 So.2d 1049, 1058 (Miss.Ct.App.2001) (citation omitted)).

¶ 15. In her dissent, Judge Russell took issue with the majority's conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to support Jones's aggravated-assault conviction,...

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    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • 6 Agosto 2015
    ...that S–6A properly instructed the jury on aiding and abetting. See Milano v. State, 790 So.2d 179, 185 (Miss.2001) ; Jones v. State, 95 So.3d 641, 648–49 (Miss.2012) (find an aiding-and-abetting instruction substantially similar to S–6A correctly informed the jury on aiding and abetting).4 ......
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