Jones v. Thomas

• Decision Date: 31 March 1909
• Citation: 218 Mo. 508,117 S.W. 1177
• Parties: JONES v. THOMAS et al.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

117 S.W. 1177

218 Mo. 508

JONES v. THOMAS et al.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

March 31, 1909.

1. DEEDS (§ 196)—SUIT TO SET ASIDE—MENTAL INCAPACITY—UNDUE INFLUENCE—BURDEN OF PROOF.

Where a confidential relation existed between grantor and grantee, the burden of proving that grantor's mental capacity to make a deed, and that the deed was his free act, uninfluenced by any improper conduct, rested on grantee.

2. DEEDS (§ 72)—SUIT TO SET ASIDE—CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONS.

To prove confidential relations between a father and son so as to require the son obtaining a deed from the father to show that the father possessed mental capacity to make a deed, and that it was made by his free act, it must appear that the son had charge and control of his father, and that he administered to his health, wants, and necessities, or that he had charge of and conducted his business, or that the father actually reposed trust and confidence in his son, in consequence of the relations existing between them.

3. DEEDS (§ 68)—MENTAL CAPACITY OF GRANTOR.

One has the mental capacity to execute a deed as a gift to a child in consideration of love and affection, where he has the intelligence to understand his ordinary business and what disposition he is making of his property, though, to have sufficient capacity to execute a deed for a valuable consideration, one must possess sufficient mental strength to judge of values, and successfully oppose fraud and undue influence whenever brought to bear on him in the negotiations for a contract.

4. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1009)—FINDINGS— REVIEW.

The Supreme Court, in reviewing an equity case, will defer largely to the findings of the trial court on all issues of fact, and will not disturb a judgment of the trial court on the ground that the findings are against the weight of the evidence.

5. DEEDS (§ 211) — MENTAL CAPACITY OF GRANTOR—EVIDENCE.

Evidence held to justify a finding that a grantor possessed sufficient mental capacity to execute a deed of gift to a child.

6. EVIDENCE (§ 568)—OPINION EVIDENCE— EFFECT—MENTAL CAPACITY OF GRANTOR.

Witnesses bearing close family, social, or business relations to a grantor possess the most favorable opportunity for observing and knowing his mental condition, and their testimony as to his mental condition is entitled to great weight.

7. DEEDS (§ 196) — MENTAL CAPACITY OF GRANTOR — PRESUMPTIONS — BURDEN OF PROOF.

The law presumes that a grantor was of sound mind at the time he made the deed, and the burden of disproving that fact rests on the one asserting the contrary.

8. DEEDS (§ 211)—UNDUE INFLUENCE—EVIDENCE.

Evidence held to justify a finding that a deed was not procured by the undue influence of the grantee.

9. DEEDS (§ 203)—SUIT TO SET ASIDE—UNDUE INFLUENCE—EVIDENCE.

In a suit by an heir to set aside his ancestor's deed to another heir on the ground of

mental incapacity and undue influence, declarations of the ancestor, made prior to the execution of the deed, and extending back several years, that he intended to give to the grantee the land conveyed to him were admissible to show a definite purpose of the ancestor to convey the property to the grantee.

10. DEEDS (§ 203)—SUIT TO SET ASIDE—MENTAL INCAPACITY — EVIDENCE — ADMISSIBILITY.

In a suit by an heir to set aside a deed of his ancestor to another heir on the ground of mental incapacity, declarations of the ancestor showing improper acts on the part of the grantee and of members of his family are admissible to show the mental condition of the ancestor and the state of his affections.

11. DEEDS (§ 203)—SUIT TO SET ASIDE—UNDUE INFLUENCE—EVIDENCE—ADMISSIBILITY.

In a suit by an heir to set aside a deed of his ancestor to another heir, declarations of the ancestor showing improper acts on the part of the grantee and of members of his family are inadmissible to establish undue influence.

12. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 837)—REVIEW— RENDITION OF PROPER JUDGMENT.

The court, on appeal in an equity case, may admit and consider all testimony preserved in the record which was improperly excluded by the trial court, and render such judgment as the court may deem proper under the pleadings and evidence.

13. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1056)—HARMLESS ERROR — ERRONEOUS EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE.

Where the Supreme Court, on appeal in an equity case, could not disturb the findings of the chancellor, though it considered testimony improperly excluded by the chancellor, the error in excluding the evidence was not ground for reversal.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; Jesse A. McDonald, Judge.

Action by Mary Jones against Alma Thomas and another. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Mary Jones, the plaintiff, a daughter of William O. Thomas, deceased, brought this suit in the circuit court of the city of St. Louis to set aside two deeds conveying certain real estate, situated in said city, to his two sons, Thomas and Alma Thomas, executed March 16, 1901. A trial was had before the court, which resulted in a finding of facts and a rendition of judgment in favor of the defendants. The court having refused to grant a new trial, the plaintiff duly appealed the cause to this court. The trial consumed several days, during which time many witnesses were introduced and examined by both plaintiff and defendants. Their testimony covers more than 550 printed pages. There are no close or complicated legal propositions involved in the case, but it turns almost exclusively upon questions of fact; and, as the testimony introduced by the respective parties is so sharply contradictory, it will require a somewhat extensive statement of the substance thereof in order that we may properly determine with which party the preponderance of the evidence abides. Counsel for both plaintiff and defendants have presented a most excellent abstract of the record, and a statement of their respective theories of the case, which greatly shortens and facilitates the work of this court; and, as there is no material difference in the substance of the two, we will copy largely from both in making up this statement, and thereby present a full statement of the substance of the testimony which we are requested to review.

William O. Thomas, the father of plaintiff and defendants, was in his eighty-second year at the time he executed the deeds in question, which was on March 16, 1901. His wife, his third, was accidently killed in the month of September, 1899, and his next of kin were the plaintiff and defendants, and William, David, John Arthur, Lillie, and Daisy, children of a deceased son, John Thomas. His property consisted chiefly of a tract of land fronting on Manchester avenue, in Cheltenham, a subdivision of the city of St. Louis, upon which was located his residence and several other small buildings, which he rented to various tenants for $7 or $8 a month, aggregating about $160 per month. On March 16, 1901, William O. Thomas executed the deeds before mentioned to his sons, Alma and Thomas. On the 28th of the same month he executed. his will, wherein he devised part of his remaining property to plaintiff for life, with remainder to her children, a small tract to the bishop of his church, and all of the remainder to his grandchildren above named. The will also contained a residuary clause, making his children and grandchildren residuary legatees, the grandchildren to take per stirpes. William O. Thomas departed this life September 6, 1901, and this suit was instituted July 3, 1903.

The plaintiff contends that her father was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the deeds in question, and that he was incapable of understanding or knowing what he was doing; also that defendants, knowing their father was of weak mind and easily influenced, conspired together and through fraud and undue influence induced him to make the conveyances, to the injury and loss to plaintiff and the other heirs of said William O. Thomas, to a large portion of his estate. The defense is a general denial, and the questions of fact presented are: First. Was William O. Thomas of unsound mind on March 16, 1901, at the time of the execution and delivery of said deeds? Second. Was the execution of the deeds the result of fraud and undue influence perpetrated upon him by the defendants? As before stated, the evidence disclosed by this record tending to prove and disprove those issues comes from the mouths of many witnesses, and is voluminous and conflicting, and is substantially as hereinafter stated, as appears from appellant's abstract and the statements of the parties. At that time William O. Thomas owned the following lots of land in the city of St. Louis, of the values stated, to wit: (a) Lot fronting 179 feet on north side Manchester avenue, city block 4007, value $8,675 (deeded to Alma Thomas March 16, 1901). (b) Lot fronting 632 feet 6 inches on north side Manchester avenue, city block 4007 (deeded to Thomas Thomas March 16, 1901), value $12,496. The value of these lots is $21,600, exclusive of the buildings thereon, which are worth $10,700. (c) House No. 5729 Manchester avenue, lot 47 by 100 feet (devised to Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ or Latter Day Saints), value $2,350. (d) House No. 5725 Manchester avenue, lot 18 by 100 feet, value $1,500 (devised to Lillie Mason, his granddaughter). (e) House No. 5723 Manchester avenue, lot 27 by 100 feet, value $1,500 (devised to Arthur Thomas, his grandson). (f) House No. 5719 Manchester avenue, lot 30 feet 9 inches by 100 feet, value $4,500 (devised to John Thomas, his grandson). (g) Houses Nos. 5713 and 5715 Manchester avenue, lot 54 by 100, value $4,700 (devised to Daisy Thomas, his granddaughter). (h) House in rear of property devised to Daisy Thomas, lots 16 and 166, value ____ (devised to William Thomas, his grandson). (i) House in rear of property devised to Daisy Thomas, lot 30 by 166 feet, value ____ (devised to David Thomas, his grandson). (j) Lots 5 and 6 in Crabster's ...