Jones v. State

• Decision Date: 03 May 1972
• Docket Number: No. 44695,44695
• Parties: Roger Byron JONES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 307

479 S.W.2d 307

Roger Byron JONES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 44695.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 3, 1972.

James P. Finstrom, Dallas, for appellant.

Henry Wade, Dist. Atty., and W. T. Westmoreland, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Dallas, Jim D. Vollers, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

OPINION

ODOM, Judge.

This appeal is from a conviction for the offense of unlawful possession of a narcotic drug, to-wit: marihuana. The punishment was assessed by a jury at 35 years.

Appellant contends that reversible error was committed when three nude photographs of him were admitted into evidence. over objection, during the punishment stage of the trial.

State's Witness Robert B. Patterson, a Dallas police officer, testified at the punishment hearing that appellant's reputation was bad. He was then shown the photographs in question and identified them as being photographs of the appellant taken during a downtown parade in Dallas. These exhibits show the appellant walking in front of the parade and show him to be completely nude. The witness testified that he was present at the parade and saw the appellant at the time.

The state contends the exhibits were admissible at the punishment stage of the trial to show character. Sec Article 37.07, Sec. 3(a), Vernon's Ann.C.C.P.

This court has consistently held that specific acts of misconduct to evidence a person's bad character may not be used except where they are in the form of conviction for other crimes. e.g. Webber v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 472 S.W.2d 136. There is no evidence in the record that appellant was convicted of an offense from his performance in the parade. Even if he had been charged but not yet convicted with such an offense, evidence that such charge had been filed could not properly be admitted.

Webber v. State, supra; Garcia v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 454 S.W.2d 400.

Witnesses testifying as to the good reputation of a defendant may be asked on cross-examination whether they have heard of acts of misconduct on the part of the accused for the purpose of testing the credibility of their testimony. But even here, the prosecution may not show any personal knowledge the witness has about specific acts or conduct of the defendant. ¹ e.g. Billingsley v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 473 S.W.2d 501. Surely, the prosecution should not be allowed to go further in direct examination of the state's own character witnesses than is permitted on cross-examination of a character witness for the defense.

In Leverett v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 455 S.W.2d 312, the defendant was convicted for assault to murder with malice and made application for probation. She testified in her own behalf and on cross-examination the state introduced, over objection, two letters. One she had written to her mother and another she had written to her brother and both showed specific bad character traits. This court held that the letters were of such a harmful nature and prejudicial to the defendant's rights that their discrediting effect could not be cured by limiting instruction in the court's charge and state at page 315:

'The matters related in the two letters which were written while appellant was confined in a mental ward of a state institution at Rusk four months before the alleged offense occurred were immaterial, collateral to and wholly disassociated with this offense. While testifying, the appellant admitted going to the house and shooting into the door, but she denied that she had any intent to harm or kill Howard Leverett. The letters were of such a nature that they would be reasonably calculated to prejudice appellant's rights before the jury in considering her credibility as a witness, The punishment to be assessed, and her application for probation, and they deprived her of a fair and impartial trial. 1 Branch 2d 198, Sec. 187; Warrick v. State, 119 Tex.Cr.R. 637, 45 S.W.2d 976; Ramirez v. State, 159 Tex.Cr.R. 410, 264 S.W.2d 99; Mauldin v. State, 165 Tex.Cr.R. 405, 308 S.W.2d 36; Chatterfield v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 436 S.W.2d 146.' (Emphasis supplied.)

In Lewellen v. State, 172 Tex.Cr.R. 622, 361 S.W.2d 880, the defendant was convicted of driving a motor vehicle on a public highway while intoxicated. A character witness for the defendant was asked on cross-examination if he did not know that the defendant had been convicted for being drunk in a public place just a week before he was charged with the offense for which he was on trial. This court, in reversing the conviction, stated:

'It is error to ask a witness if he knows of specific acts of misconduct of accused. The state can only ask if he had heard of a specific act of misconduct. Pitcock v. State, 168 Tex.Cr.R. 204, 324 S.W.2d 855; Davis v. State, 160 Tex.Cr.R. 138, 268 S.W.2d 152; Wiley v State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 370, 220 S.W.2d 172; Wharton v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 326, 248 S.W.2d 739.'

In Houghton v. State, 171 Tex.Cr.R. 91, 345 S.W.2d 535, character witnesses were cross-examined over appellant's objection concerning specific acts of misconduct and of their knowledge both concerning drinking habits and about specific occasions when such witnesses had drunk whiskey with the defendant. In reversing the conviction this court stated:

'This court has emphatically stated that a defendant in any criminal case shall not be tried before a jury for collateral matters, for the reason that it is against policy as well as being prejudicial. Furthermore, the witnesses are usually not in position to deny the truthfulness of charges included in the questions.

'In Simons v. State, 139 Tex.Cr.R. 212, 139 S.W.2d 119, 120, we said: '. . . when a defendant places in issue his reputation it does not bring before the jury Any other matter for consideration, and the State can present only those things which deny the reputation. . . . The appellant is not required to bring forward every act and conduct of his life to be tried before the jury. It is sufficient, and he has met the requirements of the law, if he presents his reputation.'

'In Adaire v. State, 119 Tex.Cr.R. 381, 45 S.W.2d 984, 986, this court, speaking through Judge Christian, stated: '. . . it is not permissible, on cross-examination of a witness to the good character of the accused, to show by the witness what he knows individually about specific or particular acts of misconduct on the part of the accused. . . .'

'Reference is also made, here, to the cases of Shipley v. State, 131 Tex.Cr.R. 527, 100 S.W.2d 704, and Adams v. State, 158 Tex.Cr.R. 306, 255 S.W.2d 513, 515. In the latter case, Woodley, judge, this court said: 'It is not . . . permissible to show by the witness what he knows individually about specific acts of misconduct of the defendant; the inquiry being limited to whether or not the witness may have heard of such unlawful act.'

In Parrish v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 252, 290 S.W.2d 245, this court reversed a murder conviction wherein a character witness was asked if he knew that on or about a specific date the defendant was arrested in Tennessee for investigation of a burglary in Ohio or Kentucky. Therein this court stated:

'We think the asking of the question in the form in which it was propounded constituted reversible error.

'The fact that the appellant had placed his general reputation in issue did not authorize the state, in combatting proof of good reputation, to show specific acts of misconduct on his part. Goss v. State, 104 Tex.Cr.R. 456, 284 S.W. 578; Adaire v. State, 119 Tex.Cr.R. 381, 45 S.W.2d 984; Edwards v. State, 127 Tex.Cr.R. 386, 77 S.W.2d 241.

'It has been the uniform holding of this Court that a character witness to the good reputation of the accused, for the purpose of testing his knowledge of the reputation, may be asked, on cross-examination, if he has heard of specific acts of misconduct on the part of the accused, but may not be asked if he knows of such specific acts of misconduct. Prater v. State, 104 Tex.Cr.R. 669, 284 S.W. 965; McNaulty v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 317, 135 S.W.2d 987; Wharton v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 326, 248 S.W.2d 739; and Davis v. State, 160 Tex.Cr.R. 138, 268 S.W.2d 152.

'The vice in the form of the question which inquires of the witness as to whether he knows of specific acts of misconduct is that it asserts as a fact that the accused has committed the acts which the state is...