Jones v. Stephens
| Decision Date | 13 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 4:05-CV-638-Y (death-penalty case) |
| Citation | 157 F.Supp.3d 623 |
| Parties | Quintin Phillippe Jones, Petitioner, v. William Stephens, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Lydia M.V. Brandt, Brandt Law Firm, Richardson, TX, Michael Mowla, Michael Mowla PLLC, Cedar Hill, TX, for Petitioner.
Jeremy C. Greenwell, Office of the Texas Attorney General, Austin, TX, for Respondent.
Quintin Phillippe Jones petitions for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
, contending that his state conviction and death sentence are unconstitutional. The Court previously dismissed the application as time-barred but later reversed its decision based upon a change in the law. See
Holland v. Florida , 560 U.S. 631, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010). Having reviewed the parties' arguments and the complete record, the Court now denies the petition and dismisses this action with prejudice.
The victim in this death-penalty case was Quintin Phillippe Jones's eighty-three-year-old great aunt, Berthena Bryant, who was beaten to death with a baseball bat in her home on September 11, 1999. After speaking to neighbors, the police sought Jones for questioning about a man named Ricky Roosa, whom Jones had previously recruited to do yard work for Bryant. The police set up surveillance on the home of Jones's girlfriend, Paula Freeman. Jones was arrested on outstanding traffic warrants as he attempted to flee the home in a car driven by Freeman. While in police custody, Jones confessed to Detective Ann Gates that his alternate personality, “James,” had murdered Bryant (the “Gates statement”). Nine days later, while still in custody and without a lawyer, Jones made another confession to Texas Ranger Lane Akin that he and Roosa had murdered two men during a drug deal six months earlier (the “Akin statement”).
The Gates statement was admitted at trial, along with testimony describing Jones's whereabouts on the night of the murder, DNA evidence, and testimony that Jones had called Bryant's sister from jail and apologized for the murder. The prosecution (“the State”) relied upon the Akin statement at sentencing, along with other evidence showing Jones's participation in the double murder, his juvenile criminal history, his gang membership, jail disciplinary infractions, and a diagnosis of psychopathic personality disorder
. The defensive theory was that “James,” not Jones, participated in the murder. The defense offered testimony that Jones had suffered a dysfunctional childhood and severe childhood abuse, which caused him to develop the alternate personality, drug and alcohol addiction, and severe self-injuring behavior. The jury convicted Jones and sentenced him to death. (3 CR 408.)1
Jones pursued an appeal through new counsel. (3 CR 459). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (“CCA”) affirmed the conviction. Jones v. State , 119 S.W.3d 766 (Tex.Crim.App.2003)
. The Supreme Court declined review. Jones v. Texas , 542 U.S. 905, 124 S.Ct. 2836, 159 L.Ed.2d 270 (2004).
Attorney Wes Ball was appointed to file Jones's state application for habeas-corpus relief, but he failed to do so. The CCA relieved Ball, appointed Jack Strickland as substitute counsel, and set a new due date for the application. Ex parte Jones , No. (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 3, 2003) (unpublished order). Strickland filed the application in 2004. (SHR 2.) Strickland filed the application thirty days late, but the CCA accepted it after finding good cause. (1 SHR Supp. 2.) The CCA denied habeas relief in 2005. Ex parte Jones , No.,299–01, 2005 WL 2220030 (Tex.Crim.App. Sept. 14, 2005)
.
Jack Strickland was appointed as federal habeas counsel. (Doc. 7.)2 Strickland filed the federal petition in 2006, raising two grounds for relief, but the Court dismissed it as time-barred on the Respondent's unanswered motion to dismiss. (Doc. 28.) Strickland did not appeal the dismissal. After receiving communication from Jones that he did not wish to abandon the appeal, the Court appointed Lydia Brandt as substitute counsel in 2008. (Doc. 31.) The Court vacated the judgment of dismissal, and Ms. Brandt filed a response to the motion to dismiss. (Docs. 43, 55.) The Court again found the petition time-barred, however. (Doc. 59.)
Jones appealed, and the appellate court remanded the case for consideration in the first instance of the Supreme Court opinion in Holland
. Jones v. Thaler , 383 Fed.Appx. 380 (5th Cir.2010). On remand, the Court held for a third time that equitable tolling was not appropriate even under the less stringent Holland standard. Jones v. Stephens , No. 4:05–CV–638–Y, 2013 WL 4223968 (N.D.Tex. Aug. 15, 2013). (Doc. 101.)
In a post-judgment motion, however, Jones asserted for the first time that the magistrate judge's order appointing Jack Strickland contained provisions requiring that the petition be timely filed and that the petition demonstrate its timeliness under the statute. (Doc. 103.) After receiving supplemental briefing, the Court concluded that the provisions in the appointment order dictated a different result in the equitable-tolling analysis. The Court vacated the dismissal order and reopened the case. Jones v. Stephens , 998 F.Supp.2d 529 (N.D.Tex.2014)
. (Docs. 106, 113.)
The Court ordered the parties to file amended briefing, as briefing on the substantive issues was nearly eight years old. Jones moved for a continuance, which the Court granted in part, and moved for funding, which the Court denied. The amended petition was filed June 22, 2014, the amended answer was filed November 7, 2014, and Jones's reply was filed February 3, 2015.
Jones raises the following claims for relief:
by failing to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence.
3. Trial counsel were ineffective by failing to investigate and develop “condition-of-the-mind” evidence.
4. Trial counsel were ineffective for failing to seek timely and relevant mental evaluations regarding the reliability of Jones's confession, his competency to stand trial, his criminal responsibility for capital murder, and his moral culpability and the appropriate punishment.
5. The trial court violated the Fifth Amendment by admitting the Akin statement at sentencing.
Claims 1 and 5 were exhausted in state court. Claims 2, 3 and 4, as well as an unnumbered subclaim in claim 1, are presented for the first time in this Court. The amended petition is subject to the standards set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(“AEDPA”),3 which are addressed where appropriate below.
Jones contends that the trial court violated the Sixth Amendment by failing to timely appoint counsel after his arrest. The convicting state court ruled that this claim was barred on habeas review because Jones did not complain about the timeliness of counsel's appointment at trial and or on direct appeal. In the alternative, the state court held that the claim lacked merit because: (1) during the time in which Jones was without counsel, formal adversary judicial proceedings had not been initiated, (2) Jones knowingly waived his rights and did not request counsel, and (3) Jones failed to show prejudice. (2 SHR Supp. 38-42). Based on the findings of the convicting court and its own review, the CCA denied habeas relief.
Cardenas v. Dretke , 405 F.3d 244, 249 (5th Cir.2005) ; Rowell v. Dretke , 398 F.3d 370, 375 (5th Cir.2005). Likewise, the Texas “Gardner rule,” which bars habeas review of record-based claims that were not raised on direct appeal, is also an adequate and independent bar to federal review. See
Busby v. Dretke , 359 F.3d 708, 719 (5th Cir.2004) ; Ex parte Gardner , 959 S.W.2d 189, 199 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (op. on reh'g). Furthermore, when a state court rules that a claim is procedurally barred, the fact that the court, as here, alternatively reached the merits of the claim does not vitiate the independent and adequate state procedural bar. See
Cotton v. Cockrell , 343 F.3d 746, 754 (5th Cir.2003).
Jones does not dispute that claim 1 was not raised in the trial court or on direct appeal. He makes no argument to avoid a procedural bar based on Coleman
. (Doc. 149, p. 5-32). Claim 1 is procedurally barred. See
determination
Respondent contends, in the alternative, that the state court's denial of the claim on the merits was not unreasonable. Based on the following discussion, the Court agrees.
A claim adjudicated on the merits in state court may not be relitigated in federal habeas court unless it (1) is “contrary to” federal law then clearly established in the holdings of the Supreme Court or “involved an unreasonable application of” such law, or (2) “is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts” in light of the record before the state court. See § 2254(d)
; Harrington v. Richter , 562 U.S. 86, 100, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d...
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