Jones v. State
| Decision Date | 24 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2346,2346 |
| Parties | DARRICK MAURICE JONES v. STATE OF MARYLAND |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Circuit Court for Dorchester County
UNREPORTED
Meredith,* Berger, Nazarian, JJ.
Opinion by Meredith, J.
*Meredith, Timothy E., J., now retired, participated in the hearing of this case while an active member of this Court, and after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and the preparation of this opinion.
*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.
Darrick Jones, appellant, asserts that the Circuit Court for Dorchester County erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence of drugs discovered during a traffic stop that took place on May 2, 2018. After the circuit court denied the motion, Jones pled not guilty on an agreed statement of facts and was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. He now asks this Court: "Did the [circuit] court err by denying [his] motion to suppress?" We shall affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Dorchester County.
The Court of Appeals noted in Pacheco v. State, 465 Md. 311, 320 (2019):
In 2014, the General Assembly decriminalized possession of less than ten grams of marijuana. Robinson v. State, 451 Md. 94, 152 A.3d 661 (2017). The legislature made such possession a "civil offense" and mandated that a "police officer shall issue a citation to a person who the police officer has probable cause to believe has committed [that civil offense]." Id. at 97, 115, 152 A.3d 661 (citations omitted).
Since the time the General Assembly decriminalized possession of less than ten grams of marijuana, the Maryland Court of Appeals has decided several cases that provide guidance with respect to the legal significance of a police officer's detection of the odor of marijuana during a traffic stop. Particularly instructive are Lewis v. State, 470 Md. 1 (2020); Pacheco v. State, 465 Md. 311 (2019); and Norman v. State, 452 Md. 373 (2017). Because of the developing caselaw since 2014 in this area of the law, some of the arguments that have been made by prosecutors in opposing motions to suppress evidence discovered as a result of a search conducted in reliance upon the odor of marijuana have been held ineffective by our State's highest court. See, e.g., Lewis and Pacheco.
At the suppression hearing in Jones's case, the State's principal argument was:
What the State is saying is you had a lawful traffic stop followed by the odor of raw marijuana emanating from the vehicle. The State believes that gives the police the right to search both the vehicle and that sole driver of the car. And when they did that, they discovered the CDS [on his person], they placed him into custody and thereafter [additional] CDS was found at the police station.
(Emphasis added.)
This rationale is inconsistent with the holding in Lewis, 470 Md. at 10, where the Court of Appeals held "that the odor of marijuana, without more, does not provide law enforcement officers with the requisite probable cause to arrest and perform a warrantless search of that person incident to the arrest." The Lewis Court reiterated, id. at 27: "Consistent with our decision in Pacheco, we hold here that the mere odor of marijuana emanating from a person, without more, does not provide the police with probable cause to support an arrest and a full-scale search of the arrestee incident thereto."
In Jones's case, the suppression judge adopted a somewhat different rationale for denying the motion to suppress, stating:
He's pulled over. The officer smells the odor of raw marijuana from the car. The officer conducts the pat-down, and of course that led to the other things. But it seems to me there was --- there is a reasonably articulable suspicion that some sort of wrongdoing was afoot. The officer acted reasonably under the circumstances[;] therefore, the motion to suppress is denied.
But the suppression court's reliance upon "a reasonably articulable suspicion that some sort of wrongdoing was afoot" is inconsistent with the statement in Norman, 452 Md. at 411, "reaffirm[ing] the basic principle that, for a law enforcement officer tofrisk, i.e., pat down, an individual, there must be reasonable articulable suspicion that the individual is armed and dangerous, even where a law enforcement officer detects the odor of marijuana emanating from a vehicle." (Emphasis added.) The suppression judge did not find a reasonable articulable suspicion that Jones was "armed and dangerous," and the police officer's testimony did not identify anything peculiar about Jones other than a strong odor of marijuana. The officer explained that the pat down of this driver who smelled of marijuana was based upon the officer's normal routine and his "training, knowledge and experience I am familiar with people that carry a large amount of CDS to typically carry weapons."
Nevertheless, there was an argument that the State did not articulate at the suppression hearing that clearly supported the search of Jones's person after he was stopped for driving without a license. The State did raise this argument in its brief in this Court, and further asserted:
[G]enerally, "an appellee is entitled to assert any ground adequately shown by the record for upholding the trial court's decision, even if the ground was not raised in the trial court, and that, if legally correct, the trial court's decision will be affirmed on such alternative ground." Unger v. State, 427 Md. 383, 406 (2012).
Holdings similar to this quote from Unger are found in Elliott v. State, 417 Md. 413, 435 (2010) () (quoting Robeson v. State, 285 Md. 498, 502 (1979)); and Barrett v. State, 234 Md. App. 653, 665 (2017)("Although appellant is correct that the search incident to arrest argument was not raised below, that does not preclude this Court from considering the issue.").
It is apparent from the record that, at the time the police stopped Jones's vehicle, he was driving on a suspended or revoked license. And he readily admitted that he did not have a license. As a consequence of that, the officers had probable cause to arrest Jones for committing a misdemeanor in the presence of the officers.
Maryland Code (1977, 2012 Repl. Vol.), Transportation Article ("Trans.") § 26-202(a)(3)(iv) provides:
A police officer may arrest without a warrant a person for a violation of the Maryland Vehicle Law, including any rule or regulations adopted under it, or for a violation of any traffic law or ordinance of any local authority of this State, if . . . [t]he officer has probable cause to believe that the person has committed the violation, and the violation is any of the following offenses: . . . [d]riving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while the driver's license or privilege to drive is suspended or revoked[.]
(Emphasis added.)
Having probable cause to arrest Jones for committing a misdemeanor in their presence gave the officers the right to conduct a warrantless search of Jones's person. See Lewis, 470 Md. at 20 ( ).
On that basis, we will uphold the denial of the motion to suppress the CDS discovered on Jones's person, and we shall affirm the conviction.
Jones argues that the suppression court "should have granted [the] motion to suppress because all of the evidence in this case was the fruit of an unlawful Terry frisk" (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)) and "also the fruit of an unlawful search." The following facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the State as the prevailing party, were adduced at the hearing on Jones's motion to suppress.
The sole witness at the hearing was Detective Stephen Hackett, a narcotics detective for the Cambridge Police Department and a member of the Dorchester County Narcotics Task Force. Det. Hackett testified that, on the afternoon of May 2, 2018, he and Deputy McDaniel, of the Dorchester County Sheriff's Office, were conducting a routine patrol in the 600 block of Greenwood Street in Cambridge when they observed Jones operating a motor vehicle. Det. Hackett testified that this observation was "significant" because "Deputy McDaniel and myself [were] familiar with [Jones] previously not possessing a valid license." When Jones then parked his vehicle at an apartment complex in the 500 block of Greenwood Avenue, Det. Hackett and Dep. McDaniel performed a "license check" of Jones through the Dorchester County Sheriff's Office dispatch, and confirmed that Jones's license to drive was "deemed to be suspended and revoked currently."
Det. Hackett and Dep. McDaniel then observed Jones get back into the car and drive on public streets. They effected a traffic stop of Jones in the 400 block of Oakley Street. Det. Hackett asked Jones if he had a valid driver's license, and Jones responded that he did not. Det. Hackett also testified that, "[u]pon immediate contact with [Jones], I smelled a strong odor of raw marijuana coming from inside the vehicle." The following colloquy provides further details regarding the traffic stop:
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